NAPOLEON AT JENA. Page 186.
The principal of the heights that overlook the town of Jena is called Landgrafenberg, and, since the memorable events of which it has been the theatre, it has received from the inhabitants the name of Napoleonsberg. It is the highest in these parts. Napoleon and Lannes, surveying from that height the surrounding country, with their backs turned to Jena, beheld on their right the Saale running in a deep, winding, wooded gorge, to Naumburg[Naumburg], which is six or seven leagues from Jena. Before them they saw undulated plateaux, extending to a distance, and subsiding by a gentle slope to the little valley of the Ilm, at the extremity of which is situated the town of Weimar. They perceived on their left the high road from Jena to Weimar, rising by a series of slopes from the gorge of the Muhlthal to these plateaux, and running in a straight line to Weimar. These slopes, somewhat resembling a sort of snail’s shell, have thence received in German the appellation of the Schneeke[Schneeke] (snail.)
It was in September, 1806, that Napoleon, having set all his divisions in motion, left Paris and put himself at the head of his grand army. The Prussians were superior in numbers, well disciplined, and full of spirit. They numbered between one hundred and thirty thousand and one hundred and forty thousand men. The cavalry especially, bore a high reputation, which, however, as we shall see, it could not sustain. The French Emperor had an army of one hundred and seventy thousand men in the field, with a power of concentrating one hundred thousand of them within a few hours.
On learning that the Prussian army was changing its position and advancing from Erfurt upon Weimar, with a view to approach the banks of the Saale, Napoleon manœuvred to meet the changes of the enemy.
They might be coming thither with one of the two following intentions: either to occupy the bridge over the Saale at Naumburg, over which passes the great central road of Germany, in order to retire upon the Elbe, while covering Leipzig and Dresden; or to approach the course of the Saale, for the purpose of defending its banks against the French. To meet this double contingency, Napoleon took a first precaution, which was to dispatch Marshal Davoust immediately to Naumburg, with orders to bar the passage of the bridge there with the twenty-six thousand men of the third corps. He sent Murat, with the cavalry, along the banks of the Saale, to watch its course, and to push reconnoisances as far as Leipzig. He directed Marshal Bernadette upon Naumburg, with instructions to support Marshal Davoust in case of need. He sent Marshals Lannes and Augereau to Jena itself. His object was to make himself master immediately of the two principal passages of the Saale, those at Naumburg and Jena, either to stop the Prussian army there, if it should design to cross and to retire to the Elbe, or to go and seek it on the heights bordering that river, if it purposed to remain there on the defensive. As for himself, he continued with Marshals Ney and Soult, within reach of Naumburg and Jena, ready to march for either point according to circumstances.
On the morning of the 13th, he learned by more circumstantial accounts that the enemy was definitively approaching the Saale, with the yet uncertain resolution of fighting a defensive battle on its banks, or of crossing and pushing on to the Elbe. It was in the direction from Weimar to Jena that the largest assemblage appeared. Without losing a moment, Napoleon mounted his horse to proceed to Jena. He gave himself his instructions to Marshals Soult and Ney, and enjoined them to be at Jena in the evening, or at latest in the night. He directed Murat to bring his cavalry towards Jena, and Marshal Bernadotte to take at Dornburg an intermediate position between Jena and Naumburg. He set out immediately, sending officers to stop all troops on march to Gera, and to make them turn back for Jena.
In the evening of the preceding day, Marshal Davoust had entered Naumburg, occupied the bridge of the Saale, and taken considerable magazines, with a fine bridge equipage. Marshal Bernadotte had joined him. Murat had sent his light cavalry as far as Leipzig, and surprised the gates of that great commercial city. Lannes had proceeded towards Jena, a small university town, seated on the very banks of the Saale, and had driven back pell-mell the enemy’s troops left beyond the river, as well as the baggage, which encumbered the road. He had taken possession of Jena, and immediately pushed his advanced posts upon the heights which command it. From these heights he had perceived the army of the Prince of Hohenlohe, which, after recrossing the Saale, encamped between Jena and Weimar, and he had reason to suspect that a great assemblage was collecting in that place.
Napoleon had arrived at Jena on the afternoon of the 13th of October. Marshal Lannes, who had outstripped him, was waiting for him with impatience, like that of a war-horse, snuffing the battle. Both mounted their horses to reconnoitre the localities. We have described the ground upon which the battle was fought. The Prussians were posted on the heights which overlook the town of Jena. The French were coming up on the low ground on the opposite side of the river. The chief difficulty was to reach the Prussians. There was but one method that appeared practicable. The bold tirailleurs of Lannes, entering the ravines which are met with on going out of Jena, had succeeded in ascending the principal eminence, and all at once perceived the Prussian army encamped on the plateaux of the left bank. Followed presently by some detachments of Suchet’s division, they had made room for themselves by driving in General Tauenzien’s advanced posts. Thus by force of daring, the heights which commanded the left bank of the Saale were gained; but by a route which was scarcely practicable to artillery. Thither, Lannes conducted the emperor, amidst an incessant fire of tirailleurs which rendered reconnoisance extremely dangerous.
Napoleon, having before him a mass of troops, the force of which could scarcely be estimated, supposed that the Prussian army had chosen this ground for a field of battle, and immediately made his dispositions, so as to debouch with his army on the Landgrafenberg, before the enemy should hasten up, en masse, to hurl him into the precipices of the Saale. He was obliged to make the best use of his time, and to take advantage of the space gained by the tirailleurs to establish himself on the height. He had, it is true, no more of it than the summit, for, only a few paces off, there was the corps of General Tauenzien, separated from the French only by a slight ridge of ground. This corps was stationed near two villages, one on the right, that of Closewitz, surrounded by a small wood, the other on the left, that of Cospoda, likewise surrounded by a wood of some extent. Napoleon purposed to leave the Prussians quiet in this position till the next day, and meanwhile to lead part of his army up the Landgrafenberg. The space which it occupied was capable of containing the corps of Lannes and the guard. He ordered them to be led up immediately through the steep ravines which serve to ascend from Jena to the Landgrafenberg. On the left, he placed Gazan’s division. On the right, Suchet’s division; in the centre, and a little in rear, the foot-guard. He made the latter encamp in a square of four thousand men, and in the centre of this square he established his own bivouac.