Washington the Soldier

by Henry B. Carrington

That the reader may more fully appreciate the temper of some narrow-minded men of that period, and at so fearful a crisis, the following extract from a letter to the Count de Vergennes is cited. In referring to the simple question of appointing a committee to visit their Commander-in-Chief, this American writes: “It was said that the appointment of a committee would be putting too much power in a few hands, and especially in those of the Commander-in-Chief; that his influence already was too great; that even his virtues afforded motives for alarm; that the enthusiasm of his army, joined to the kind of dictatorship already confided to him, put Congress and the United States at his mercy; that it was not expedient to expose a man of the highest virtues to such temptations.”

General Schuyler, then in Congress, John Matthews and Nathaniel Peabody served on this committee, and as the result, Congress resolved to equalize the pay of the army, and make more systematic efforts to recruit and maintain it.

On the twelfth of February, Congress affirmed the sentence of a court-martial which sentenced Arnold, then commanding at Philadelphia, to a reprimand for giving passes to disaffected citizens and using public transportation for private use. The reprimand was mildly administered: but it made Arnold very angry. His life of ostentatious display, his extravagant habits, and his loose views of moral obligation, aroused public indignation; and the mere matter of the charges upon which he was sentenced would not have appeared so grave, except that he was universally suspected of using his official position for private emolument.

During all these struggles to keep his army together and prevent British operations out from New York, Washington was watchful of the operations then in progress at the South. General Clinton cleared the ice without difficulty, and left New York on the twenty-ninth of December, as already stated, expecting to reach his destination within ten days; but a storm dispersed his fleet, and one vessel foundered. Nearly all of his cavalry, and all of his artillery horses, perished. Although they reached Tybee Island, their first rendezvous, within the month, they did not leave for St. John Island, thirty miles below Charleston, until the tenth of February; and did not take up their position before Charleston, between the Ashley and Cooper rivers, until the twelfth of March. It appears from documentary data that the retention of Charleston, garrisoned by only two thousand two hundred regulars and a thousand militia, was largely induced by the inhabitants of the city. It is true that Commodore Whipple of the American navy regarded it as defensible; but Washington did not concur in that opinion. He held that the same force which would be required to hold the city, could do far greater and better service by remaining without the city, besides being more independent in securing supplies and coöperating with militia and other forces seeking their support. Besides this, the defences had been prepared to resist approach by sea, and not by land. An extract from Tarleton’s history of the campaigns of 1780–’81, is as follows, indicating the purpose of the movement itself: “The richness of the country, its vicinity to Georgia, and its distance from Washington, pointed out the advantages and facility of its conquest.”

The British forces broke ground on the first of April; on the nineteenth established their second, and on the sixth of May, their third, parallel. On the twelfth, the British took possession of the city. The schedule of prisoners prepared by Major André, of General Clinton’s staff, included all citizens, as prisoners of war. The Continental troops, including five hundred in hospital, did not exceed two thousand. General Clinton followed up this success by an absurd proclamation to the people, and wrote a more absurd letter to Lord Germaine, which is valuable to the reader, for the interest which attaches to its terms in connection with subsequent operations of Clinton, upon his return northward. It is as follows: “The inhabitants from every quarter declare their allegiance to the king, and offer their services in arms. There are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners, or in arms with us.” On the fifth of June, General Clinton returned to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command.

During the absence of Clinton from New York, and with the opening of spring, Washington’s position became more offensive to the garrison of New York. Amid all his gloom on account of the condition of his army, a bright episode gladdened his heart and nerved him for action. He had a visitor. The Marquis de Lafayette, who reached Boston on the 28th of April, by the frigate Hermione, entered Washington’s headquarters on the morning of May 10th. He announced, that the Count de Rochambeau was on the seas with the first division of an army, coming to support the American Republic. This French army was not directed to report to the American Congress, nor to take orders from that body. Washington opened the communication which Lafayette was intrusted to deliver, in advance of the arrival of Count de Rochambeau, and the following is a copy of the instructions to that officer: “The French troops are to obey Washington; to admit the precedence of American officers of equal rank; on all formal occasions to yield the right to the American army; and bear in mind that the whole purpose is, heartily and efficiently, to execute the will of the American Commander-in-Chief.”

On the fourteenth, after four days of confidential conference, Lafayette, bearing a letter from Washington, reported to the President of Congress for duty, preserving, for the time, the secret that the troops of France were already on their way to America.

But what a condition of affairs awaited the arrival of these gallant allies! The American army had already lost more in numbers than was anticipated by Washington in the official Report, already noticed. On the second of April, his entire force on both sides of the Hudson River consisted of only ten thousand four hundred, rank and file; and of these two thousand eight hundred had only two weeks to serve. Lord Rawdon had, indeed, taken from the New York garrison two thousand five hundred men as a reënforcement to General Clinton; but nearly twelve thousand remained behind. Although this increase of Clinton’s command afforded Washington small ground for hope of success in the Southern Department, he realized that it was impossible for him to abandon his present position. But he immediately despatched southward the Maryland and Delaware troops, which had fought in nearly every battle with the skill of veterans, and the First Artillery, all under the command of the Baron De Kalb.

While sparing these well disciplined troops, Washington’s position involved vastly increased responsibility. On the twenty-fifth day of May, two Connecticut regiments mutinied, declaring that they would “march home,” or at least secure subsistence at the point of the bayonet. Handbills were printed in New York and distributed, urging the soldiers to desert. “This mutiny,” says Washington, most impressively, “has given infinite concern.” There was no money except the Continental, and of this he says: “It is evidently impracticable, from the immense quantity it would require, to pay them as much as to make up the depreciation.” He further adds: “This is a decisive moment, one of the most. I will go further, and say, the most important America has ever seen. The Court of France has made a glorious effort for our deliverance, and if we disappoint its intentions by our supineness, we must become contemptible in the eyes of all mankind; nor can we, after, venture to confide that our allies will persist in an attempt to establish what we want ability, or inclination, to assist them in.”

General Greene thus addressed the Colonel of the Morristown militia: “There are no more provisions than to serve one regiment, in the magazine. The late terrible storm, the depth of the snow, and the drifts in the roads, prevent the little stock from coming forward which is in distant magazines. The roads must be kept open by the inhabitants, or the army cannot be subsisted. Unless the good people lend their assistance to forward supplies, the army must disband. The army is stripped naked of teams, as possible, to lessen the consumption of forage. Call to your aid the overseers of the highways, and every other order of men who can give despatch to this business. P.S.—Give no copies of this order, for fear it should get to the enemy.”