Napoleon halted two weeks at Witepsk. He felt that if he could not find the Russian army, it was necessary to make a conquest that would end the campaign with substantial glory. Now, more than ever the idea of capturing the ancient Moscow entered his head, and he quickly decided to advance. Already full of the plan, which was to crown him with success, he ran to his maps. There he saw nothing but Smolensko and Moscow.
“At the sight of them,” says Hazlitt, “he appeared inflamed by the genius of war. His voice became harsh; his glance fiery, and his whole air stern and fierce. His attendants retired from his presence, through fear as well as respect; but at length his mind was fixed, his determination taken, and his line of march traced out. Immediately after, the tempest was calmed, and having given consistency and utterance to his great conceptions, his features resumed their wonted character of placidity and cheerfulness.” He did all in his power to gain over his officers to his purposes, and redoubled his attentions to his soldiers. The latter soon displayed a spirit of heroic devotion to his person.
The column of advance consisted of one hundred and eighty-five thousand men; not one half of the complement of the vast army which had entered Russia on the 23d of June.
It must be remembered that the great tract of country already passed was now occupied by his army, and necessarily expended a force, amounting perhaps to nearly eighty thousand men; but it is computed that in addition to this diminution of his army engaged in actual service, he had lost one-third of his original numbers by desertion, wounds, or death, either from fatigue or disease, or in the field of battle. Numbers of his hospital wagons, pontoons, and provision wagons, also, were far in the rear. Still, all these considerations gave way before his ardent desire to hurry the war to a termination, and the exertions he made at Witepsk were all with a view to an advance. Several actions, occurred between his generals and the different divisions of the Russian army during the period in which he held his head-quarters at Witepsk. Schwartzenberg conquered Tormazoff at Gorodeczna; Barclay retreated before Ney at Krasnoi; and Oudinot defeated Witgenstein near Polotsk, in a second combat,—the first in which they encountered was indecisive. It was at this moment that Napoleon received news of the conclusion of peace between Russia and Turkey, an event which much more than counterbalanced these successes.
During the first week of August, intelligence reached Witepsk, that the advanced guard, led by Prince Eugene, had obtained some advantages near Suraij; but that, in the centre, at Tukowo, near the Dnieper, Sebastiani had been surprised, and conquered by superior numbers. This information, together with the march of Barclay upon Rudnia, decided Napoleon. He conjectured that the whole Russian army was united between the Dwina and the Dnieper, and was marching against his cantonments. His conjecture proved to be perfectly correct. The Russian commander-in-chief conceiving that the French army at Witepsk lay considerably more dispersed than his own, had resolved to attempt a surprise. The utmost activity now pervaded head-quarters. On the 10th of August, Napoleon was observed to write eight letters to Davoust, and nearly as many to each of his commanders. “If the enemy defends Smolensko,” he said, in one of his letters to Davoust, “as I am tempted to believe he will, we shall have a decisive engagement there, and we cannot have too large a force. Orcha will become the central point of the army. Every thing induces me to believe that there will be a great battle at Smolensko.” Barclay having laid a plan for the surprise of Napoleon, the latter by a daring manœuvre avoided it, and almost succeeded in an attempt to turn the very same plan of surprise upon his enemy. Allowing the skirmishing to continue on the advanced posts, he changed his line of operations, and turning the left of the Russians instead of their right, which was expected by Barclay, he gained the rear of their army, and endeavored to occupy Smolensko, and act upon their lines of communication with Moscow. To effect this, he had withdrawn his forces from Witepsk and the line of the Dwina, with equal skill and rapidity, and throwing four bridges across the Dnieper, made a passage for Ney, Eugene Beauharnais, and Davoust, with Murat at the head of two large bodies of cavalry. They were supported by Poniatowski and Junot, who advanced in different routes. The attack was led by Ney and Murat, who bore down all opposition till they reached Krasnoi, where a battle was fought on the 14th of August. He had thus suddenly changed his line of operations from the Dwina to the Dnieper, and the manœuvre has been the subject of much admiration and criticism among French and Russian tacticians.
The Russian general, Newerowskoi, who commanded at Krasnoi, finding himself attacked by a body of infantry stronger than his own, and two large bodies of cavalry besides, retreated upon the road to Smolensko. This road being favorable for the action of cavalry, he was hotly pressed by Murat, who led the pursuit in full splendor of attire, and with all the reckless valor which characterised him. He also dispatched some of his light squadrons to alarm if not attack the front of the retreating corps, while he made furious onsets upon their flank and rear. Newerowskoi, however, effected a skilful and gallantly-conducted retreat, availing himself of a double row of trees on the high road to Smolensko, by which he evaded the charges of the cavalry, and was enabled to pour in a heavy fire. He made good his retreat into Smolensko, with the loss of four hundred men.
The day on which the combat at Krasnoi was fought, happened to be the Emperor’s birth-day. There was no intention of keeping it in these immense solitudes, and under the present circumstances of peril and anxiety. There could be no heartfelt festival without a complete victory. Murat and Ney, however, on giving in the report of their recent success, could not refrain from complimenting the Emperor on the anniversary of his nativity. A salute from a hundred pieces of artillery was now heard, fired according to their orders. Napoleon, with a look of displeasure, observed, that in Russia it was important to be economical of French powder. But he was informed in reply, that it was Russian powder, and had been taken the night before. The idea of having his birth-day celebrated at the expense of the Russians made Napoleon smile. Prince Eugene also paid his compliments to the Emperor on this occasion; but was cut short by Napoleon saying, “Every thing is preparing for a battle. I will gain that, and then we will see Moscow.”
While Newerowskoi was intrenched in Smolensko, the generals, Barclay and Bagration, who were stationed towards Inkowo, between the Dnieper and Lake Kasplia, hesitated whether to attack the French army, which they believed to be still in their front. But when they heard of the situation of Newerowskoi, the question of forcing the French lines was superseded by the necessity of hurrying to the rescue of Smolensko. Murat had already commenced an attack on the city. Ney had attempted to carry the citadel by a coup de main, but was repulsed with the loss of two or three hundred men, and was himself slightly wounded. He withdrew to an eminence on the river’s bank, to examine the various positions, when on the other side of the Dnieper he thought he could discern some large masses of troops in motion. He hastened to inform the Emperor. Napoleon was presently on the spot, and distinguished, amidst clouds of dust, long dark columns which seemed electric with the intermittent glancing of innumerable arms. These masses were advancing with rapidity. It was Barclay and Bagration at the head of a hundred and twenty thousand men. At this sight, Napoleon clapped his hands for joy, exclaiming,—“At last I have them!” The moment that was to decide the fate of Russia or the French army, had apparently arrived.
Napoleon passed along the line, and assigned to each commander his station, leaving an extensive plain unoccupied in front, between himself and the Dnieper. This he offered to the enemy as a field of battle. The French army in this position was backed by defiles and precipices; but Napoleon had no anxiety about retreat, so certain felt he of victory.
Instead, however, of accepting the challenge to a decisive battle, Barclay and Bagration were seen next morning in full retreat towards Elnia; a movement which was so bitterly disappointing to Napoleon that he for some time refused to credit the fact. Various plans were contemplated by the Emperor for partially cutting off their retreat, but could not be brought into operation. He instantly ordered the storming of Smolensko, inferring that it should be considered as a mere passage through which he would force his way to Moscow. It appears that Murat was very anxious to dissuade him from this attempt, but finding his efforts in vain, the King of Naples was so exasperated that he rode in front of the most formidable of the Russian batteries while it was in full play upon the French; and having dismounted, remained standing immoveable, while the balls were cutting down men on all sides. The storming proceeded with success, except in the attack made by Ney upon the citadel, which repulsed him with loss. One battalion happening to present itself in flank before the Russian batteries, lost the entire row of a company by a single ball, which thus killed twenty-two men at the same instant. In the mean time, the main army, on an amphitheatre of hills, surveyed in anxiety the struggles of their comrades in arms, and occasionally applauded them with loud clapping hands as in a theatre, while they made good any fresh onset, dashing through a maze of balls and grape-shot which shadowed the air.