A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 3

by Henry Charles Lea

We have seen how the gradual centralization in the Suprema required all sentences, whether of torture or judgement, to receive its confirmation. Under this influence the consulta de fe declined in importance, and tribunals began to neglect the formality of summoning it or even of appointing consultors. The concurrence of the Ordinary was theoretically indispensable, but that sufficed, and the Suprema was quite content to overlook irregularities which marked the diminishing importance of the tribunals. Thus, in 1717, at Barcelona, in the case of Dr. Estevan Perpiñan for impeding the Inquisition, the Ordinary could not attend and the inquisitors voted on it alone; they could not agree on a sentence, and the Suprema sent the case back with orders to vote on it again, in conjunction with the Ordinary; they did so, but this time all three disagreed and the Suprema finally rendered the sentence.[198] It seems never to have thought of instructing them to call in experts and form a consulta de fe. Thus the time-honored institution, coeval with the establishment of the Inquisition in the thirteenth century, came to an end. In a series of votes of the tribunal of Madrid, extending through the eighteenth century, there is no indication of consultors being called in. Sometimes there are two inquisitors with the Ordinary and sometimes one; sometimes two inquisitors without the Ordinary, and occasionally, though rarely, a single inquisitor by himself.[199] In the enumeration of the personnel of all the tribunals, about the middle of the century, the insignificant one of Majorca had eight consultors, Granada had four, Córdova three, Valladolid, Cuenca and Santiago one each and the others had none. The institution was rapidly dying out and men no longer aspired to the honor of belonging to it. So it was under the Restoration. In the sentences of the period which I have seen there is no reference to it save in some pronounced by the Canary tribunal, which have the clause “without a consultor because it is united in the Ordinary.”[200]

Before the Suprema had rendered the tribunals mere agencies for collecting evidence and attending to the formalities of trials, the consulta de fe may occasionally have been of service in preventing or diminishing injustice. Incidents related above show that the consultors formed opinions of their own, and that the votes were often far from unanimous. This was encouraged by the routine of voting, in which the consultors voted first and the senior inquisitor last, although doubtless, when there had been a preliminary discussion, the views of the inquisitors had been made known. Occasionally we meet with debates in which each member of the consults accompanies his vote with an exposition of his reasons, and sometimes even with elaborate written opinions, showing a conscientious expenditure of thought and labor. Unfortunately, doubts and disagreements generally were compromised by recourse to torture, after which the consulta would be reconvened to formulate the definitive sentence.

Not the least cruel feature of the inquisitorial trial was the interminable delay to which the victim was commonly exposed. In ordinary criminal practice, especially in capital cases, the accused may seek perhaps to postpone the evil day, but in the Inquisition, where he was denied all communication with the outside world, and was kept in ignorance as to the progress of his own case, the agony of suspense concerning himself and those dear to him during dreary months and years was, in itself, a most severe and protracted punishment. This was thoroughly understood, not only from the repeated despairing cries of prisoners to have their cases despatched, but from the habitual promise of such despatch held out as an inducement for confession. The slow torture of delay was a well-understood device of the Old Inquisition to procure confession, when five, ten, or twenty years’ interval between arrest and sentence was not infrequent,[201] but, except in special cases, this would not seem to be the motive in Spain. It is rather attributable to callous indifference and the habit of procrastination. The prisoner was presumably guilty and no good Christian need waste sympathy on the sufferings, mental and bodily, of a heretic too pertinacious for confession and conversion.

In Spain, speedy justice was constantly urged on the tribunals as soon as the mad rush of the early years was over. While this lasted such urgency was superfluous, for haste was necessitated by the enormous amount of work to be done, and was stimulated by impatience for the fines and confiscations, though the formalities of procedure were cumbrous and there were multitudes of cases jostling each other as they wore through their several stages. In the great auto de fe at Ciudad Real, February 23, 1484, where there were seventy-six burnings in person or in effigy, besides the large number of reconciliations, there could have been no time wasted on each case. Among those relaxed was Juan González Daza, whose trial commenced December 1, 1483, when the inquisitors granted nine days for presenting proof. On December 10th, the fiscal asked an extension of time in view of his other occupations and the absence of witnesses, but he was obliged to take an oath that these were his reasons and not malice. On December 8th evidence for the defence was already being taken before two deputies of the inquisitors and, on the 12th, that for the prosecution before two other deputies. Considering that human life was at stake, the work was most expeditious.[202]

Possibly this speed soon slackened; whether it did so or not, the Suprema was dissatisfied, for the Instructions of 1488 ordered that prisoners should not be worn out in gaol with postponements, and proceedings must be so prompt as to afford no cause of complaint. This urgency was repeated in the Instructions of 1498, which fixed a limit of ten days between arrest and the presentation of the accusation, during which the three monitions were to be given; after this cases were to be pushed with all despatch and without awaiting further proof, for this had led to prolonged detention, causing injury to persons as well as to property. Again, in 1500, the tribunals were ordered to proceed summarily and not to permit delays—all these instructions showing that the procrastination was attributable to the prosecution and not to the defence.[203]

DELAYS

These instructions received scant obedience and the delays were felt as a serious grievance by the accused. In 1510 we have a petition to Ferdinand from five women appealing for a speedy decision of their cases, which had been “concluded,” to which he responded by ordering the inquisitors to expedite them in accordance with justice.[204] So among the Aragonese petitions at the Córtes of Monzon, in 1533, is a complaint that the prisoners of the Inquisition were vexed with the prolonged delays in giving them the accusation and postponing the publication of evidence, wherefore the inquisitor-general was prayed to prescribe briefer terms. To this the reply was merely that provision would be made for the good administration of justice and the speedy disposition of cases.[205]

If there were any intention of fulfilling this promise it was resultless. Procrastination was habitual in all Spanish tribunals, as we learn from the repeated remonstrances of the Castilian Córtes of the period, which vainly represented that pleaders were impoverished and exhausted in the vain attempt to obtain justice, and that the gaols throughout the land were crowded with prisoners.[206] The Inquisition shared in this indifference to the sufferings of those in its hands; there were causes of delay in ratifying evidence and looking up the witnesses for the defence, and it had besides a practice, in all cases serious enough to appear in an auto de fe, of allowing them to accumulate until there were enough to render the solemnity impressive. This abuse was forbidden by the Suprema in 1518, 1532, 1539 and 1540, but its commands were disregarded.[207] That it was a real grievance is shown by a summons addressed, in 1534, by the Toledo fiscal to the Vicar-general Blas Ortiz, reciting that it was four years since the tribunal had celebrated an auto de fe; its prisoners were suffering much thereby in person, honor, and property, and the Inquisition was defamed in consequence. On the part of the accused and their kindred there had been bitter complaints to the inquisitor-general and Suprema, to the emperor and royal council, and to persons of influence, and three or four months ago the Suprema and inquisitor-general had come to Toledo to see what was the matter and had ordered the cases to be despatched and an auto de fe to be held. When, however, we learn that the concurrence of the vicar-general was needed only for the torture of nine persons and the sentencing of ten, we see how little occupation the tribunal had had during those four years, rendering the delay inexcusable, while moreover the effort to shift the blame on Blas Ortiz was transparent for, under the Clementines, inquisitors were required to wait only nine days for the Ordinary.[208] The custom of waiting for an auto de fe continued and if, in 1570, 1571 and 1577, there were repeated orders that the cases of poor prisoners should be despatched promptly, without holding them for an auto, this urgency savors more of thrift than of mercy, for it infers that the rich, who could defray their prison expenses, might linger.[209]

DELAYS