THE BELATED TREATY OF RAPALLO
And the Rapallo Treaty of November 1920, when at last the statesmen of Italy and Yugoslavia came to terms regarding all their frontiers! This Treaty was received with much applause by the great majority of the French and British Press; in this country of compromise it was pointed out by many that as each party knew that the other had abated something of his desires the Treaty would probably remain in operation for a long time to come. And column after column of smug comment was written in various newspapers by the "Diplomatic Correspondent," whose knowledge of diplomacy may have been greater than his acquaintance with the Adriatic, since they followed one another, like a procession of sheep, in copying the mistake in a telegram which spoke of Eritto, the curious suburb of Zadar, instead of Borgo Erizzo. They noted that each side had yielded something, though it was true that the Yugoslavs had been the more generous in surrendering half a million of their compatriots, whereas the Italians had given up Dalmatia, to which they never had any right.[58] "The claim for Dalmatia was entirely unjustified," said Signor Colajanni in the Italian Chamber on November 23—yet it was not our business to weigh the profit and loss to the two interested parties. After all, it was they who had between themselves made this Agreement, and one might argue that it surely would be an impertinence if anybody else was more royalist than the king. These commentators held that it was inexpedient for anyone to ask why the Yugoslavs should now have accepted conditions that were, on the whole, considerably worse than those which President Wilson, with the approval of Great Britain and France, had laid down as a minimum, if they were to realize their national unity. And, of course, these writers deprecated any reference to the pressure which France and Great Britain brought to bear upon the Yugoslavs when the negotiations at Rapallo were in danger of falling through. If we take two Scottish newspapers, the Scotsman[59] was typical of this very bland attitude; it congratulated everyone on the harmonious close to a long, intricate and frequently dangerous controversy. The Glasgow Herald,[60] on the other hand, was one of the few newspapers which took a more than superficial view. "Monstrous," it said, "as such intervention seems, no student of the Adriatic White Paper—as lamentable a collection of documents as British diplomacy has to show—can deny its possibility, nay its probability. It is precisely the same game as was nearly successful in January 1920 and again in April 1920, but both times was frustrated by Wilson. We are entitled to ask, for the honour of our nation, if it has been played again; indeed if the whole mask of direct negotiation—a British suggestion—was not devised at San Remo with the express purpose of making the game succeed. If it be so—and if it is not so it is imperative that we are given frankly the full story of British policy in the Adriatic, for instance the dispatches so carefully omitted from the White Paper—then our forebodings for the future are more than justified.... It is emphatically a bad settlement."
"We shall not establish friendly and normal relations with our neighbour Italy unless we reduce all causes of friction to a minimum," said M. Vesnić, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, who during his long tenure of the Paris Legation was an active member of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres and other learned societies; he excelled in getting at the root of the worst difficulties in international law, and he was particularly admired for his ability to combine legal and historic knowledge. Because he studied history minutely—with a special fondness for Gambetta who, racially an Italian, had something of the generous and sacred fervour that distinguished the leaders of the Risorgimento—M. Vesnić could not bring himself to hate Italy, despite all that d'Annunzio and other Imperialists had made his countrymen suffer. "Neither the Government nor the elected representatives of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," said he courageously in his first speech as Prime Minister, "ought to look upon Italy as an enemy country. We have to settle important and difficult questions with Italy.... We must reduce all causes of friction to a minimum."
The Treaty of Rapallo gives Zadar to Italy, because in that little town there is an Italian majority; but central and eastern Istria, with their overwhelming Slav majority, are not given to the Yugoslavs—a fact which Professor Salvemini deplored in the Roman Chamber. By the Treaty of Rapallo Rieka is given independence,[61] but with Italy in possession of Istria and the isle of Cres, she can at any moment choke the unprotected port, having very much the same grip of that place as Holland has for so long had of Antwerp; and the sole concession on Italy's part seems to be that in the south she gives up the large Slav islands of Hvar, Korčula and Vis, and only appropriates the small one of Lastovo.... "It has cost Italy a pang," says Mr. George Trevelyan, "to consent, after victory, to leave the devoted and enthusiastic Italians of the Dalmatian coast towns (other than Zara) in foreign territory." The truth is that henceforward Yugoslavia will contain some 5000 Italians (many of whom are Italianized Slavs), as against not less than 600,000 Slavs in Italy. And while the former are but tiny groups in towns which even under Venetian rule were predominantly Slav and are surrounded on all sides by purely Slav populations, the latter live for the most part in compact masses and include roughly one-third of the whole Slovene race, whose national sense is not only very acute, but who are also much less illiterate than their Italian neighbours. One cannot be astonished if the Slovenes think of this more than of Giotto, Leonardo, Galileo and Dante. But one may be a little surprised that such a man as Mr. Edmund Gardner should allow his reverence for the imperishable glories of Italy to becloud his view of the modern world. It is certainly a fact that the Slovenes are to-day less illiterate than the Italians, but because Dr. Seton-Watson alludes to this, Mr. Gardner (in the Manchester Guardian, of February 13, 1921) deplores the "Balkanic mentality that seems to afflict some Englishmen when dealing with these problems."
ITS PROBABLE FRUITS
Now it is obvious that the Treaty of Rapallo has placed between the Yugoslavs and the Italians all too many causes of friction. Zadar, like other such enclaves, will be dear to the heart of the smuggler. She cannot live without her Yugoslav hinterland—five miles away in Yugoslavia are the waterworks, and if these were not included, by a special arrangement, in her dominion, she would have no other liquid but her maraschino. She cannot die without her Yugoslav hinterland—but so that her inhabitants need not be carried out into a foreign land, the cemetery has also, by stretching a point, been included in the city boundaries. It remains to be seen how Zadar and the hinterland will serve two masters. We have alluded to the questionable arrangements at Rieka, in which town there had for those years been such an orgy of limelight and recrimination that even the most statesmanlike solution must have left a good deal of potential friction. In Istria the dangers of an outbreak are evident. Italy has now become the absolute mistress of the Adriatic and has gained a strategical frontier which could hardly be improved upon, while Yugoslavia has been placed in an economic position of much difficulty. Sooner or later, if matters are left in situ, trouble will arise. Perhaps an economic treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia, as favourable as possible to the weaker State, would introduce some sort of stability; but no good cause would be served by crying "Peace" where there is no peace, and while Yugoslavia has a grievance there will be trouble in the Balkans.
The most serious phase of the Adriatic crisis is now ushered in, for a new Alsace has been created; and those who point this out cannot be charged with an excessive leaning towards the Yugoslavs. It also seems to me that one can scarcely say they are alarmists. If Yugoslavia, in defiance of that most immoral pressure, had declared for war, Vesnić at the general election would have swept the country with the cry of "War for Istria!" To his eternal honour he chose the harder path of loyalty to the new ideas which Serbian blood has shed so freely to make victorious. A momentary victory has now been gained by the Italians, but not one that makes for peace. It poisons by annexations fundamentally unjustifiable, however consecrated by treaty, the whole source of tranquillity in the Near East. "Paciencia!" [Have patience] you say, in refusing to give alms to a Portuguese beggar, and he follows your advice. But when the Yugoslavs ask for a revision of the Treaty—if the Italians do not wisely offer it themselves—it would be rash if in attempting to foretell the future we should base ourselves upon the premise that their patience will be everlasting. A new Alsace has been created, an Alsace to which, in the opinion of competent observers, all the Yugoslavs will turn until the day comes when it is honourable to set the standards forth on a campaign of liberation.
NEW FORCES IN THE FIRST YUGOSLAV PARLIAMENT
When the Yugoslavs were at last in a position, late in 1920, to hold the elections for the Constituent Assembly the Radicals and the Democrats were the most successful, but even if they made a Coalition they would still have no majority. [Now and then the Democrats asserted themselves against the Radicals, but when the Opposition thought they could perceive a rift the Democratic Press would write that the two parties were most intimately joined to one another, and especially the Democrats.] The small parties were very numerous, the smallest being that of M. Ribarac, the old Liberal leader, who found himself in the Skupština with nobody to lead; the clericals of Slovenia came to grief, a fact which appeared to give general satisfaction, and a similar mishap befell the decentralizing parties of Croatia. On the other hand the Croat Peasants' party, whose decentralization ideas were more extreme, had a very considerable success, and the Communist party, whose fall we have already described, had come to the Skupština with some fifty members.
(a) MARKOVIĆ THE COMMUNIST