A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 3

by Henry Charles Lea

In the medieval Inquisition it may be said that acquittal was virtually prohibited—a sentence of not proven might possibly be rendered, but acquittal was an admission of fallibility and was regarded as a bar to subsequent proceedings in case further evidence was obtained.[280] This principle was maintained in the Roman Inquisition, although, in the eighteenth century, exception was made in cases where the adverse evidence was clearly proved to be fraudulent.[281] The Spanish Holy Office was not quite so sensitive, and had no hesitation as to repeated prosecutions, so that to it acquittal was a less serious matter. Moreover, while sentences of not proven were not unknown, there was an equivalent device by which the accused could be dismissed without admitting his innocence—suspending the case and discharging him, subject to the liability of its being reopened at any time.

The furious zeal of Torquemada rendered acquittal peculiarly distasteful to him, and we have seen above (Vol. I, p. 175) a case in which he set aside acquittals at Medina del Campo, and insisted on conviction although, at his instance, the parties had been tried twice and had been tortured without confession. This temper on his part could not but impress itself on his subordinates, and yet we occasionally meet with acquittals in this early time—acquittals, however, which manifest a strange mental confusion, and betray the unwillingness to admit the prosecution of the innocent, for they couple acquittal with punishment. Thus at Guadalupe, in 1485, in the case of Andrés Alonso of Trogillano, the sentence recites that the fiscal had not proved his accusation as fully as he ought, wherefore the inquisitors absolved the accused but, as the evidence aroused some suspicion in their hearts, for the satisfaction of their consciences and his, they sentenced him to abjure de levi and, as some infamy had accrued to him from the accusation, they removed it and restored him to his former good repute, and lifted the sequestration on his property. Whereupon he duly abjured de levi, renouncing all manner of heresy, and especially that of which he was accused, promising to be always obedient to the Church, after which he was absolved ad cautelam from any excommunication which he might have incurred, and of all this he asked to have a certificate.[282] All the acquittals that I have met, of this period, bear this illogical character, sometimes even requiring abjuration de vehementi and inflicting penalties for the offence of which the accused is pronounced innocent.

ACQUITTAL

In Barcelona, the Inquisition had been established twelve years before the first acquittal was granted, and, from such record as we have, it would appear that there were acquittals of more than one kind—conditional and unconditional. Thus, in 1499, Jayme Castanyer and Eufrosina Pometa were acquitted, but were required to abjure publicly on May 2d, and, on October 5th, Luys Palau was acquitted. In 1500, on September 18th, four women were acquitted absolutely, two men were acquitted with penance, and two women and a man were acquitted with abjuration. Then, on October 5th, the memory and fame of Juan de Ribes Altes were cleared and, on December 20, 1501, Blanquina Darla was acquitted absolutely.[283]

In a record of the Toledo tribunal, from 1484 to 1531, there are eighty-six cases of acquittal, or an average of somewhat less than two per annum which, in view of the intense activity of the earlier period, indicates how few escaped when once the Inquisition had laid its hand upon them. Some of these cases show how long the conditional acquittal persisted. Thus of those acquitted, Hernando Parral was required to abjure, and Francisca Ramírez and Catalina beata negra abjured de vehementi. Unless there is a mistake by the scribe, Leonora de la Oliva of Ciudad Real was acquitted and scourged, October 3, 1521, and again had the same sentence October 13, 1530. In 1520 Alonso Hernández was acquitted with public penance and, in 1513, Sancho de Ribera was acquitted with confiscation. One entry is difficult of comprehension—that of Inez González, who was voted to acquittal with reconciliation and confiscation, but the confiscation was remitted.[284]

Practically acquittal amounted only to a sentence of not proven. In the formula for it, Pablo García calls special attention to the omission of the word “definitive,” pointing out that it is not final, for the case could be reopened at any time that fresh evidence was obtained—and even without it, as we have seen in the case of Villanueva. In matters of faith there was no finality, no cosa juzgada, and it was so declared by Pius V, in the bull Inter multiplices, invalidating all letters of absolution and acquittal issued by inquisitors and other spiritual judges.[285] In strict accordance with this principle was the rule that sentences of acquittal of the living were not to be read at the autos de fe, unless at their especial request, while acquittals of the dead were read; in either case, the sentence simply stated that he had been accused of heresy and no details were given; if living he did not appear at the auto and if dead there was no effigy.[286] All this was in direct contradiction to the glowing eulogy of Páramo who, as we have seen, states that the inquisitors used every means to prove the innocence of the accused and, when they succeeded, took care that he should go forth like a conqueror crowned with laurel and the palm of victory.[287] Yet Páramo had some justification in the fact that there were rare exceptional cases in which the acquitted was thus honored. The only instance of this that I have met in Spain was that referred to above (Vol. II, p. 561), where fourteen residents of Cádiz were falsely accused. In Peru, however, several cases are recorded. In the Lima auto of 1728 Doctor Agustin Valenciano appeared in the procession on a white horse, with a palm, and proclamation was made of his innocence. In the great auto of January 23, 1639, there were seven thus honored after their three years of incarceration, and in that of October 19, 1749, the effigy of Don Juan de Loyola, who had died in prison in 1745, headed the procession, bearing a palm. This last case is perhaps explicable by Jesuit influence, for he was of the family of St. Ignatius, and further reparation was made by creating his brother, Don Ignacio de Loyola y Haro alguazil mayor of the tribunal, while three nephews were made familiars.[288]

The reluctance of the tribunals to pronounce a sentence of acquittal is illustrated in the case of Francisco Marco, tried at Barcelona for bigamy, in 1718. Unable to prove the charge, which was punishable with scourging and galleys, the tribunal sentenced him to have his sentence con meritos read in the audience-chamber, to be reprimanded and threatened, and to be banished from Barcelona and Madrid for six years. In the earlier period this sentence would have stood, but by this time the Suprema was in full control and it expressed great surprise at so unjust a decision, inflicting so foul a stigma on the accused. It declared null and void all the acts of the process, it ordered Marco to be discharged at once, and that the inquisitors should defray out of their salaries all the cost of his imprisonment.[289]

SUSPENSION

The indisposition to acquit found expression in the device known as suspension. When the effort to convict failed, the case could be suspended, thus leaving matters as they stood; the accused was neither acquitted nor convicted, the case could at any moment be reopened and prosecuted to the end, and it hung over the unfortunate victim while it saved the infallibility of the tribunal. The earliest allusion to it that I have met occurs in the Instructions of 1498, which show that it was a usage already established and abused, for it is forbidden in prosecutions of the dead, except when further evidence is expected, and acquittal is ordered when the proof is imperfect, because there are many cases of suspension that inflict hardship through the sequestrations continuing in force.[290]

Suspension was a convenient resource for a tribunal, unable to convict yet unwilling to acquit, and desirous to conceal its failure. At first it was comparatively rare, but in time it became a favorite method of escaping a decision and, as it gradually, for the most part, replaced acquittal, in its development it might even remove the stigma; in the great majority of cases it was practically the end of the matter, and it was usually accompanied with lifting the sequestration. Some authorities held that a case could not be entered as suspended, if there was enough in it to justify a reprimand, or even when the offence was trivial and the defendant was cautioned not to speak or act in that fashion, but this rigidity of definition was not observed in practice. When suspension was decided upon, the accused was not permitted to know it. He was simply brought into the audience-chamber; if he had been confined in the secret prison he was put through the customary inquiries as to what he had seen and heard, and was sworn to secrecy; he was told that for just reasons he was granted the favor of returning home and that he must seek to discharge his conscience for his case was still pending.[291] This mystery served to keep him in suspense, but, after he found the sequestration or embargo lifted from his property, he could doubtless fathom its meaning. If he demanded a definite sentence of conviction or acquittal, he had the right to do so, but I have met with no instance of this, and few could have been hardy enough thus to tempt their fate. If he asked for a certificate that he was freely discharged, or that his case was suspended, it was not to be given, but the Suprema might grant him one to the effect that he was discharged without penance or condemnation.[292]