22d January, 1801.
... As to politics, you may suppose that being all thrown together in a few boarding-houses, without hardly any other society than ourselves, we are not likely to be either very moderate politicians or to think of anything but politics. A few, indeed, drink, and some gamble, but the majority drink naught but politics, and by not mixing with men of different or more moderate sentiments, they inflame one another. On that account, principally, I see some danger in the fate of the election which I had not before contemplated. I do not know precisely what are the plans of the New England and other violent Federals, nor, indeed, that they have formed any final plan; but I am certain that if they can prevail on three or four men who hold the balance, they will attempt to defeat the election under pretence of voting for Burr. At present it is certain that our friends will not vote for him, and as we cannot make nine States without the assistance of some Federal, it is as certain that, if all the Federal will vote for him, there will be no choice of the House. In that case what will be the plans of the Federalists, having, as they have, a majority in both Houses? Will they usurp at once the Presidential powers? An attempt of that kind will most certainly be resisted. Will they only pass a law providing for a new election? This mode, as being the most plausible, may, perhaps, be the one they will adopt. And in that case, as no State has provided for an election in such cases; as the concurrence of the Legislature of any one State will be necessary to pass a law providing for the same; as in the five New England States, Jersey, and Delaware (which give 49 Federal votes), both branches of the Legislature are Federal, whilst in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina, where we have a majority, the State Senates are against us; the consequence might be that the Senates of these four last States refusing to act, the 49 votes of New England, Jersey, and Delaware would outweigh the 44 votes of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee; and they would thus, by in fact disfranchising four States and annulling the last election, perpetuate themselves in power, whilst they would in appearance violate none of the forms of our Constitution. If they shall act so, shall we submit? And if we do not submit, in what manner shall we act ourselves? These are important questions, and not yet finally decided. At all events, no appeal shall be made to the physical strength of the country except in self-defence, and as that strength is with us, I am not afraid of an attack on their part. Thus I am confident that we will have no civil war, and the love of union and order is so general that I hope that in every possible case we shall preserve both. My opinion is, however, decided that we must consider the election as completed, and under no possible circumstance consent to a new election. In that I may be overruled by our friends, but I think it a miserable policy, and calculated to break for a length of time the Republican spirit, should we at present yield one inch of ground to the Federal faction, when we are supported by the Constitution and by the people. I will every mail let you know the prospect. At present it is still considered as probable that Maryland will unite in the vote in favor of Mr. Jefferson....
29th January, 1801.
... Here the approaching 11th February engrosses all our attention. And opinions vary and fluctuate so much every day, that I will confine myself to a few general observations in communicating to you what I know you must be very anxious of understanding as fully as the nature of the case will admit. If a choice is not made by the House, either the next House must choose between Jefferson and Burr or a new election must take place. Which mode would be most constitutional is doubtful with many. I think the first to be the only truly constitutional way of acting. But whatever mode be adopted, we are sure of success, provided the election be fair. The next House will give us a majority of nine States, and, counting members individually, of more than twenty votes. That House must be in session at all events before a new election can be completed in order to count the votes. That House may therefore adopt either the mode I think right, by choosing between J. and B., or acquiesce in a new election if it has been fair (that is to say, if the Senates of Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, and South Carolina shall have permitted those States to vote). But if through trick or obstinacy the election has been unfair, that House will not acquiesce. That being an indubitable position, what interest can the Federalists have in defeating an election? None, unless they mean to usurp government. And if they do make the attempt, is it possible they would run the immense risk attending the attempt merely for the sake of keeping government in their hands till December next, with the certainty of losing it then and the probability of being punished, at all events annihilated as a party on account of the attempt? Hence I conclude that if they are in earnest they must mean something more than a temporary usurpation. The intention of the desperate leaders must be absolute usurpation and the overthrow of our Constitution. But although this may be the object of a few individuals actuated by pride and ambition, it cannot be the true object of a majority of the Federal men. Many may not indeed see and calculate all the consequences of their defeating an election. But I am confident that the true motive of action, which may possibly induce at first a sufficient number to vote against Mr. J., is an opinion of our imbecility and a supposition that we will yield ourselves rather than to run any risk. This is the only rational way to account for their conduct. It is yet extremely doubtful whether we will not on the first ballot carry Mr. J.; but if we do not, I am firmly of opinion that by persevering we will compel a sufficient number of Federals to yield. Should, however, the election be defeated, I apprehend no very dangerous consequences. Usurpation will undoubtedly be resisted in a legal and constitutional way by several of the largest and most populous States, and I much doubt whether they would find any man bold enough to place himself in front as an usurper. If, what I think much more probable, there is no usurpation, we would acquiesce in a kind of interregnum until the meeting of next Congress, which in that case would probably be hastened. I conclude on that subject by observing that there is no appearance of any of our friends seceding. If any do secede, B. may be elected; if not, I think it is one hundred to one that Jef. will.... Lucius H. Stockton (the indicter of Baldwin) was nominated Secretary of War. The Senate suspended the appointment and gave him time to decline. His brother, your friend’s husband, writes on this occasion that although it might be well for Mr. A. to reward those who had written in his favor, yet he should take care not to offer them appointments which must render them ridiculous. And to-day Griswold, of our House, has been nominated for the same Department. He has too much sense not to be mortified at being rendered ridiculous by that nomination, and I am sure will not accept. Mr. Marshall is Chief Justice. His Department (Secretary of State) is not yet filled, so that Dexter is pro temp. Secretary in chief of all the Departments. He is rather unfortunate; the auditor’s office and all the papers therein were burnt. Malice ascribes the fire to design, and party will believe it. But I do not. What renders the thing unlucky is that the very books which had been, through the infidelity of a clerk, in Duane’s hands are burnt. Hence it will be extremely difficult to remove the suspicion from the minds of many. The French convention, as I had foretold, has been rejected by the Senate. But they have contrived to agree that it was not a final determination, and they are now negotiating amongst themselves on the subject. The merchants are in favor of the convention; the Senators who voted against it are rather afraid of the unpopularity of the measure, and some of them are willing to come in and approve, provided they may have a decent cover for changing their vote. So that it is not improbable that on the next trial the convention may be adopted with some immaterial modifications; but it is far from certain.
I believe I have given you every political and private information that I can trust to a letter. Much will remain for me to tell when we meet. Yet, as the newspapers have made me Secretary of the Treasury, hereafter, that is to say, I may tell you that I have received no hint of that kind from Mr. J. Indeed, I do not suppose that it would be proper in him to say anything on the subject of appointments until he knows whether he shall be elected. The Republicans may wish me to be appointed, but there exist two strong doubts in my mind on the subject, 1st, whether the Senate would confirm; 2d, what you have already heard me express, whether my abilities are equal to the office....
5th February, 1801.
... Indeed, I feel more forcibly than ever I did before that you cannot, that you must not be left alone in that country. The habits of the people and state of society create difficulties and inconveniences which you cannot overcome. And it is to similar circumstances that we are to ascribe the establishment and introduction of slavery in the Middle States. Under my and your peculiar situation and place of abode, it has required no uncommon exertion to resist the temptation. And should imperious circumstances compel a longer residence in the western country than we now contemplate, some method must be taken to obviate the inconvenience. At all events, if through any means I can subsist and be independent on this side the mountains I will attempt it, for from experience I am fully convinced that you cannot live happy where you are.... I have had a cold since my last, and nursed myself; have been out but once to dine at Georgetown with some of our members who lodge there. I mean to go and stay there all night this evening in order to have a more full conversation with Dallas in relation to myself and future plans than can be done by letter.
The Federal party in Senate got frightened at their having rejected the French treaty, which is certainly extremely popular. And they offered to recant provided they were afforded a decent cover. To this our friends agreed, and the treaty was two days ago ratified, with the exception of the 2d Article (which was a mere matter of form and introduced at the request of our own commissioners), and a limitation for eight years. From thence I am inclined to think that the party will also want perseverance in the execution of the other plan, that of defeating the election. A variety of circumstances induce me to believe that either the plan is abandoned or that they know that it will fail. Bayard has proposed, and a committee of sixteen members, one from each State, have agreed, that on the 11th February, the day fixed by law for counting the votes, if it shall appear, as is expected, that the two persons highest in vote (Jef. and Burr) have an equality, the House shall immediately proceed (in their own chamber) to choose by ballot the President, and shall not adjourn until a choice is made. I do not know whether the House will agree; but if they do, and the two parties are obstinate in adhering, the one to B., the other to Jef., we will have for the last three weeks of the session to sleep on blankets in the Capitol, and also to eat and drink there. For the idea is that of a permanent sitting, without doing any other business whatever until we have chosen. But this evidently shows that they mean to choose. For if no choice was made, they could neither pass a law for a new election or usurpation, nor indeed for any object whatever; and there is as yet no appropriation law passed; which would leave us on 3d March without any government. I believe I told you before that we had expectations of Bayard and Morris joining us on this question. Mr. Adams has very improperly called Senate for the 4th of March next, at which time the three new Republican Senators from Kentucky, Georgia, and South Carolina cannot, from their distance, be here; the new Republican Senator from Pennsylvania instead of Bingham will not be appointed, our thirteen Senators refusing to agree; the same with a new Senator from Maryland; Charles Pinckney has also dislocated his shoulder. The fact is that in December next the Senate will be 16 to 16, or at worst 15 to 17. And on 4th March only 8 or 9 Republicans against 17 or 18. The secretaries may and probably will all resign on that day, and the Senate being in session, that will compel Mr. J. to appoint immediately and submit his appointments to that Rump Senate. The object is undoubtedly to embarrass him by crippling his intended Administration....
12th February, 1801.
... Yesterday, on counting the votes, Burr and Jefferson had 73 votes each, as was already known. At one o’clock in the afternoon we returned to our chamber and kept balloting till eight o’clock this morning without making a choice. We balloted 27 times, and on each ballot the result was the same; eight States for Jefferson, six for Burr, two divided. At eight o’clock we agreed (without adjourning the House) to suspend the further balloting till twelve o’clock, and during that time I went to sleep. We have just returned and balloted once more, when, the result being still the same, we have just now agreed to suspend the balloting till to-morrow at eleven o’clock. Still the House is not adjourned, and we consider this as a permanent sitting; but by mutual agreement it is a virtual adjournment, as we shall not meet nor do any business till to-morrow. I must write to Philadelphia, Lancaster, and New York, to keep them acquainted of our situation, and I want to return to bed, which must be my apology, with my love, for this short letter. Our hopes of a change on their part are exclusively with Maryland, but everything on that subject is conjecture....