The Life of Albert Gallatin

by Henry Adams

“12th July, Monday.—Head-wind.... Entered Gulf of Finland.”

Here end Mr. Gallatin’s memoranda of his voyage, and here begins the history of his long diplomatic career. He arrived at St. Petersburg on the 21st July, and set to work with his colleagues to carry out the purposes of the mission.

As now completed, the American commission appointed to negotiate for peace under the mediation of Russia consisted of Mr. Gallatin, Mr. J. Q. Adams, then our minister at St. Petersburg, and Mr. James A. Bayard. For the first time Gallatin was now associated in public business with J. Q. Adams, and by a curious combination of circumstances this association was destined to last during all the remainder of Mr. Gallatin’s public life. What each of these men thought of the other will be seen in the course of the story, for neither of them had anything to conceal. Cast as they were in two absolutely different moulds, it was not in the nature of things that they should ever stand in such close and affectionate intimacy as had existed between Mr. Gallatin and the two Presidents of his own choice, especially since the Virginia triumvirate was even more remarkable for the private than for the public relations of its members, and in this respect stands without a parallel in our history. Although there was little in common between the New England temperament of Mr. Adams and the Virginia geniality of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison; although Mr. Adams, as the younger man and at first the inferior in rank and influence, could under no circumstances stand to Mr. Gallatin in the same light as his older and more confidential friends; although the previous history of both seemed little calculated to inspire confidence or good will in either; there was nevertheless a curious parallelism in the lives and characters of the two men, which, notwithstanding every jar, compelled them to move side by side and to agree in policy and opinion even while persuading themselves that their aims and methods were radically divergent. Mr. Adams was about six years the junior. When young Gallatin took his degree at the College of Geneva in May, 1779, young Adams was arriving with his father at Paris to begin his education as diplomate and scholar in the centre of all that was then most cultivated and stimulating in the world. While Gallatin was wandering with Serre among the Maine woods, Adams was wandering between Paris and St. Petersburg, picking up his education as he went. Had Gallatin remained two years longer at Harvard College, he would have met Adams there. As they grew older they were in opposing ranks as public men. For Gallatin’s early political theories Adams felt little respect, and for his eminent share in expelling the Federalists from office the son of the expelled President could hardly have been grateful. A few years, however, brought them together. As Senator the force of circumstances compelled Mr. Adams to support the Administration and the measures of Mr. Jefferson for the same reasons which compelled Mr. Gallatin to support those measures which, abstractly considered, were entirely inconsistent with his past history and his early convictions. In 1813 there was no very decided opinion to divide them. They worked cordially together at St. Petersburg and at Ghent. During nearly twelve years they continued to work together in the management of our foreign relations. The irruption of President Jackson and his political following threw them both out of public life; and when Mr. Adams returned to it as member of Congress, Mr. Gallatin remained in retirement. Both were then non-partisan; both held very strong convictions in regard to the duties and the short-comings of the day; both died near the same time, the last relics of the early statesmanship of the republic.

So far as his colleagues in the mission to St. Petersburg were concerned, although Mr. Adams had been and Mr. Bayard still was a moderate Federalist, Gallatin found no difficulties in the way of harmonious action; but almost from the first moment it became evident that the negotiation itself was destined never to take place. The English government, though somewhat embarrassed by Russia’s offer to mediate, and yet more by the quick action of President Madison in sending commissioners under that offer, was clear in its determination not to allow Russia or any other nation to interpose in what it chose to consider a domestic quarrel. The questions involved were questions of neutral rights, and on that ground the position of the Baltic powers had never been satisfactory to England; accordingly, England had met the invitation of Russia, if not with a positive refusal, certainly with decided coldness. Instead of finding everything prepared for negotiation, Mr. Gallatin found on his arrival that not a single step had yet been taken by England beyond the communication of a note which discouraged any arbitration whatever. Unfortunately, too, there were complications beneath the surface; complications with which the American commissioners were not familiar, and which no agency of theirs could remove. The Emperor was not at St. Petersburg; he was with his army, fighting Napoleon. He had left Count Romanzoff behind him at St. Petersburg, and was accompanied by Count Nesselrode. Count Romanzoff had nominal charge of foreign affairs; he held strong opinions on the subject of neutral and commercial rights; he was regarded as not peculiarly friendly to England; and he was the author or instigator of the Emperor’s offer of mediation. On him alone in the imperial court could the American commissioners rely. On the other hand, every immediate interest dictated to the Emperor the policy of close friendship with England. This policy was apparently represented by Count Nesselrode, and Count Nesselrode now had every advantage in impressing it upon the Emperor. The British government before the arrival of the American commissioners would have preferred that Alexander should quietly abandon his scheme of mediation and that all discussion of the subject should be dropped. The object of Romanzoff was to press the mediation in order to secure in the United States a balance against the overpowering dominion of England on the ocean.

The sudden arrival of the American commissioners was an event which no one expected or wished. Upon Count Romanzoff, already tottering, it brought a new strain, which appears to have been more than he could meet; yet, although his influence was nearly at an end, he still caused no little irritation to the British government before his fall, and the arrival of Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard added greatly to this embarrassment. Lord Castlereagh was obliged to abandon the attempt to smother the Emperor’s mediation, and to take a more decided tone.

Nothing could well be more unpleasant than the position of Mr. Gallatin and his colleagues at St. Petersburg. To see plainly that they were not wanted was in itself mortifying, but to feel that they were gravely embarrassing their only real friend was painful. Yet it was impossible to get away; Count Romanzoff was not disposed to retreat from the ground he had taken; without waiting to be pressed,—indeed, immediately on hearing of the arrival of the commissioners at Gottenburg,—he wrote to the Emperor suggesting a renewal of the offer of mediation to England. He did all in his power to make the envoys comfortable in their unpleasant situation, and he set himself to study their case with the aid of a masterly little memoir which Mr. Gallatin prepared at his request.

On the 10th of August the Emperor’s reply was communicated to the envoys, and it authorized Romanzoff not only to renew the offer of mediation, but to send it direct to London without further advice from headquarters. On the 24th, the Count summoned Mr. Gallatin and his two colleagues to listen to the reading of his despatches, by which the offer was to be renewed; and at Mr. Gallatin’s suggestion two slight alterations were made in the draft.

The envoys had already waited more than a month at St. Petersburg, and the summer was gone without the accomplishment of a single object. Mr. Gallatin ought soon to be on his way home, if he had any idea of resuming his post at the Treasury, but to escape was now out of the question, while any effective action was even more hopeless. The envoys discussed the subject from every point of view, but their means were slender enough and the power of England was omnipotent about them. For their purposes it was essential to open some private communication with the Emperor Alexander at headquarters; General Moreau offered himself for this service, and Mr. Gallatin wrote to him at considerable length on the subject.[119] To ascertain directly the views and intentions of the British government was more important, and here Mr. Gallatin was even more fortunate. On his arrival at Gottenburg he had written to his old acquaintance Alexander Baring, announcing his progress towards St. Petersburg, and in this letter he had invited communication of intelligence connected with the mission. Mr. Baring replied on the 22d July, and his letter reached St. Petersburg about the middle of August; it was written with the knowledge and advice of Lord Castlereagh, and showed in every line the embarrassment caused by the Russian offer of mediation. In order to withdraw questions of blockade, contraband, and right of search from the mediation of a Baltic power, the British government was driven to assume the position that this was “a sort of family quarrel, where foreign interference can only do harm and irritate at any time, but more especially in the present state of Europe, when attempts would be made to make a tool of America in a manner which I am sure neither you nor your colleagues would sanction. These, I have good reason to know, are pretty nearly the sentiments of government here on the question of place of negotiation and foreign mediation, and, before this reaches you, you will have been informed that this mediation has been refused, with expressions of our desire to treat separately and directly here, or, if more agreeable to you, at Gottenburg.”

This was clumsy enough on the part of the British ministry, whose parental interest in protecting the innocence of America from contact with the sinfulness of Russia was not calculated to effect its avowed object, and still less to please the Emperor and his continental allies, who were here plainly charged with intending to make a tool of the United States; but at this time English diplomacy cultivated very few of the arts and none at all of the graces; there is hardly an important state paper in the whole correspondence between England and America from 1806 to 1815, which, if addressed to the United States government to-day, would not lead to blows. The letter of Mr. Baring, kindly meant and highly useful as it was, had all the characteristics of the English Foreign Office, and in the hands of an indiscreet man would have done more harm than good; Mr. Gallatin’s temper, however, was not irritable; he did not even show the letter itself to Count Romanzoff, and he answered Mr. Baring without a trace of sarcasm or irony. His reply is, indeed, a model of dignified and persuasive address, brief, straightforward, and comprehensive,[120] and the passage in which he refers to his own sacrifice throws some light on the nature of his private feelings: “I would not have given up my political existence and separated myself from my family unless I had believed an arrangement practicable and that I might be of some utility in effecting it.”

The situation was now more than ever perplexing. On the one hand, not only Mr. Baring but the British government maintained that the mediation had been refused and that direct negotiation had been offered in its place; on the other hand, Count Romanzoff denied that the mediation had been refused, and in a manner obliged the three envoys to wait the result of another application. As a matter of fact, England had made as yet no offer of direct negotiation; had this offer been made when it was said to have been determined upon, in June, and then transmitted to America, the situation would have been simple; but, as matters now stood, the American envoys were fully justified in thinking that the British government had no other purpose than to mislead them, and their impatience naturally increased.