At this stage of the narrative of Washington’s career as a Soldier, it is interesting to consider his own views of the situation as expressed in a letter to the Continental Congress. He thus wrote: “Men of discernment will see that by such works and preparations we have delayed the operations (British) of the campaign till it is too late to effect any capital incursions into the country. It is now obvious that they mean to enclose us on the island of New York, by taking post in my rear, while their shipping secures the front, and thus oblige us to fight them on their own terms, or surrender at discretion.”
Again, “Every measure is to be formed with some apprehension that all of our troops will not do their duty. On our side the war should be defensive. It has even been called a ‘war of posts.’ We should, on all occasions, avoid a general action, and never be drawn into the necessity to put anything to risk. Persuaded that it would be presumptuous to draw out our young troops into open ground against their superior numbers and discipline, I have never spared the spade and the pick-axe; but I have never found that readiness to defend, even strong posts, at all hazards, which is necessary to derive the greatest benefit from them.”
Again, “I am sensible that a retreating army is encircled with difficulties, that declining an engagement subjects a general to reproach; but when the fate of America may be at stake on the issue, we should protract the war, if possible. That they can drive us out is equally clear. Nothing seems to remain but the time of their taking possession.”
The thoughtful reader will find these quotations to be very suggestive of some future offensive action on the part of Washington whenever the British might be shut up in winter quarters; and the reply of Congress, whereby they authorize him “not to retain New York longer than he thought proper for the public service,” was accompanied by the following Resolution: “That General Washington be acquainted that Congress would have special care taken, in case he should find it necessary to quit New York, that no damage be done to the said city by his troops, on their leaving it; the Congress having no doubt of their being able to recover the same, though the enemy should, for a time, have possession of it.”
The experience of the Continental army before Boston was now repeated. New recruits came in daily, to fill the places made vacant by expiring enlistments; but again the army seemed to be “fast wasting away.”
The interval is significant because of another effort on the part of General Howe and his brother, Admiral Howe, special commissioners, to settle the controversy upon terms alike satisfactory to the American people and the British crown; but John Adams, Edward Rutledge, and Benjamin Franklin, commissioners appointed by Congress, insisted first upon Independence, and a subsequent alliance between the two nations as friendly powers. This ended the negotiations. Such a settlement, if it had been realized, might have imparted to Great Britain even a prouder destiny than the succeeding century developed.
At that juncture of affairs, however, and as a key to General Howe’s importunity in securing at least “a suspension of hostilities,” he was urging upon the British Government, with the same pertinacity as Washington besought Congress, to increase his army. His figures were large, and worthy of notice. He wanted ten thousand men for the occupation of Newport, R.I., that he might threaten Boston, and make incursions into Connecticut. He demanded for the garrison of New York twenty thousand men; of which number, seventeen thousand should be available for field service. He asked for ten thousand more, for operations into New Jersey, where Washington had established a general Camp of Instruction for all troops arriving from the south; and still another ten thousand for operations in the Southern Colonies. It is not improbable that much of General Howe’s tardiness in following up temporary success, in all his subsequent campaigns, was based upon the conviction—embodied in these enormous requisitions for troops—that the war had already assumed a character of very grave importance and a corresponding uncertainty of the result.
Events crowded rapidly. On the tenth of September. Washington began the removal of valuable stores. He acted as quickly as if he were in Howe’s place, seeking the earliest possible possession of New York. On the twelfth, a Council of War decided that a force of eight thousand men should be left for the defence of Fort Washington and its dependencies. Of eight regiments of the very best troops, reporting three thousand three hundred and twenty-two present, the sick-roll reduced the effective strength twelve hundred and nine men. On the fourteenth, additional British vessels passed up East River, landing troops at Kipp’s Bay on the sixteenth. Then occurred one of the most stirring incidents of the war. One of the best brigades in the army, and one which had previously fought with gallantry and success, gave way. Washington, advised of the panic, denounced their behavior as “dastardly and cowardly.” He dashed among them, and with drawn sword mingled with the fugitives, to inspire them with courage. In his report he says: “I used every means in my power to rally them to the fight, but my attempts were fruitless and ineffectual: and on the appearance of not more than sixty or seventy of the enemy they ran away without firing a shot.” In the strong language of General Greene: “Washington, on this occasion, seemed to seek death, rather than life.” These same troops, a part of Parsons’ Brigade, afterwards redeemed themselves; and Washington was wise enough to give them opportunity, under his own eye, as especially trustworthy troops. This incident found its counterpart in the career of Napoleon. At the siege of Toulon, one demi-brigade fled before a sally of less than one-fourth its numbers: but afterwards lost nearly half its strength in storming and entering the same fortress.
Immediately upon this unfortunate affair, the whole army was withdrawn to Harlem Heights. This position was regarded as impregnable; but the following extract, from Washington’s report to Congress exposes the deep anguish of his soul: “We are now encamped with the main body of the army upon the Heights of Harlem, where I should hope the enemy would meet with a retreat, in case of attack, but experience, to my great affliction, has convinced me that this is a matter to be wished, rather than expected.”
The British lines were advanced, and extended from Bloomingdale across to Horn’s Hook, near Hell Gate; and General Howe made his headquarters at the Beekman Mansion, not far from those just vacated by Washington on Murray Hill.