CHAPTER XXII.
FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS AGAIN.—BATTLE OF MONMOUTH.
The abandonment of Philadelphia by the British army, as anticipated by Washington, had become a military necessity. The city was too remote from the coast, unless its army of occupation could be so reënforced as to be independent of support from the British base at New York. The reënforcements of troops called for by General Howe had not been and could not have been furnished. The recommendation of General Amherst, military adviser of George III., “that forty thousand men be sent to America immediately,” had been positively disapproved. It was therefore of vital importance that General Clinton should reach New York with the least possible delay. Any attempt to return by sea was obviously impracticable.
The incidents of the evacuation of Philadelphia were similar to those which marked the departure of Howe from Boston. The embarkation of three thousand citizens with their families, their merchandise, and their personal effects, upon vessels, to accompany the retiring fleet, was a moral lesson of vast significance. This withdrawal of the British garrison was no ruse, to entice the American army from its camp, for battle, but a surrender of the field itself, without a struggle. It announced to America and to the world, that the British army lacked the ability to meet the contingencies of field service, either in Pennsylvania or New Jersey; and that loyalists would be left to their own resources for protection and safety.
Other considerations precipitated the action of Clinton. Congress had publicly announced the impending arrival of a formidable French fleet from the West Indies; and, as a matter of fact, so immediate was its advent, that the advance frigates entered the Delaware Bay, just after Admiral Howe turned Cape May, on his return to New York. Meanwhile, every movement in the city was hourly reported to Washington by his secret messengers, and by families who kept constantly in touch with all movements of the garrison. Hardly a ball or social dinner, during the entire winter, was without the presence of one or more of his representatives, who as promptly reported the secret influences which were making of the city a deadly prison-house for the British troops. Even at the playhouses, comedians had begun to jest upon the “foraging of the rebel scouts”; and it is said to have been hinted, on one occasion, that “there were chickens and eggs in abundance outside the lines, if the soldiers would take the trouble to go after them,” and that “it was hardly the right thing to let Washington’s ragged army have the pick of all country produce.”
The actual evacuation began at three o’clock on the morning of June eighteenth, and the entire British army was on the New Jersey side of the Delaware by ten o’clock. Washington had so closely calculated the movement, that General Maxwell’s brigade and the New Jersey militia were already at work burning bridges and felling trees across the roads, in order to delay Clinton’s march and afford an opportunity for attacking his retiring columns. General Arnold, whose wound still prevented field service, entered the city with a strong detachment as the British rear-guard left. Twelve miles of baggage-train, loaded with everything of army supplies that could be heaped upon wagons, formed the long extended caravan which accompanied nearly eighteen thousand British veterans as they returned to New York, whence they had started only eleven months before. The capture of the American capital and the destruction of the American army had been their fondest desire. Now, they shrunk away from the same American capital as from a pest-house. There was no longer an eager search to find Washington. To make the earliest safe distance from his presence, or his reach, was the incentive to the speediest possible travel. It was no longer the destruction of that one principal American army that engrossed thought and stimulated energy; but how to save the British army itself, for efficient service elsewhere. And Washington, although fully appreciating the British situation, did not know the fact that the British cabinet were actually discussing, at that very time, the propriety of transferring all active operations to the more sparsely settled regions of the South.
The movements in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, as well as those of Burgoyne, away from the sea-coast, recall an emphatic communication from General Howe, which contained this practical statement: “Almost every movement in America was an act of enterprise, clogged with innumerable difficulties. A knowledge of the country, intersected, as it everywhere is, by woods, mountains, water or morasses, cannot be obtained with any degree of precision necessary to foresee and guard against the contingencies that may occur.”
Washington was also fully advised of the character and extent of Clinton’s retiring column, and of the opportunity which the country afforded for breaking it up. Haste was the need of Clinton. His delay, however slight, was Washington’s opportunity. Clinton reached Haddonfield the same day. The militia of Maxwell made a short resistance, and then retired to Mount Holy Pass. The increased British vanguard compelled him to fall back; but the destruction of bridges and interposed obstructions, together with the excessive summer heat, made the march of the British troops one of intense strain and exhaustion. And yet, Clinton used such vigor in pressing forward to anticipate more formidable obstructions, that he reached Crosswicks before the destruction of the bridge at that point was complete; and on the morning of the twenty-fourth, his army crossed the creek. The column of Lieutenant-General Knyphausen went into camp at Imlay’s Town; while that of Clinton occupied Allentown, and thereby effectively covered the advance division in case of an American attack from the north. At this point, he learned that Washington had already crossed the Delaware, and that the northern army was expected to unite with that of the American Commander-in-Chief. Such a combination, just then, would render a direct retreat to New York, via Princeton and Brunswick, extremely hazardous, if not impossible. With the promptness which characterized him, Sir Henry Clinton consolidated his baggage and sent it in advance under Lieutenant-General Knyphausen; placed the second division in light marching order, under his own personal command, in the rear, and took the Monmouth route to the sea. (See map.)
Washington was quickly advised of this organic change in the British formation, and acted instantly. He had crossed the Delaware River at Coryell’s Ferry, forty miles above Philadelphia, without assurance of the definite purpose of his adversary. Any other route of march by Clinton than by Brunswick, would prevent him from receiving military support from New York, and hold him to the limit of supplies with which he started from Philadelphia. When, therefore, couriers from Maxwell notified Washington of Clinton’s diversion eastward, from Crosswicks, it was evident that Clinton would take no risks of battle in reaching New York, or some port on the coast accessible by a British fleet.
Colonel Morgan was sent with five hundred men to reënforce Maxwell. On the twenty-fourth, General Scott, with fifteen hundred chosen troops, was despatched to reënforce those in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, more effectually to retard their retreat. On the twenty-sixth, Washington moved the entire army to Kingston; and learning that the British army was moving directly toward Monmouth, advanced an additional force of one thousand men under General Wayne, placing General Lafayette in command of the entire corps, including the brigade of Maxwell and Morgan’s Light Infantry. Orders were also sent to Lafayette: “Take the first opportunity to strike the rear of the enemy.”