Washington the Soldier

by Henry B. Carrington

Two regiments under Colonel Prescott, of Bunker Hill fame, were on duty upon Governor’s Island. The works on Long Island, begun by General Lee, had been completed by General Greene, who had explored the country thoroughly and knew the range of every piece. A redoubt with seven guns crowned the Heights. The exposed point of Red Hook, a combination of marsh and solid land, was supplied with five guns. The intrenchments, more than a half mile in length, were protected by abatis and four redoubts which mounted twenty guns. Greene occupied these redoubts and lines with two regiments of Long Island militia and six regiments of Continental troops, not one of which exceeded four hundred men, for duty. The line extended from Wallabout, the present Navy Yard, to Gowanus Bay.

The total nominal strength of the American army about New York on the twenty-sixth of August, including the sick, non-effectives, and those without arms, was a little over twenty-seven thousand men. The Connecticut regiments which had just joined brought such arms as they could provide for themselves, and were simply that many citizens with nominal organization, but without drill.

Meanwhile, the entire line from Brooklyn to King’s Bridge, fifteen miles, with the navigable waters of the Hudson, the Harlem, and East rivers, and their shore approaches, had to be guarded. It was not entirely certain but that Howe simply feigned an attack upon the intrenched position upon the Heights, to draw thither Washington’s best troops, and take the city by water approach. Paulus Hook, then an island, was fortified in a measure, but was unable to prevent the passage of two vessels which at once cut off water communication with Albany and the northern American army.

Washington had previously issued orders for the government of sharp-shooters; and particularly, “not to throw away fire. To fire first with ball and shot.” This order had its specific significance, and was illustrated in the Mexican War, and early in 1861, in America. “Buck-and-ball” scattered its missiles, and wounded many who would be missed by a single rifle-shot; and the wounded required details of others for their care or removal. “Brigadiers were ordered to mark a circle around the several redoubts, by which officers are to be directed in giving orders for the first discharge.” He also ordered “small brush to be set up, to mark the line more distinctly, and make it familiar to the men, before the enemy arrive within the circle.”

The reader will recall the experience of Washington in his early career, when similar methods made his success so emphatic.

When advised of the landing of the British on the twenty-second, and that Colonel Hand had retired to Prospect Hill (now Prospect Park), Washington sent six regiments to reënforce the garrison of the Heights. Orders were also sent to General Heath, then at the head of Manhattan Island, to be prepared to forward additional troops; and live regiments from the city force were ready to cross East River so soon as it should be determined whether the attack was to be made, in force, against the Heights.

General Greene, prostrated with fever, had written on the fifteenth, that “he hoped, through the assistance of Providence, to be able to ride before an attack should be made, but felt great anxiety as to the result.” On the twenty-third, Washington was compelled to write to Congress, “I have been compelled to appoint General Sullivan to the command of the island, owing to General Greene’s indisposition.” In a letter written by Sullivan, on the twenty-third, respecting a minor skirmish after the British landing, when Hand retired, he said: “I have ordered a party out for prisoners to-night. Things argue well for us, and I hope are so many preludes to victory.” This confidence was hardly less unfounded than his faith in the success of operations in Canada. It was the inverse of sound reason, and made the “less include the greater.” He was immediately superseded, and General Putnam was placed in command.

The following are some of Washington’s orders issued to General Putnam on the twenty-sixth of August, when it seemed as if only his omnipresence could compel even general officers to understand their responsibility for the good behavior of the troops:

“Stop the scattering, unmeaning, and wasteful firing, which prevents the possibility of distinguishing between a real and a false alarm, which prevents deserters from approaching our lines, and must continue, so long as every soldier conceives himself at liberty to fire when, and at what, he pleases.”