Note.—American statesmanship in 1898, exacted other appliances than those of immediately available physical force. The costly and insufferable relations of the Spanish West Indies to the United States, had become pestilential. No self-respecting nation, elsewhere, would have as long withheld the only remedy. Cuba was dying to be free. Spain, unwilling, or unable, to grant an honorable and complete autonomy to her despairing subjects, precipitated war with the United States. The momentum of a supreme moral force in behalf of humanity at large, so energized the entire American people that every ordinary unpreparedness failed to lessen the effectiveness of the stroke.
It was both statesmanship and strategy, to strike so suddenly that neither climatic changes, indigenous diseases, nor tropical cyclones, could gain opportunity to do their mischief. When these supposed allies of Spain were brushed aside, as powerless to stay the advance of American arms in behalf of starving thousands, and a fortunate occasion was snatched, just in time for victory, it proved to be such an achievement as Washington would have pronounced a direct manifestation of Divine favor.
But the character of Washington as a soldier is not to be determined by the numerical strength of the armies engaged in single battles, nor by the resources and geographical conditions of later times. The same general principles have ever obtained, and ever will control human judgment. Transportation and intercommunication are relative; and the slow mails and travel of Revolutionary times, alike affected both armies, with no partial benefit or injury to either. The British had better communication by water, but not by land; with the disadvantage of campaigning through an unknown and intricate country, peopled by their enemies, whenever not covered by the guns of their fleet. The American expedition to Cuba in 1898 had not only the support of invincible fleets, but the native population were to be the auxiliaries, as well as the beneficiaries of the mighty movement.
Baron Jomini, in his elaborate history of the campaigns of Napoleon, analyzes that general’s success over his more experienced opponents, upon the basis of his observance or neglect of the military principles already outlined. The dash and vigor of his first Italian campaign were indeed characteristic of a young soldier impatient of the habitually tardy deliberations of the old-school movements. Napoleon discounted time by action. He benumbed his adversary by the suddenness and ferocity of his stroke. But never, even in that wonderful campaign, did Napoleon strike more suddenly and effectively, than did Washington on Christmas night, 1776, at Trenton. And Napoleon’s following up blow was not more emphatic, in its results, than was Washington’s attack upon Princeton, a week later, when the British army already regarded his capture as a simple morning privilege. Such inspirations of military prescience belong to every age; and often they shorten wars by their determining value.
As a sound basis for a right estimate of Washington’s military career, and to avoid tedious episodes respecting the acts and methods of many generals who were associated with him at the commencement of the Revolutionary War, a brief synopsis of the career of each will find early notice. The dramatis personæ of the Revolutionary drama are thus made the group of which he is to be the centre; and his current orders, correspondence, and criticisms of their conduct, will furnish his valuation of the character and services of each. The single fact, that no general officer of the first appointments actively shared in the immediate siege of Yorktown, adds interest to this advance outline of their personal history.
For the same purpose, and as a logical predicate for his early comprehension of the real issues involved in a contest with Great Britain, an outline of events which preceded hostilities is introduced, embracing, however, only those Colonial antecedents which became emotional factors in forming his character and energizing his life as a soldier.
The maps, which illustrate only the immediate campaigns of Washington, or related territory which required his supervision, are reduced from those used in “Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.” The map entitled “Operations near New York,” was the first one drafted, at Tarrytown, New York. In 1847, it was approved by Washington Irving, then completing his Life of Washington, and his judgment determined the plan of the future work. All of the maps, however, before engravure, had the minute examination and approval of Benson J. Lossing. The present volume owes its preparation to the personal request of the late Robert C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, made shortly before his decease, and is completed, with ever-present appreciation of his aid and his friendship.
HENRY B. CARRINGTON.
Hyde Park, Mass., Sept. 1, 1898.