PROSECUTION OF THE ABSENT

If there is something grotesque in all this, at least the proceedings were decently in order and, if Sancho and his wife had cared to risk it, they could have been heard. How hurried and informal the process sometimes was is manifested by a case at Guadalupe in 1485. On July 13th three witnesses were heard as to ten persons who had left that place from twelve to sixteen years before, and of whom public fame reported that they had gone to Málaga or to some other Moorish town, and had turned Jews. On July 21st the fiscal presented his accusation, asking for sentence without previous citation or other notice, because by law in such cases and crimes of heresy, when notoriety is proved, nothing further is required. This was expressly assented to in the sentence, although it alluded to some kind of citation with three terms, published in the plaza and affixed to the church-doors, and also to a consulta de fe, but all this was probably mythical for, in an auto de fe held on August 1st, seven of the parties were included in one sentence, their effigies were relaxed to the secular arm and their property was declared to be confiscated, while judges everywhere were empowered to seize and proceed against them.[234] Neither of the three methods described in the Instructions of 1484 could have been employed in the interval of eighteen days between denunciation and execution, but, as one of the inquisitors was Francisco de la Fuente, an experienced judge from the tribunal of Ciudad Real, we must presume that there was nothing irregular in this quick despatch.

Although in these sentences the condemned is abandoned to any secular justice for burning, the whole proceeding was merely designed to secure the confiscations and enhance the solemnities of the autos de fe with additional comburation of effigies. Its nullity in other respects was admitted by the rule that, if a culprit who had been burnt in effigy should return spontaneously, confessing and repenting, he could be admitted to reconciliation or, if he asserted his innocence, he was to be heard in his defence. This was decreed by Torquemada, October 10, 1493, with the reservation that it was a matter of grace and did not affect the confiscation. In 1494 there was a further provision that, if the condemnation had been the result of false-witness, it was the duty of the inquisitors to revoke the sentence ex officio, without awaiting the appearance of the convict.[235]

No change of importance was introduced in the procedure by the Instructions of 1561. In practice, the prosecution for contumacy was the one ordinarily employed; the second method was sometimes used when the testimony was complete and the third, summoning the accused to compurgation, became obsolete. The formula of the sentence, in the first method, avoids all allusion to the crimes alleged against the accused and bases the condemnation wholly on his remaining for a year under excommunication, thus proving himself to be an apostate heretic, the penalties for which are to be executed on his person, if it can be had and, in his absence, upon the effigy representing him.[236]

Of course condemnation to the stake was inevitable, when once the process was commenced, whether there was substantial evidence against the accused or not. Some authorities held that, whenever he could be caught, he was to be burnt, but Simancas expresses the considerate practice of the Inquisition in assuming that he is entitled to a hearing, whether he presents himself spontaneously or is captured, for there is no prescription of time against defence; if he comes within a year he can plead against confiscation, but after the year he can be heard only as to himself, unless he is manifestly innocent or has been detained by a just impediment.[237] It may justly be doubted whether any fugitive was ever burnt for contumacy, and the ordinary practice is seen in the case of nine Judaizers of Beas, whose arrest was ordered by the tribunal of Murcia, April 5, 1656. When the warrants reached Beas, April 12, they were found to have departed secretly about the end of February. Five of them were traced to Málaga and four were reported to have gone to Pietrabuena, but all efforts to capture them failed and, on July 27th, the fiscal asked for edicts of citation. The regular process in contumacy followed leisurely, ending in a sentence of relaxation if the culprits should be found and if not, that their effigies should be burnt. This was confirmed by the Suprema and was pronounced December 5, 1659, and executed April 13, 1660, in an auto de fe at Seville. Nearly twenty years later two of the fugitives, Ana Enríquez and her husband Diego Rodríguez Silva, were arrested at Daimiel. They were tried anew; the previous records were brought from Murcia and used, as well as evidence concerning their career during the interval. There was no thought of executing the former sentence; the consulta de fe voted for reconciliation with two years of prison and sanbenito, which the Suprema changed to perpetual irremissible, and it was duly published in an auto de fe of December 17, 1679.[238]

BURNING OF EFFIGIES

Dilatory as were the proceedings in absentia in this case, they were speedy when compared with some others. The Valladolid tribunal issued a warrant of arrest against the Capitan Enrique Enríquez, June 6, 1650, but he eluded it. His trial for contumacy dragged on until July 30, 1659, when sentence was rendered, confirmed by the Suprema November 24th and sent to Seville, to be executed in the auto de fe of April 13, 1660.[239] It would appear that these delays did not please the Suprema for, in 1666, it called upon the tribunals to report the sentences agreed upon against the absent and dead and to push forward all unfinished trials. To this Barcelona replied that it had in hand three cases of absentees guilty of “propositions,” two of bigamy, one of a fraile who was said to have fled to France in order to embrace Protestantism, and another of a dead Huguenot—all of which would indicate that these cases constituted a considerable portion of the diminishing business of the tribunals. The Suprema thereupon ordered that if, on examination, prosecution appeared to be called for, the cases should be followed up closely to a vote in the consulta de fe, which was to be submitted to it for decision.[240]

Effigies of the dead and absent continued to be one of the attractions of the autos de fe. In the great Madrid celebration of 1680, the procession was headed with thirty-four, of which all but two were burnt; they bore mitres with flames, on their breasts were placards with their names in large letters and some of them carried chests containing their bones.[241] At that of Granada, in 1721, there were no living persons burnt, but there were seven effigies, and the chronicler of the occasion assures us that the glory of Catholic zeal is acquired as much by carrying to the flames the dead as the living and, in this case, the inquisitors, the alguacil mayor and the secretaries bore them in the procession. Fired by this example, after the sentences were read, the ministers of the royal chancellería exultingly carried them from the staging to the brasero where they were burnt.[242] Even as late as 1752, at Llerena, there were six effigies of fugitives and one of a dead woman.[243]

It will be seen from this presentation of facts from the records that the inquisitorial process, as developed in the Spanish Holy Office, so far from being the benignant and equitable procedure asserted by its representatives and re-echoed by modern apologists, was one which violated every principle of justice. The guilt of the accused was assumed in advance; the prosecution was favored in every way; the defence was so crippled as to be scarce more than a pretext, while the judge, who was in reality the prosecutor, was shielded, by impenetrable secrecy, from all responsibility except to the Suprema. Many cases cited above show that the arbitrary power thus conferred was not always abused, for the individuals were not necessarily as vicious as the system, but the power existed and its exercise for good or for evil depended on temperament and temptation.[244]