Irrespective of the influence which the office of president may have had, the relations between the inquisitor-general and Suprema were ill-defined and fluctuating. Under Cardinal Adrian we sometimes find the Councils acting as though independent and sometimes Adrian doing the same. In the Aragonese troubles over Juan Prat, the Suprema nowhere appears—everything is in the name of Adrian or of Charles. During the interval between Adrian’s election as pope, January 9, 1522, and his leaving Spain, August 5th, he and the Suprema acted at times each independently of the other.[435] As the vacancy was not filled until September 1523, by the appointment of Manrique, there can be little doubt that this effacement of the inquisitor-generalship established precedents for a development of the activity and functions of the Suprema which, under Manrique, is found taking part in all business, the signatures of the members following his in the letters and decrees; it was rapidly becoming the direct executive and legislative head of the Holy Office.[436] His disgrace and relegation to his see, in 1529, could not but stimulate this tendency. During his absence there are many letters from it submitting questions for his decision, but there are also many to the tribunals, showing that it was acting in full independence.

THE SUPREMA BECOMES DOMINANT

The result of this is seen, in 1540, when Cardinal Tavera, in announcing to the tribunals his accession to office, tells them that he will act with the concurrence and opinion of the members of the Council and when, in the same year, he appointed Nicolao Montañánez inquisitor of Majorca, he refers him to what the Council writes to him with regard to his duties. The appointing power continued to give to the inquisitor-general a certain predominance, but otherwise he and the Suprema had coalesced into one body—a fact emphasized by a declaration, May 14, 1542, that they formed together but a single tribunal and that there was no appeal from the one to the other.[437] Still, there was a primacy of honor in the inquisitor-generalship. When the Instrucciones nuevas—the elaborate code of procedure embodied in the Instructions of 1561—were sent to the tribunals, it was in the name of Inquisitor-general Valdés but, in the prefatory note, he is made to state that they had been maturely discussed in the Council, where it was agreed that they should be observed by all inquisitors.[438]

Thus the Suprema had fairly established itself as the ruling power of the Inquisition, and its independent position is described by the Venetian envoy, Simone Contarini, in his Relation of 1605, where he says that it is absolute in everything concerning the faith, not being obliged, like the other Councils, to consult with the king. The inquisitor-general, he adds, fills all the offices except the membership of the Council, whose names are presented to the king.[439] Even in the matter of these appointments, as we have seen, the instructions of Philip II, III, and IV, from 1595 to 1626, require the inquisitor-general to consult with the Suprema in appointing inquisitors and fiscals.

Various documents, during the seventeenth century, show that the inquisitor-general by no means attended all the daily sessions of the Council and rarely voted on the cases brought before it.[440] In the letters of the Suprema, a decision reached when he was present records the fact—“visto en el consejo, presente el exmo señor inquisidor-general”—but by far the greater number have no such formula, indicating that it acted without him and that its acts were binding.[441] Another formula frequently employed is “consultado con el exmo señor inquisidor-general,” which makes the Suprema act and the inquisitor-general merely consult.[442] Yet of course the power wielded by the inquisitor-general must have varied greatly with the character of the individual and the influence which he had with the king. A man like Arce y Reynoso, in such a case as Villanueva’s or Nithard under the queen-regent, used the tremendous authority of the Holy Office at his pleasure.

In the deliberations of the Council, as early as 1551, we find decisions reached by a majority vote and when, about 1625, there chanced to be a tie and the imperious Pacheco endeavored to decide the matter, he was bluntly told that he could not do so—his vote counted no more than that of any other member.[443] An elaborate account of the procedure, dating between 1666 and 1669, tells us that, when a letter, petition or memorial is read, if it is a matter of routine, the inquisitor-general decides it without taking votes; if it is doubtful, he takes the vote, beginning with the youngest member. If it is a question of justice, the majority decides; if there is a tie, it is laid aside until other members can be called in; all sign the papers, irrespective of how they had voted. It is not necessary for the inquisitor-general to be present throughout the session; it suffices for him to be there for two hours in the morning, for what especially concerns his jurisdiction and he need not assist in the afternoons, when matters not of faith are discussed with the two adjunct members of the Council of Castile. Another writer tells us that it was forbidden to give reasons for the vote and that absent members could vote in writing.[444]

The relations between the inquisitor-general and the Suprema thus had grown up without any precise definition and consequently were open to diversity of opinion. A writer who, about 1675, drew up an exhaustive account of the working of the Inquisition, admits that it was a disputed question whether the inquisitor-general could act by himself and dispense with the Suprema, but he states that the prevailing opinion is that the members are independent and act by immediate delegated papal powers; in his absence their acts are final and it is the same when the office is vacant. This, he says, is the invariable custom, nor can there be found an instance of his acting without the Suprema, while the Suprema in his absence acts without him.[445]

As we have seen, this was a usurpation, grown strong by prescription. It was fairly put to the test, in 1700, by Inquisitor-general Mendoza, in the trial of Fray Froilan Díaz, which was, in some respects, one of the most noteworthy cases in the annals of the Inquisition.

CASE OF FROILAN DÍAZ

Carlos II, the last of the Hapsburgs who were the curse of Spain, was imbecile equally in mind and body. A being less fitted to rule has probably never encumbered a throne and it was his misfortune, no less than that of his people, that, reaching it in his fourth year, through thirty-five weary years, from 1665 to 1700, he staggered under the burden, while his kingdom plunged ever deeper in misery and humiliation. He was but a puppet in the hands of any intriguing man or woman or artful confessor who might obtain ascendancy; prematurely old, when he should have been in the prime of manhood, with mental and bodily sufferings continually on the increase, he was restlessly eager for whatever might promise relief. His first wife, Marie Louise of Orleans, had died childless, and the second, Maria Anna of Neuburg, whom he married in 1690, in the vain hope of an heir, was an ambitious woman who speedily dominated him and ruled Spain through her favorites. It soon became recognized that a successor would have to be selected from among the collateral branches and, after active intrigues, parties formed themselves in the court in support of the two most prominent aspirants—Philip Duke of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, who was preferred by the mass of the people, and the Archduke Charles, son of the Emperor Leopold I, whose claims were urged by the queen. It was the misfortune of Froilan Díaz that he became the sport of the contending factions.