Napoleon esteemed the battle of Borodino, or Moskwa, his “greatest feat of arms.” But his conduct during the conflict has been the subject of much animadversion, and many critics agree with Segur that he did not display upon that field his usual splendor and power of genius.—But to the incidents of Borodino.
The Russian army halted at Borodino, and intelligence was brought to the Emperor of the French that they were breaking up the whole plain and forming intrenchments in every part. Napoleon then announced to his troops the approaching battle, and allowed them two days rest to prepare their arms and collect their provision.
Napoleon was leading his army onwards farther and farther, through pathless deserts, or over ruined fields, or towns laid in ashes; fatigue, famine, and war, were reducing his numbers, and he was at every step increasing his distance from his resources, while his enemies were in the heart of their own country. Even at Wilna, a deficiency had been discovered in the hospital department; the evil increased at Witepsk. At Smolensko, there was no want of hospitals; fifteen large brick buildings, saved from the flames, had been set apart for this purpose, and there was plenty of wine, brandy, and medicines, but there was a dearth of dressings for the appalling number of wounds. The surgeons had already used all that could be procured—had torn up their own linen, and at length were obliged to substitute the paper found in the city archives. One hospital, containing a hundred wounded men, was forgotten, in the stress of difficulties, for the space of three whole days. The state of its wretched inmates when it was accidentally discovered by Rapp, none of the chroniclers of these events have ever attempted to describe, and the imagination recoils with horror from the attempt to realise it. Napoleon sent them his own stock of wine, and many pecuniary gratuities. The alarming decrease of numbers noticed at Witepsk was still more perceptible now. The army at Smolensko might be computed at about one hundred and fifty-seven thousand men, part of the deficiency being caused by the occupation of additional territory; the rest by desertion, wounds, sickness, or death. With such a force, however, Napoleon had no reason for apprehension, if he could bring his enemies to a battle; but it was evident that Barclay had discovered and resolutely pursued a more efficient plan. It seems certain, therefore, that Napoleon did entertain thoughts of establishing winter-quarters at Smolensko; of intrenching himself strongly, bringing up his reinforcements and supplies, and in this central point commanding the roads to both the capitals of Russia; waiting proposals of peace, or preparing for a fresh campaign in the spring. The danger of so long an absence from France; the difficulty of holding together an army composed of many different nations; the news of fresh successes achieved by his various leaders in different directions; above all, the impetuosity of his own temperament, decided the point. The only doubt which long existed was on which of the two capitals to advance. By the 24th of August, all was decided, and the French army was in full march towards Moscow.
Sixteen thousand recruits, and a vast multitude of peasants, joined the ranks of Kutusoff. On the 4th of September, the French left Gjatz. The heads of their columns were now more than ever annoyed by troops of Cossacks, and the frequent necessity of making his cavalry deploy against so temporary and random an obstacle, provoked Murat to such a degree that he once clapped spurs to his horse, and dashing alone to the front of their line, halted within a few paces, and waving his sabre with the most indignant and menacing authority, signified his command for them to withdraw. The sudden apparition of this splendid figure in front of their ranks, with the air of one who possessed the power of annihilating them with a blow, so took these barbarians by surprise that they instantly withdrew in vague astonishment. They shortly, however, returned, and received the charge of the Italian chasseurs. Platoff has since related that in this affair, a Russian officer, who had brought a sorcerer with him, was wounded; whereupon he ordered the sorcerer to be soundly drubbed, as he had expressly directed him to turn aside all the balls by his conjurations.
Napoleon now surveyed the whole country from an eminence, and displayed marvellous sagacity in the conclusions he drew as to the positions and intentions of the enemy. Vast numbers of troops were posted in front of their left, and he concluded that this must be the point where their ground was most accessible, and that they had there constructed a formidable redoubt. It was, therefore, necessary to carry this. The attack was general, and the Russian rear-guards were driven back upon Borodino. This curtain being removed, the first Russian redoubt was discovered. The division of Compans attacked it, and the 61st regiment took it at the point of the bayonet. Bagration sent reinforcements, and it was retaken. It was again taken by the 61st, and this occurred three times, till finally, with the loss of half the regiment, it remained in possession of the French. But a neighboring wood was swarming with Russian riflemen, and it required the efforts of Morand, Poniatowski, and Murat, to complete the conquest. Firing, nevertheless, continued till nightfall.
Not a single prisoner had been taken. When Napoleon heard this, he asked many questions impatiently. Were the Russians determined to conquer or die? He was answered, that their priests and chiefs had wrought them up to a state of fanaticism in their love for their country and their abhorrence of their invaders. The Emperor at this fell into meditation, and concluded that a battle of artillery would be the only efficient mode to adopt. On that night, a thin, cold rain, began to fall, and autumn proclaimed its approach by violent gusts of wind. The French slept without fires.
On the morning of the 6th of September, the two armies were again visible to each other, in the same position as the preceding day had left them. This excited a general joy among the French. At last, this desultory, vagrant, and irritating war, in which so many brave men had perished, to so little advantage, seemed about to come to a satisfactory issue. The Emperor rode forth at the earliest dawn, and surveyed the whole front of the enemy’s army, by passing along a succession of eminences that rose between the two antagonist powers.
The Russians were in possession of all the heights, on a semi-circle of two leagues extent from the Mosqua to the old Moscow road. Their centre, commanded by Barclay, formed the salient part of their line; it was protected by the Kalogha, by a ravine, and by two strong redoubts at its extremities. Their right and left receded. Their right rested on the precipitous and rocky bank of the Kalogha, and was defended by deep and muddy ravines. A strong redoubt also crowned the height, which was lined with eighty pieces of cannon. Bagration commanded the left; it was stationed on a less elevated crest than the centre, and having lost the protection of its great redoubt was the most accessible point of their army. Two small hills crowned with redoubts protected its front. It was flanked by a wood, beyond which, on the extreme left, was a corps commanded by Tutchkoff, but stationed at so great a distance as to permit the possibility of manœuvring on the intervening ground without previously overwhelming this detached corps.
Having concluded his observation, Napoleon made his plan. “Eugene,” he said, “should be the pivot; the battle must be begun by the right. As soon as the right, advancing under the protection of the wood, shall have carried the redoubts of the Russian left wing, it must turn to the left, march on the Russian flank, overthrowing and driving back their whole army upon their right wing, and into the Kalogha.” Napoleon was still on the heights, taking a last view of the ground, and considering the details of the grand plan he had formed, when Davoust hastily approached him. The marshal had a proposal of his own to make, by which he expected to turn the enemy’s left in the night, and by surprise. The Emperor listened to him with great attention, but after silently considering the proposition for a few minutes, rejected it, and persisted in his rejection, notwithstanding the confidence with which it was urged by Davoust. He then re-entered his tent, when Murat pertinaciously strove to persuade him that the Russians would again retreat before he commenced his attack. The Emperor in some agitation returned to the heights of Borodino, where, however, every indication of an intention to remain and fight was observable among the Russians. He had taken very few attendants, to avoid being recognized by the enemy’s batteries; but at the moment he was pointing out the signs he had observed to Murat, the discharge of one of their cannon broke the silence of the day;—“for it is frequently the case,” observes Segur, “that nothing is so calm as the day which precedes a great battle.”