The victory of Austerlitz is considered by many competent judges as the most splendid triumph ever gained by Napoleon; and the “sun of Austerlitz,” is a watchword with the French soldiery to the present day. The scene of this great battle is in the vicinity of the small seignoral town of Austerlitz, situated on the Littawa, in Moravia.
Napoleon, with that military tact which he had received from nature, and which he had so greatly improved by experience, had adopted, among other positions which he might have taken about Brunn, one which could not fail to insure to him the most important results, under the supposition that he should be attacked—a supposition which had become a certainty.
The mountains of Moravia, which connect the mountains of Bohemia with those of Hungary, subside successively towards the Danube, so completely that near that river Moravia presents but one wide plain. In the environs of Brunn, the capital of the province, they are not of greater altitude than high hills, and are covered with dark firs. Their waters, retained for want of drains, form numerous ponds, and throw themselves by various streams into the Morawa, or March, and by the Morawa and the Danube.
All these characters are found together in the position between Brunn and Austerlitz, which Napoleon has rendered forever celebrated. The high road of Moravia, running from Vienna to Brunn, rises in a direct line to the northward, then, in passing from Brunn to Olmutz, descends abruptly to the right, that is to the east, thus forming a right angle with its first direction. In the angle is situated the position in question. It commences on the left towards the Olmutz road, with heights studded with firs; it then runs to the right in an oblique direction towards the Vienna road, and after subsiding gradually, terminates in ponds full of deep water in winter. Along this position, and in front of it, runs a rivulet, which has no name known in geography, but which, in part of its course, is called Goldbach by the people of the country. It runs through the little villages of Girzikowitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and Telnitz, and, sometimes forming marshes, sometimes confined in channels, terminates in the ponds above mentioned, which are called the ponds of Satschau and Menitz.
Concentrated with all his forces on this ground, defended on the one hand upon the wooded hills of Moravia, and particularly upon a rounded knoll to which the soldiers of Egypt gave the name of the Centon, defended on the other, upon the ponds of Satschau and Menitz—thus covering by his left the Olmutz road, by his right the Vienna road—Napoleon was in a condition to accept with advantage a decisive battle. He meant not, however, to confine his operations to self-defence, for he was accustomed to reckon upon greater results; he had divined, as though he had read them, the plans framed at great length by General Weirother. The Austro-Russians, having no chance of wresting from him the point d’appui which he found for his left in the high wooded hills, would be tempted to turn his right, which was not close to the ponds, and to take the Vienna road from him. There was sufficient inducement for this step; for Napoleon, if he lost that road, would have no other resource but to retire into Bohemia. The rest of his forces, hazarded towards Vienna, would be obliged to ascend separately the valley of the Danube. The French army, thus divided, would find itself doomed to a retreat, eccentric, perilous, nay, even disastrous, if it should fall in with the Prussians by the way.
Napoleon was perfectly aware that such must be the plan of the enemy. Accordingly, after concentrating his army towards his left and the heights, he left towards his right, that is towards Sokolnitz, Telnitz, and the ponds, a space almost unguarded. He thus invited the Russians to persevere in their plans. But it was not precisely there that he prepared the mortal stroke for them. The ground facing him presented a feature from which he hoped to derive a decisive result.
Beyond the stream that ran in front of the position, the ground spread at first, opposite to the left, into a slightly undulated plain, through which passed the Olmutz road; then, opposite to the centre, it rose successively, and at last formed facing the right a plateau, called the plateau of Pratzen, after the name of a village situated half-way up, in the hollow of a ravine. This plateau terminated on the right in rapid declivities towards the ponds, and at the back in a gentle slope towards Austerlitz, the chateau of which appeared at some distance.
There were to be seen considerable forces; there a multitude of fires blazed at night, and a great movement of men and horses was observable by day. On these appearances, Napoleon had no longer any doubt of the designs of the Austro-Russians. They intended evidently to descend from the position which they occupied, and, crossing the Goldbach rivulet, between the ponds and the French right, to cut them off from the Vienna road. But, for this reason, it was resolved to take the offensive in turn, to cross the rivulet at the villages of Girzikowitz and Puntowitz, to ascend to the plateau of Pratzen while the Russians were leaving it, and to take possession of it. In case of success, the enemy’s army would be cut in two; one part would be thrown to the left into the plain crossed by the Olmutz road; the other to the right into the ponds. Thenceforward the battle could not fail to be disastrous for the Austro-Russians. But, for this effect, it was requisite that they should not blunder by halves. The prudent, nay even timid attitude of Napoleon, exciting their silly confidence, would induce them to commit the entire blunder.
Agreeably to these ideas, Napoleon made his dispositions. Expecting for two days past to be attacked, he had ordered Bernadotte to quit Iglau on the frontier of Bohemia, to leave there the Bavarian division which he had brought with him, and to hasten by forced marches to Brunn. He had ordered Marshal Davoust to march Friant’s and if possible Gudin’s division towards the abbey of Gross Raigern, situated on the road from Vienna to Brunn, opposite to the ponds. In consequence of these orders, Bernadotte marched, and had arrived on the 1st of December. General Friant, being alone apprised in time, because General Gudin was at a greater distance towards Presburg, had set out immediately, and travelled in forty-eight hours the thirty-six leagues which separate Vienna from Gross Raigern. The soldiers sometimes dropped on the road, exhausted with fatigue; but at the least sound, imagining that they heard the cannon, they rose with ardor to hasten to the assistance of their comrades, engaged, they said, in a bloody battle. On the night of the 1st of December, which was extremely cold, they bivouacked at Gross Raigern, a league and a half from the field of battle. Never did troops on foot perform so astonishing a march; for it is a march of eighteen leagues a day for two successive days.
On the 1st of December, Napoleon, reinforced by Bernadotte’s corps and Friant’s division, could number sixty-five or seventy thousand men, present under arms, against ninety thousand men, Russians and Austrians, likewise present under arms.