Farther down the coast and on the islands the Italians seemed, with few exceptions, to have relinquished every effort to make themselves popular with the Slavs. Of course one naturally hears more of the cases of tension than of those where friendliness prevails; but in the towns or villages where the Slav intelligentsia appreciated that an officer was doing his best, they were obliged invariably to add that he was doing it in spite of his men, and that his control of these men was more or less defective. Numbers of the soldiers, marines and carabinieri may have been animated, when they landed in Dalmatia, with excellent intentions, but their months amid an alien population had produced in them too often a deplorable effect. It must be taken into account that many of them had an almost insurmountable desire to be demobilized. At Gradišca, where many Slovenes were interned, with fences round them but with no roof other than the sky, their guards with other soldiers had risen in revolt. This outbreak was suppressed, certain soldiers—some say sixty, but the number is doubtful—being shot; and all the others took an oath that on the first occasion of a deserter being shot at, they would, down to the last man, leave the barracks. This movement had been growing since the withdrawal of Bissolati from the Cabinet. As for the young officers, they had been exhorted, in a communication from Admiral Millo, the Governor, that they must realize the position they were in. The Admiral's memorial, which was marked with wisdom but also with a too-sweeping air of superiority, was labelled "Secret Document: No. 558 of Register P. Section of Propaganda. Sebenico, March 21, 1919." A copy was found by the Yugoslavs under an officer's mattress, was transcribed and replaced. Since it made admissions with regard to the Croats the contents were telegraphed to Paris. It is a lengthy and to us at times a rather rhetorical exposé, of which it will suffice to make some extracts. "The Officer," says Admiral Millo, "should place himself in a calm and dignified fashion outside and above the disputes which divide the sentiments of the local population. And in accounting, psychologically and historically, for the detestations and the aspirations of either party, he must regard the situation with the serene mind of a judge.... The position of officers is extremely delicate, more particularly in the small centres. It is known that outside the towns the population in its great majority and often its totality consists of Yugo-Slavs or Slavs of the South, that is to say, Croats or Serbo-Croats. It is a people of another race, of that formidable Slav race which for centuries has been pressing against the West, athirst for liberty and eager for the sea; a people with a psychology, a mentality, a civilization, habits, traditions, a national consciousness and a quite special individuality. This population is fundamentally good, good as simple and primitive people are. But the simple and primitive peoples are also extremely sensitive and suspicious and violent in their impulses.... May Heaven preserve the officers from not taking these things into account and from letting themselves be guided solely by their Italian feelings.... Firm nerves, sangfroid and an evenly-balanced mind are required in order to prevent the hostility of the population from causing, as a reaction, resentment and a spirit of revolt, of vengeance and of oppression on our part. The officer must ... become an element of moderation and pacification, with the object of assuaging and obviating the bitter feelings which have been created and fed by a past that is and must be wiped out for ever; and of dissipating that hostility which, determined by a political situation and events, has been and is being incited and strengthened by blind passions and an artificially created campaign of interested parties (da artificiose interessate campagna).... It must be remembered that this is the first contact (il primo contatto) which the population, as yet primitive and uncultured in its mass, has had with Italy, where it instinctively sees the enemy and the new oppressor. We must do our best to make them see in Italy their friend and liberator.... It is evident and it leaps to the eyes of all how delicate and important is the moment of this first contact. Nothing more than a superficial knowledge of the circumstances is needed for the officer to understand that in all his official and personal acts he must behave in such a manner that the population, which is primitive and simple and therefore all the more susceptible to suggestions, should regain the impression that Italy is a great country, the country of liberty and right, that its people is educated and civilized, that its officers and soldiers are here to fulfil a work of civilization and education, of love, in a country which must be Italian on account of historic rights and for the exigencies of Italy's defence: in which the Slavs, who have been introduced by the course of events and as an effect of the expansive potentiality of their race and the artifices of those who dominated the country, will find in the independence and development of their nationality a great fatherland which is civilized, powerful, humane and free.... In estimating the enmity of the Croats the fact must be taken into account that the Croatian world, I mean to say the Croat people, with its action in the interior of Austria while the Italian army was acting outside, resolutely and victoriously, has co-operated in precipitating the downfall of Austria and in freeing itself from a detested régime; particularly in the last year of the War this sentiment of nationality became accentuated with the fervent aspiration for liberty.... These are the circumstances which have determined a special psychology composed of joy and ecstasy—both elements which, in minds that are laden with all the influences of the East, produce a facile and dangerous excitement. On the other hand there survives in the Italian population the hatred against the Croatian supremacy, a hatred which is comprehensible but which in time must give place to other sentiments, rendering possible a fair coexistence of the two populations, whose aim should be common—the prosperity and development of Dalmatia, in the prosperity and for the prosperity, in the greatness and for the greatness of Italy. From this picture it must be instantly clear to every officer that his duty here is ... a truly lofty mission of civilization.... Especially the officer who is in charge of administrative work must awaken impressions that are naturally caused by the sense of justice for all; his severity must be good and his goodness must be severe, and from every act there must transpire the dignity which comes from the might and right of Italy, the kindness and generosity which come from the virtue of the race.... There is already an impression on the part of the Croats that the Italians are good, that Italy is strong. There must also be born and reinforced the other conviction that we are not oppressors but liberators.... The best propaganda, the most efficacious, because spontaneous and unexpected, is done by the officer and his men. The Italian officer ... with the harmony of manners which distinguishes him, obtains very easily the sympathies of this population, a sympathy, however, which for an optimist may become dangerous. Young officers must not forget that the propagators of the great Yugoslavia still exercise with their megalomania a potent influence over the primitive population and that a gesture of theirs, a word, an attitude, may even yet indirectly favour the Croat cause and make difficulties for us in exhibiting our mission of civilization."

HIS MISGUIDED SUBORDINATES AT ŠIBENIK

It is strange that this order should have been so scurvily treated in the town of Šibenik, where it was issued and where the Admiral resided until the beginning of June, after which he transferred the seat of government to Zadar. At Šibenik, by the way, the population comprises 13,000 Yugoslavs and 400 Italianists. On February 20, 1919, there arrived from Zadar, in consequence of an invitation from Admiral Millo, the Italian professor Domiakušić who, according to the sixth clause of the Armistice, was justified in assuming the functions of school-controller, but was not authorized to become the inspector or in any way to interfere in didactic matters. Two inspectors existed in Dalmatia, one for the elementary and one for the secondary school, but the chief school authority of the province and the two inspectors under him were not informed of Professor Domiakušić's nomination. If the Governor intended him to abide by the stipulations of the Armistice, he must have been astonished at the schools being shut on the day after his arrival. And they remained shut, both the modern school and the middle-class girls' school for months, because the Professor's quite illegal attempt to usurp the inspectorship was resented. The secondary school was closed and the teachers who had come to Šibenik with their families, but whose permanent domicile was elsewhere, received an order, delivered by carabinieri, that they would have to leave the town in four days. A few Italians were brought from Split and the school was reopened, but the attendance, which had been about 200, was now 24, and of these only two were the sons of Yugoslavs—but Yugoslavs who had taken office under the Italians, one as President of the Court of Justice and the other as prison inspector; these gentlemen took their boys by the hand and led them to school. Perhaps the Admiral was unaware of these transactions; but various Yugoslav officials, whose salaries had been withheld because they would not sign a paper asking to be made Italian officials, continued, notwithstanding, at their posts for two months; after which the Government perceived that by the clauses of the Armistice they were compelled to pay them. Each of them received exactly what was due, while some Italian teachers who had signed the paper were given a war bonus, extending over five months, of 80 per cent. Whether the Admiral knew of this or not, it does not harmonize with his exalted sentiments. And the town-commandant spoke very darkly[37] on various occasions to the leading citizens of what would come to pass if the Italians by any chance were told to leave the place. His brave fellows, the arditi, so he said, had plenty of machine guns and of ammunition. But this fair-haired German-looking officer was a rampageous sort of person who discharged, according to his lights, the Admiral's "truly lofty mission of civilization." It was not he, but another of the Admiral's subordinates at Šibenik, who, when approached by a certain Mr. Ivaša Zorić with the request that something might be done to release his son, a prisoner of war in Italy, replied: "Your son shall be released in eight days, provided that you declare, in writing, that you are content with the Italian occupation." On Mr. Zorić saying that he was unable to do this, "Very well," said the officer, "then your son will be one of the last to be set free."

THE ITALIANS WANT TO TAKE NO RISKS

Altogether one might say that the schoolmasters were being treated in a manner that was at variance with the Admiral's document. To give a few examples: Ivan Grbić, the schoolmaster at Sutomišcica, was arbitrarily imprisoned and was afterwards removed to another school at Privlaka. The Government school at the former place was closed, an Italian private institution being opened in the same building, with a teacher who was devoid of professional qualifications. The pupils of the school which had been dissolved were compelled by soldiers to attend the new Italian school. The elementary schools at Zemunik were likewise closed and the schoolmasters, after a period of imprisonment, taken to another village. If in the rather dreary little Zemunik, where there is not one Italian, the schoolmaster was very dangerous to the might of Italy, let us compare with this the conduct of the Slovene authorities who permitted more than one priest of the old régime to remain in office—one of them at a village four or five miles from Ljubljana—though they knew that these clergy were wont from the pulpit to utter disloyal sentiments. Maybe the Slovene Government was unwise, but they had scruples in removing a priest; and moreover, they had not given up the hope that these gentlemen would by and by change their opinions. On the island of Pag the schoolmaster Buratović and his wife, who was also a teacher, had to fly in order to escape imprisonment. The schoolmaster Grimani of the same place was obliged, with his wife, to follow the example of Buratović, so that the school was necessarily closed; and an Italian school was started in this island with its 0·31 per cent. of Italians. The same edifying scenes must have taken place as in so many Magyar schools where the pupils—Serbs, Slovaks, Roumanians and so forth—did not understand what the teacher was saying. The Government of the occupied part of Dalmatia appointed to the elementary schools at Rogoznica and Primošten two young Italian law-students from Zadar, who had no pedagogic qualifications; and whereas the legal annual salary was 1080 crowns, these lucky young men were in receipt of 625 crowns a month, which covered more than handsomely any depreciation in the currency. But now to another subject:

Per cent. Yugoslavs.Per cent. Italians.
1.Zadarwith 80·25with 18·61
2.Hvar (Lesina)" 92·94" 6·75
3.Korčula (Curzola)" 94·89" 5·08
4.Šibenik (Sebenico)" 95·66" 1·31
5.Starigrad (Cittavecchia)" 97·98" 1·91
6.Vis (Lissa)" 98·98" 0·92
7.Skradin (Scardona)" 99·36" 0·57
8.Knin" 99·48" 0·31
9.Drniš (Dernish)" 99·49" 0·41
10.Benkovac" 99·60" 0·30
11.Tijesno (Stretto)" 99·61" 0·35
12.Biograd (Zaravecchia)" 99·66" 0·23
13.Pag (Pago)" 99·67" 0·31
14.Obrovac (Obrovazzo)" 99·84" 0·12
15.Kistanje" 99·88" 0·12
16.Blato (Blatta)" 99·93" 0·05

The London Treaty had conferred on Italy the foregoing Judiciary Districts, whose population, according to the last Austrian census, was as given on page 147.

Italy was also to receive portions of the following Justiciary Districts:

Per cent. Yugoslavs.Per cent. Italians.
1.Trogir (Traù)with 99·12with 0·32
2.Sinj" 99·29" 0·24
3.Imotski" 99·84" 0·11
4.Vrlika" 99·95" 0·04

In the early part of 1919 a plebiscite was organized by a delegation which the representatives of the occupied communes elected at Split on January 11. According to the census of 1900 the occupied territory contained 35 communes, divided into 398 localities, with 297,181 inhabitants. In 35 localities, with 14,659 inhabitants, the census was prevented by the Italians, who also confiscated the results of the plebiscite in the commune of Obrovac.[38] The delegates were therefore successful in canvassing 95·07 per cent. of all the inhabitants. In 34 communes the majority for union with Yugoslavia was over 90 per cent., while in 24 it exceeded even 99 per cent. At Zadar (the town) out of 14,056 inhabitants 6623 (= 47 per cent.) voted for Yugoslavia, while in the suburbs, with a larger population, the majority was 89·57 per cent. In the islands the majorities ranged from 96 per cent. to 100 per cent. And if any doubts were entertained as to these figures, the delegates were authorized to propose another plebiscite under the control of a disinterested Allied Power.