Washington the Soldier

by Henry B. Carrington

The Assembly of Virginia, quickened to new energy, retired to Charlottesville May 24th. But they authorized the “issue of fifteen millions of bills,” and also the declaration of martial law within twenty miles of any army headquarters. That brought Richmond within the military control of Lafayette. The Burgoyne prisoners were also removed from Charlottesville, over the mountains, to Winchester. The details of the pursuit of Lafayette by Cornwallis, day by day, are full of thrilling interest, but beyond the province of this narrative.

On the twenty-eighth of May, Lafayette wrote as follows to Washington: “The enemy have been so kind as to retire before us. Twice, I gave them a chance of fighting, taking good care not to engage them farther than I pleased, but they continued their retrograde motions. Our numbers are, I think, exaggerated to them, and our seeming boldness confirms the opinion. I thought, at first, Lord Cornwallis wanted to get me as low down as possible, and use his cavalry to advantage. His lordship had, exclusive of the reënforcements from Portsmouth, (said to be six hundred) four thousand men; eight hundred of whom were dragoons, or mounted infantry. Our force is about his; but only one thousand five hundred regulars, and fifty dragoons. One little action more particularly marks the retreat of the enemy. From the place where he first began to retire to Williamsburg, is upwards of one hundred miles. The old arms at the Point of the Fork have been taken out of the water. The cannon was thrown into the river undamaged, when they marched back to Richmond; so that his lordship did us no harm of consequence, but lost an immense part of his former conquests, and did not make any in the State. General Greene only demanded of me to hold my ground, in Virginia. I don’t know but what we shall, in our turn, become the pursuing enemy.”

On the very next day, after this letter was despatched to the American Commander-in-Chief, May twenty-ninth, Cornwallis did, in fact, abandon pursuit. Tarleton, who never lost opportunity to express his appreciation of the tact, skill, and “invariable wisdom of Lafayette’s movements,” states, that “an American patrol was captured; and among letters of Lafayette to Greene, Steuben, and others, was one to Governor Jefferson, urging him to rally militia during his absence, and using this prophetic expression: ‘The British success in Virginia resembles the French invasion of Hanover, and is likely to have similar consequences, if the governor and the country would exert themselves, at the present juncture.’”

When Cornwallis halted and moved back towards his base, Tarleton was detached with two hundred and fifty troopers, mounted on the picked stock of the best private stables, taken at will, and attempted to capture Governor Jefferson at Monticello. His report says: “I imagined that a march of seventy miles in twenty-four hours, with the caution used, might perhaps give the advantage of a surprise.” Tarleton charged through the Riviana River, captured seven members of the Legislature and Brigadier-General Scott, and destroyed one thousand arms and four hundred barrels of powder; but the Governor escaped, and the Assembly immediately convened at Staunton, beyond Tarleton’s reach. Then he started down the Riviana to join Simcoe in an attack upon Steuben’s depot of supplies at Elk Island. But Wayne joined Lafayette, and Lafayette proceeded southward. They soon started in pursuit of the retiring column of Cornwallis. The pursued had indeed become the pursuers. Tarleton thus writes: “The Marquis Lafayette, who had previously practised defensive measures with skill and security, being now reënforced by Wayne and about eight hundred continentals and some militia, followed the British as they proceeded down James River. This design, being judiciously arranged and executed with extreme caution, allowed opportunity for the junction of Baron Steuben; confined the small detachments of the King’s troops; and both saved the property and animated the drooping spirits of the Virginians.” On the thirteenth, Tarleton reported his own movements and the waste he had accomplished.

The scouts of Lafayette intercepted the letter, and he published it to the people before Cornwallis himself had knowledge of its contents. Cornwallis returned to his headquarters, to find despatches fifteen days old awaiting his attention. One contained this extraordinary information: “The Continentals under Lafayette cannot exceed one thousand; and the Pennsylvania Line, under Wayne, are so discontented, that their officers are afraid to trust them with ammunition. Postscript.—This may have, however, since altered.”

On the very day of the receipt of this despatch, Tarleton and Simcoe were actually compelled to cover the picket-lines of Cornwallis with their full force, to prevent Lafayette’s Continentals and the Pennsylvania Line from capturing the supply trains of his command. Cornwallis started for Portsmouth on the fourth. A sharp action at Williamsburg, in which Wayne made a brilliant bayonet charge, and in which Lafayette, having lost a horse, gallantly fought the battle on foot, resulted in a loss of one hundred and eighteen Americans and seventy-five British troops. From Portsmouth, Cornwallis took boats for Yorktown, on the first of August; and on the sixth, Tarleton says: “I threw my horses into deep water, near shore, and landed without loss,” joining Cornwallis on the tenth. Gloucester, opposite Yorktown, was occupied and fortified. Constant skirmishes occurred between Tarleton and Simcoe, of its garrison, and the detachments which Lafayette kept active in the vicinity.

On the eighth, Lafayette wrote to Washington as follows: “We shall act agreeably to circumstances; but avoid drawing ourselves into a false movement, which, if cavalry had command of the river, would give the enemy the advantage of us. His lordship plays so well, that no blunder can be hoped from him, to recover a bad step of ours. Should a fleet come in at this moment, our affairs would take a very happy turn.” On the thirteenth, Lafayette established his headquarters in the forks of the Pamunkey and the Mattaponey. On the twenty-third, he wrote, in part: “In the present state of affairs, my dear general, I hope you will come yourself to Virginia. Lord Cornwallis must be attacked with pretty good apparatus; but when a French fleet takes possession of the Bay, and we form a land force superior to his, that army must sooner or later be forced to surrender, as we may then get what reënforcements we please. I heartily thank you for having ordered me to Virginia. It is to your goodness that I am indebted for the most beautiful prospect which I may ever be able to behold.”

On the thirtieth, Count de Grasse arrived in the Chesapeake with twenty-six sail-of-the-line, besides frigates and transports. On the third of September, Count de St. Simon landed with three thousand two hundred French troops, and was joined by Lafayette at Green Spring on the same day. On the fifth, the allies occupied Williamsburg, about fifteen miles from Yorktown. The Count de Grasse had a limited period for operations on the American coast, and united with the Count de St. Simon to urge an immediate attack upon Yorktown, before its defences could be completed, waiving seniority of rank, and agreeing to serve under Lafayette.

Lafayette thus wrote to Washington: “I am not so hasty as the Count de Grasse, and think that having so sure a game to play, it would be madness, by the risk of an attack, to give anything to chance. Unless matters are very different from what I think they are, my opinion is, that we ought to be contented with preventing the enemy’s forages, with militia; without committing our regulars. Whatever readiness the Marquis de St. Simon has been pleased to express to Colonel Gimât respecting his being under me, I shall do nothing without paying that deference which is due to age, talents, and experience; but would rather incline to the cautious line of conduct I have of late adopted. I hope you will find we have taken the best precautions to prevent his lordship’s escape. I hardly believe he will make the attempt. If he does, he must give up ships, artillery, baggage, part of the horses, all the negroes; must be certain to lose one-third of his army, and run the greatest risk of losing the whole, without gaining that glory which he may derive from a brilliant defence.” On the eighth, Lafayette wrote: “If you knew how slowly things go on in this country! The governor does what he can; the wheels of government are so rusty, that no governor whatever will be able to set them free again. Time will prove that Governor Jefferson has been too severely charged. We will try, if not dangerous, on so large a scale, to form a good idea of the works; but unless I am greatly deceived, there will be madness in attacking them now, with our force. Marquis de St. Simon, Count de Grasse and General Du Portail agree with me in opinion; but should Lord Cornwallis come out against such a position as we have, everybody thinks he cannot but repent of it; and should he beat us, he must soon prepare for another battle.”