A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 1

by Henry Charles Lea

The case was thus transferred to the court, where the Suprema on one side and the Council of Aragon on the other, struggled for a favorable decision from Philip III. The former evidently felt the weakness of the claim that the faith was involved, but it argued that impeding the Inquisition in any way conferred jurisdiction on it and Aliaga, in his double capacity of inquisitor-general and royal confessor, added a bitter complaint as to the manner in which the Inquisition was abused and maltreated. To this the king replied that he wished the affair treated with the customary moderation and mercy of the Holy Office, especially as it was not directly a matter of faith, and whatever sentence the Suprema resolved upon for Rejaule and the other inculpated parties must be submitted to him before publication. Besides, he ordered a junta of two members each of the Suprema and the Council of Aragon to be formed and to devise a plan for the avoidance of future contention. This assumed Rejaule’s guilt and awarded the victory to the Suprema, but it was not satisfied and presented a consulta representing the perilous condition of the Valencia tribunal, which necessitated the punishment of the delinquents as a warning, but Philip merely repeated his former decision.[991]

What was Rejaule’s fate we have no means of knowing, but his career was evidently blasted, whatever may have been the so-called mercy exhibited. As for the perilous position of the tribunal insisted on by the Suprema, it seems to be set forth in a Petition of the syndic of the College of Familiars, February 25, 1616, complaining of arrests and ill-treatment and asking the tribunal to take evidence on the subject. It accordingly did so, but while the testimony was ample as to the existence of ill-feeling towards the familiars, in substance it amounted only to their being deprived at night of daggers and bucklers which were prohibited weapons, and it does not appear that any action was taken in consequence. Complaints continued and another petition of October 30, 1626, asked that an envoy be sent to the Suprema, for which the familiars would defray the cost, for unless some relief was had they would resign in a body, as their position only exposed them to wrong and insult and their privileges were set at naught.[992]

The difficulty of enforcing the laws on the people was intensified by the privileges claimed by the familiars. They were by no means peaceable folk and the unprivileged class naturally regarded it as a hardship to be restricted to the use of swords when these gentry were so much more efficiently armed. The Suprema as a rule supported its satellites. For ten years, from 1574, it resisted, in Aragon, the enforcement on familiars of a royal decree against carrying prohibited weapons at night, although the Concordia of Aragon in 1568 provided that familiars should obey the laws respecting arms and that inquisitors should not protect them in violations. Members of all the Royal Councils were involved in the discussion, as though it were the weightiest affair of state and it was not until 1584 that the Suprema was induced to issue the necessary orders, which it was obliged to repeat in 1592.[993]

Another illustration of its attitude occurs with respect to a pragmática of great severity against the use of fire-arms, issued by Philip III, March 14, 1613, pronouncing the mere discharge of a weapon to be a capital offence, whether death ensued or not. It abrogated all privileges and exemptions and conferred on the royal courts full jurisdiction in such cases, and all this was accepted and its observance enjoined by the Suprema. This met with such scant obedience that the Council of Aragon in a consulta of July 31, 1632, called the king’s attention to the evils existing from the exemption of familiars and suggested that they should not be permitted to decline the jurisdiction of the courts for crimes committed with fire-arms. It was doubtless in consequence of opposition by the Suprema that it was not until September 30, 1633, that Philip IV, in a cédula addressed to the Viceroy of Valencia, ordered that, with the assent of the Councils of Aragon and of the Inquisition, the pragmática of 1613 must be strictly observed by which all exemptions were disallowed and offenders were triable and punishable by the royal courts; the Inquisition must withdraw from all pending competencias and the cases be carried to conclusion by the Audiencia. The Suprema must have consented unwillingly to this, for it labored with the wavering monarch and, on November 8th, he wrote withdrawing the cédula and ordering the suspension of all cases before the Audiencia. A few weeks later he yielded to other influences and annulled the last letter, but added that his orders of September 30th must be executed impartially, for the Inquisition complained that it was enforced only against its officials and in such case he would give it a free hand again. December 27th the Suprema sent this to the Valencia tribunal with formal instructions to obey it, but added a confidential letter saying that efforts would not be relaxed to persuade the king to remit all such cases back to them; meanwhile an agreement had been obtained from the Council of Aragon that all sentences by the Audiencia should be referred to it before execution and the tribunal must watch them closely and send such reports as would enable the Suprema to obtain favorable action on them.[994]

For this endless strife, for the habitual disregard of the laws by familiars, the Suprema was primarily responsible. It was perfectly acquainted with the innumerable edicts specifying prohibited weapons and forbidding the carrying of them after night-fall; it acquiesced, ostensibly at least, in the subjection of these offences to the royal courts and yet it encouraged familiars in the belief that it had power to override all laws and could confer licence to violate them. The formula of commission which it caused to be issued to familiars contained a clause granting them full liberty to carry arms, offensive and defensive, publicly and secretly, by day or by night, and ordering all secular officials to abstain from interference with them, in virtue of holy obedience and under penalty of excommunication and of fifty thousand maravedís applicable to the expenses of the Holy Office.[995] It could not be fuller or more explicit; there are no exceptions as to the character of arms or allusion to the jurisdiction in these cases granted by the king to the royal courts. When one branch of the government thus resolutely placed itself in opposition to the sovereign and encouraged its subordinates to resist the laws and the constituted authorities, peace was impossible and conflicts were inevitable. Yet the illegality of all this was admitted when, in 1634, the familiars of Valencia held a meeting to assess themselves for a donation to be offered to the king, in return for a privilege to bear arms, and the Suprema instructed the tribunal to aid the movement, and again when, in 1638, a fruitless offer was made by them of twelve thousand ducats for the revocation of legislation on the subject.[996]

BEARING ARMS

To crown all this, the Suprema, in 1657, reached the audacity of arguing that the right of familiars to bear arms was imprescriptible and could not be abrogated by any prince, for it would impede the Inquisition in the free exercise of its functions, wherefore it denied that any competencia could be formed in such cases; the secular authorities had no jurisdiction and there could not even be a discussion about their claim to interfere.[997] Philip IV had the weakness to submit to these extravagant claims, in 1658, and to decide that the Suprema alone had cognizance in such matters. The case in which this occurred was that of Jaime Espejo, alcaide of the penitential prison of Valencia, arrested for carrying pistols and it has interest for us because in it the inquisitor, Don Antonio de Ayala Verganza, argues away all the royal decrees and pragmáticas as not meaning what they said and proves it by citing a vast number of cases in which, when carried up to the king, he overruled his own legislation, invariably deciding in favor of the Inquisition and against his own jurisdiction. He could sometimes be brought to issue wholesome general regulations, but, when it came to their execution, the ever-present dread of interfering with the service of God overwhelmed him.[998]

Yet Philip promptly reversed himself for, in a despairing effort to put an end to these interminable quarrels, he was induced to issue a royal letter, December 23, 1659, declaring that the cognizance of infractions of the laws respecting prohibited arms lay with the royal jurisdiction and that no competencias should be formed in these cases. When this letter was alleged by the royal court, in the case then pending of Joseph Navarro, a familiar arrested for carrying a pistol, the Inquisition in reply airily cast aside the pragmática of 1613, and its confirmation in 1633, by asserting that both before and after those laws it had always exercised jurisdiction over these cases, as was notorious to every one—which was all doubtless true. As for the recent letter of 1659, it had not been issued with the assent of the Suprema; being thus irregularly issued it should not be regarded as valid, until the king should be supplicated to modify it, and until this was done the accused should be surrendered to it or he could be released under bail to both jurisdictions.[999] The vacillating monarch probably yielded again; whether he did so or not mattered little to the Holy Office, which regarded his decrees so lightly. The miserable business of quarrelling over the multiplication of the laws went on and, in 1691, Carlos II found it necessary again to prohibit the carrying of pistols and armas cortas and to deprive offenders of their claims to jurisdiction, even if they were familiars or salaried officials of the Inquisition.[1000]

Several cases in the earlier years of Philip V seem to indicate that this matter was an exception to the general limitation of the privileges of the Holy Office and that there was a tendency to admit its claims.[1001] Their final extinction, however, was not far off. In 1748, Fernando VI prohibited all officials of tribunals, including the Inquisition, from carrying cut-and-thrust weapons any kind; exclusive jurisdiction in the enforcement of this was reserved for the secular courts and all claims to fuero were abolished. He confirmed and extended this by proclamations of 1749, 1751 and 1754, with penalties of six years in the mines for commoners and six years service in presidio for nobles. In another of 1757 he regretted the non-observance of these laws and ordered their irremissible enforcement without privilege of fuero. This legislation was supplemented by Carlos III, in 1761, who included in the prohibition all fire-arms of less than four palms length of barrel, although he conceded to gentlemen the use of holster pistols when on horseback but not when on mule-back.[1002] Yet the Inquisition continued to issue the old form of commissions granting unlimited license, until the magistrates of Seville and Alcalá la Real refused to recognize them when, in 1777, it admitted its altered position by a modification which granted the right to carry non-prohibited weapons, but only when on duty for the Holy Office, and contented itself with exhorting the secular authorities not to interfere with this.[1003]

MILITARY SERVICE