The worker gets some reward, however little, and there is a direct incentive to reach 100 per cent. efficiency owing to the rapid increase of reward at that point. If he gets nothing, then he either feels ashamed of his laziness, or, what is more likely, he inquires into the reason why he has received no reward. This is just what the employer wants, as it discovers inefficiencies in connection with machinery or supplies or with other processes or routines.
At the same time, an inaccurate time study neither penalises the worker too much on the one hand, nor causes excessive reward on the other.
Yet again, the worker always gets his day rate even though his efficiency falls below the reward point.
It is eminently suitable for both employer and worker.
(b) Reward System No. 2.
In this case the reward consists of payment for half the time saved, and reaches 30 per cent. increase on the wage rate at 100 per cent. efficiency.
It is suitable for many classes of work, and neither worker nor employer suffer too much in the event of an inaccurate time study.