We have alluded to the relations between Serbs and Croats. This is a subject of such importance that it will be well to consider it more fully. When Yugoslavia sprang into existence at the end of the War—70 per cent. of this State having previously been under the rule of the House of Habsburg—it was met in various quarters with a grudging welcome. Soon, we were told, it would dissolve again, and every symptom of internal discontent was treated as a proof of this. On the other hand there were those who told us that the Southern Slavs, having come together after all these hundreds of years, were tightly clasped in each others' arms and that all reports to the contrary came from very interested parties.
Little was said of the Slovenes; their language, as we have mentioned, is not the same as that spoken by Serbs and Croats, and—what is of still greater importance—they have Slovenia to themselves. If Croatia were equally immune from Serbs, then by this time the Southern Slavs would be a more united nation. Those people were wrong who fancied that the presence of the Serbs in Croatia—they form between one-fourth and one-third of the population—would be of service in welding together the new State. They forgot that for many years the Austro-Hungarian Government had in Croatia played off the Roman Catholic Croats against the Orthodox Serbs. The two Slav brothers were incited to mutual hatred, and though such a propaganda would naturally have more effect among the uneducated classes, yet all too often the intelligentsia responded to these machinations. More favour, of course, was shown to the Croats, whose obedience could largely be secured by means of the Church, whereas no similar pressure could be brought to bear upon the Orthodox Serbs. Even if the Government approached the Orthodox clergy, these latter had only a very moderate control over their flock. A Serb is always ready to subscribe towards the erection of a new church, which he regards as most other nations regard their flag; but when it is built he rarely enters it. This being so, the Austro-Hungarian Government tyrannized over the Serbs in Croatia by measures taken against their schools, the Cyrillic alphabet and so forth. It was natural that the suffering Serbs were apt to compare these restrictions with those that were imposed upon the Croats. However, among the intelligentsia an effort—a fairly successful effort—was made to nullify this dividing policy; the Serbo-Croat Coalition was formed, one of the protagonists being Svetozar Pribičević, that very energetic Serb of Croatia, and in 1906 this party obtained no less than sixty-eight seats, while the power of the older Croat parties was correspondingly diminished and Radić had his very small following in the Zagreb Lantag. [Those who represented Croatia in the central Parliament at Buda-Pest were chosen by the Ban, Khuen-Hedérváry. Those forty members had practically no acquaintance with the Magyar language, so that some of them drew their 8000 annual crowns and only went to Pest if an important division was expected, others who spent more time in the capital wasted their lives amid surroundings just as riotous as and more expensive than the Parliament, while only those did useful work who managed to confer, behind the scenes, with the authorities. To some extent this was done by Pribičević and to a greater extent by another Serb, Dr. Dušan Popović, who surpassed him in capacity and geniality. It was he, by the way, who demonstrated in the Buda-Pest Parliament that if the average Croat deputy was ignorant of the Magyar language, there was a greater ignorance of Serbo-Croatian on the part of the Magyars. One day when he had started on a speech in his native tongue he was howled down after he had explained that he was talking Serbian. He promised to continue in Croatian, and did so without being interrupted.]
At Zagreb the fusion of the Croat and Serb intelligentsia was still very incomplete at the outbreak of the War—the Croat Starčevist party and others going their own way. During the War the Austro-Hungarian Government ruled by means of the Coalition party; but the latter had no choice, and throughout Croatia they were never charged with infidelity to the Slav cause. They did whatever their delicate situation permitted; and in October 1918, when the Slavs of Croatia and Slovenia threw off the yoke of centuries and joined with the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro, one hoped that the simultaneous arrival in Belgrade of the Coalition and the Starčevist leaders heralded in Croatia a cessation of the ancient hostility. Pribičević became Minister of the Interior in the new State, and very soon it was obvious that he meant to govern in a centralizing fashion, despite his earlier assurance that no such steps would be taken without the sanction of the Constituent Assembly. No doubt his motives were unimpeachable; he feared lest the negative, anti-Serb mentality, which for so long had flourished among the Croats, would not, except by drastic methods, be removed. He was met with opposition. Now you see, he cried, there are still in Croatia a number of disloyal Slavs, great landowners, Catholic clergy and others whom the Habsburgs used to favour. And he continued, with hundreds of edicts, to try to weld the State together. Consumed with patriotism, his great black eyes on flame amid the pallor of his face—his luminous and martyred face, to use the expression of his friends—he never for a moment relaxed his efforts; if those who opposed him were numerous it was all the more reason why he must be resolute. The rôle fitted him very well, for he is the dourest politician in Yugoslavia—a perfectly honest, upright, injudicious patriot. His Democratic party had now taken the place of the Serbo-Croat Coalition and it saw the other parties in Croatia gradually drifting back again from it or rather from the dominating man; if his place had been occupied by his afore-mentioned colleague, the burly and beloved Dušan Popović, there would have been in Zagreb a very much suaver atmosphere. But unfortunately Popović is a wealthy man, a highly successful lawyer who cares little for the tumult of politics.... It was a thorny problem, whether the State should be constituted on a federal or a centralized basis.[63] The federation of the United States depends on the centralization of political parties, whereas in Yugoslavia the parties have only just begun to combine. Feudalism in the German Empire rested on the predominance of Prussia, a position which the Serbs are, under present conditions, loth to occupy in Yugoslavia. In Germany, moreover, many of the States used to be independent, while in Yugoslavia this was only the case with Serbia and Montenegro. Centralism would tend to obliterate the tribal divisions, but on the other hand it brings in its train bureaucracy, which is slow, cumbrous and often corrupt; it demands unusually good central institutions and first-rate communications, neither of which are as yet in a satisfactory state. The constitution has arrived at a compromise between the federal and the centralized systems. A writer in the Contemporary Review (November 1921) said that the division of the whole of Yugoslavia into some twenty administrative areas [he should have said thirty-three] to replace the racial areas, was a very drastic proposal to put forward; and he added that when the historic provincial divisions of France were broken up into departments, the nation had been prepared by nearly 200 years of centralization under the monarchy. It is a flaw in his argument to say that the previously existing areas were racial, whereas populations of identical race were divided from one another by the course of events. And in the proposed obliteration of these divisions—to be effected in a less arbitrary fashion than in France, where no account was taken of the former provinces—it can scarcely be maintained that, of itself, this part of the centralizing programme in Yugoslavia is so very drastic.
Whatever one may think about the Balkan peoples it is a fact that the essential Serb, the Serb from Šumadia, is a pacific person, rather lazy perhaps, but certainly more devoted to dancing than to battle. And some of the wiser Serbs were dubious in 1919 and 1920 as to whether the most sagacious methods were being employed in Croatia. Radić was in prison, but they were told that this impetuous demagogue was insisting on a republic, and the Croat intelligentsia were far from happy. It is true that in the elections of November 1920 the National party, as the Starčevists now called themselves, had no great success; but the Radić party had more than half the seats. Surely this had not been brought about merely by the chief's imprisonment? There seemed to be in that province some wider, some growing dissatisfaction. And in the spring of 1921 most of the Catholic Croats, those within and those without the Radić party, were nourishing a score of grievances. No doubt a large proportion of these were unavoidable (in view of the state of Central Europe) or were rather trivial (the mayor of an important town told me that he, who was under the Minister of the Interior, had received an order from the Belgrade Minister of War, with respect to the detention of deserters—conditions, said he, were not so primitive in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy) and sometimes the grievances were against the Habsburgs (for not having made them more fit to assume these new responsibilities), and sometimes they were against the Serbs for being less civilized—though they might be more moral—than themselves, and sometimes the grievances were personal: now and then after the Austrian collapse a Serbian officer or his men, uncertain of the feelings of the population, had acted with unwise, or rather with inexpedient, vigour—instead of shooting those who in the general anarchy were laying waste and plundering, they merely flogged them, and this was for a long time remembered against them, although the Croat intelligentsia who had taken service in the police flogged in a far more wholesale fashion. But down at the bottom of all the grievances there is the fundamental fact that the Southern Slavs yearn to be comrades, to shake off the differences which in the course of ages have grown up between them. These fraternal sentiments may be crudely expressed—it has happened that a Slav from Bosnia (whose ancestors adopted Islam some centuries ago) finds himself in a Serbian village. He strikes up acquaintance with some native. "What is your name?" asks the latter. "Muhammed." The Serb has never heard of such a name; he is puzzled. "Well, never mind," says he, and takes his new friend back to dinner. They sit down to the sucking pig. Muhammed refuses to partake of it, and informs the Serb that Allah would be angry. "Don't be afraid," says the Serb; "I'll tell him that it's my fault," and after a time he overcomes the Bosniak's scruples.... In more cultured circles the wonderful union of the Southern Slavs is manifested after a different fashion, and those neighbours who imagine that the afore-mentioned grievances are going to dissolve the new State will one day see how much they are mistaken. The Southern Slavs intend to quarrel with each other, to quarrel like brothers.
THE SAD CASE OF PRIBIČEVIĆ
As between the Catholic and the Orthodox in Croatia the sole uncertainty is whether this fusion will shortly take place or after an interval. It is agreed by the most malcontent schoolmasters that their pupils are growing up to be excellent Yugoslavs who will have no more fear of what they call "Serb hegemony" than have the Scots of that of England. As for the present generation of Croats and Serbs, if they were Occidentals they would be old enough to laugh at each others' peculiarities and each others' statesmen. But South-Eastern Europe is still under the morning clouds, and they are inclined to take seriously what we in the West make fun of. However, there is one man whose presence in the Cabinet the Croats cannot be expected to regard with good-humour or with nonchalance. The reconciliation of Croatia will be much more easily effected if Mr. Pribičević resigns. His merits as a demagogue and political writer are undeniable. He would make an excellent Whip. But he prefers to be a Minister, and most unfortunately he is not a statesman. A zealous patriot, he is as yet unable to conceive that the business of the State could be more successfully managed without him. The sweets of office appear, if anything, to have made him more bitter; and even among the Serbs of the old kingdom his withdrawal is considered advisable. A friend of his has told me that in the middle of a laughing conversation he threw out a hint of this, and like a cloud blown suddenly across a summer sky, Pribičević's face grew black. Unhappily he is not even Fortinbras and yet imagines he is Hamlet. A good many people in Yugoslavia call him un homme fatal, most of the others l'homme fatal. It is said that in the Democratic party he is actively supported by not more than ten deputies, but that the others, to preserve the party, take no steps. He himself, however, would probably have not the least hesitation in choosing another party, if he could otherwise not stay in the Cabinet; for his permanence in office is the one idea that crushes every other from his mind. If he cannot be Minister of the Interior—a post from which he has been more than once, and happily for Yugoslavia, ejected—then he insists on being Minister of Education. What are his qualifications? Years ago he gave instruction at a school for elementary teachers, and so faint a conception has he of the educational needs of his country that one day when a Professor of Belgrade University asked him if no steps could be taken to diminish the prohibitive cost of books, especially foreign books, the Minister simply stared at him as if he had been talking Chinese. And yet in a recent book of national verses, published by his brother Adam, we are told that:
"At the table also sat the sage Pribičević,
Who can converse with Emperors...."
There are some who, curiously, have compared Radić's party with the Sinn Feiners; Radić may have announced that he would approach the Serbs as the representative of an independent country, but he never proposed, even when his views were most extreme, to realize them with physical force. At a great open-air meeting of his adherents the speeches were so mild that only twice did the Chief of Police, who was next to me, raise a warning finger, and on each occasion to keep the orator from very innocent digressions. Nevertheless, there is no concealing the fact that even in these unsatisfactory times—"It seems to me," said a philosophic peasant recently at Valjevo, in the heart of Serbia, "it seems to me that if we had a plebiscite then Valjevo might not wish to remain with Serbia!"—even in a world that is so awry the Croats are more reserved towards the union than is good for the State. Perhaps they would cherish fewer grievances if they had gained their freedom with greater difficulty; and surely they need have no more uneasiness than have the Scots that their name and nationality will be swamped, for what the Magyars were unable to do, that the Serbs do not wish to do. There are among the Serbs a few extremists, such as a pernicious editor or two, but their anti-Croat tirades find extremely little favour anywhere. Last autumn when the Prince-Regent (now King Alexander) visited the Croat capital his reception was most enthusiastic. "Let us keep him here!" cried the people, "and let King Peter stay in Belgrade!" The Prince by his tact brought the Croat out of his tent; he must not be allowed to go back again—let the Southern Slavs observe what each of their provinces can bring towards the common good. The Croats acknowledge that the military system of Serbia is more endurable—only one son is taken out of each family—and that whereas in Slovenia a lawsuit can be settled in fourteen days it has been wont in Croatia to take as many years. Unfortunately human nature, in Serbia, Croatia and everywhere else, finds that the bad points of other people are more worthy of comment than the good. When two brothers have been brought up in very different circumstances there will be so many points on which they differ; and when a Serb taking part in a technical discussion of scientists wishes to say that he differs from the previous speaker he will commonly observe that that person has made a fool of himself. When an editor alludes to a political opponent he may call him an assassin and be much astonished if this is resented. "Je suis un ours," said a Serbian savant of European repute; occasionally he behaves like one and is rather proud of it. The Serbs of Croatia have been imitating, nay exaggerating, the emphatic manners of their countrymen in the old kingdom. And Pribičević, as Minister of Education, has not attempted to give the Croats a tactful course in courage, patriotism and morality, where they have much to learn from the less civilized Serbs, but scowling at them he has made up his mind that, in and out of school, they must straightway be the closest of companions.
However, the Serbs and Croats have a man whose counsel is more worthy of attention. Dr. Trumbić, formerly the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had been elected at the head of four different lists in his native Dalmatia but had entered the Constituent Assembly without giving his allegiance to any party. And in April 1921 he made a speech as memorable as it was long, for it occupied the whole of one sitting and was continued the next day. Careless of the applause and the antagonism which he excited, the serene orator pointed out that the conflict between Serbs and Croats was based on their different psychology. Croatia had had her independent life and must be considered as a factor in Yugoslavia; but having come in, like Montenegro, of her own accord, she had not wished to be a separate factor. Traditions should not be so lightly set aside; and while there was perhaps no people more homogeneous than the Yugoslavs it should be remembered that none was more ready to resist the application of force.
LESSONS OF THE MONTENEGRIN ELECTIONS