In spite of these impressive formalities, I think it doubtful whether, after the first furious rush of persecution was past, the extreme penalty of relaxation, for reincidence after abjuration de vehementi, was customary. As a rule, in the later periods, inquisitors rather endeavored to avoid relaxation and, while they were callous, they were not apt to be unnecessarily cruel. I have not happened to meet with such a case, while I have found more than one in which the canons were not observed. In fact, a learned writer of the second half of the seventeenth century argues elaborately, with the citation of many authorities, to show that reincidence after abjuration de vehementi does not incur the punishment of relapse, despite the penalties expressed in the formula, and this would appear to have been tacitly accepted, for a custom arose of specifying in the sentence whether or not the abjuration should entail the penalty. Thus, in 1725 at Cuenca, Doctor Zapata, accused of Judaism, was required to abjure de vehementi with liability to relaxation, while in 1794, at Toledo, Damaso José López de Cruz, for heretical propositions, was sentenced to similar abjuration without such liability.[329] There was another distinction between the two forms of abjuration, for those who abjured de vehementi were subject to the disgrace of appearing in an auto de fe and of wearing a sanbenito de media aspa—or with one band of color across it, before and behind.[330]
The Instructions of 1561 state that, when there is semi-proof, or such indications that the accused cannot be acquitted, there are three remedies, compurgation, torture or abjuration; but this is scarce correct, for those who succeeded in compurgation were always, and those who overcame torture were generally, required to abjure. The Instructions add that abjuration, whether for light or vehement suspicion, is rather a measure to inspire fear for the future than a punishment for the past, and therefore it is usually accompanied with pecuniary penance.[331] In fact, it was only in trifling cases, or in suspensions, that abjuration was not associated with much severer penalties. This was inevitable in the large class of offences which, by a strained construction, inferred suspicion of heresy. In these, when guilt was proven, it received its appropriate punishment, perhaps of scourging or the galleys, and the abjuration was a mere formality to satisfy the artificial ascription of heretical belief. In cases of suspicion of real heresy, abjuration, whether de levi or de vehementi, was a necessary adjunct to the punishment. Thus in the Toledo auto of February 7, 1694, Luis de Vargas, for “suspicions of Judaism,” was sentenced to abjure de levi, to pay a fine of two hundred ducats and to be exiled for six years from various places. So, in 1715, at Toledo, the Carmelite Fray Francisco Martínez de Salazar, “for crimes vehemently suspect of heresy,” appeared in the audience-chamber with a sanbenito de media aspa, in the presence of twelve priests; he abjured de vehementi, was sternly reprimanded and threatened, and sentenced to a long list of penalties, including deprivation of functions, reclusion for six years in a convent and a circular discipline in the Carmelite house of Toledo.[332] On this composite sentence the consulta de fe had evidently exhausted its ingenuity, and the abjuration was merely a formal necessity to justify the rest. Yet, while abjuration in itself can scarce be termed a punishment it was, even when only de levi, an infliction of no little severity, in consequence of the infamy which it entailed, as we have seen in the Villanueva case, where the victim and his kindred struggled for so many years in Rome to have it removed.
EXILE.
EXILE
Frequent allusions above to exile as occurring in sentences indicate how customary a feature it was in the penal system of the Inquisition. By itself, or in combination with other penalties, it was an unfailing resort in offences that did not incur the graver punishment of imprisonment. It could be varied indefinitely, to suit the peculiarities of each case, and the tribunals exercised the widest discretion in its employment. In its usual form it designated certain places and a fixed number of leagues around them, which the penitent was forbidden to enter. The list of proscribed localities as a rule included Madrid, or rather the royal residences, the seat of the tribunal, the dwelling-place of the culprit, if this was not comprised in the others, and any other towns, sometimes amounting to four or five, where he had been known in his guilty career. Although this was a convenient resource to the tribunal, it was a somewhat irrational penalty, the severity of which could hardly be guessed at, for while it might be scarce more than an inconvenience to one offender, it might be the destruction of a career to a merchant established in business, or to a professional man with an assured clientèle. Considerations of this kind, however, rarely influenced the tribunals and, in the Toledan record of 1575-1610 we find exile included in a hundred and sixty-seven sentences.
The length of exile was always specified, and varied from some months to a life-time, but it usually was a term of a few years. Sometimes it was divided into two portions, the first preciso or absolute, the second voluntario or dependent upon the will of the tribunal—apparently as an incentive to amendment. A variant of this occurs in the case of Diego de Toro, sentenced for bigamy at Toledo in 1652, to four years of exile absolutely and four years more which he was to fulfil whenever the tribunal should see fit to order it, thus holding it over him indefinitely.[333]
It was not often that the Inquisition exercised the power of banishment from Spain, but it did not hesitate to assume such authority when it saw fit, and a converse to this was the occasional prohibition to leave Spain, of which an instance is cited above (p. 102). Another form, in which the wide discretion of the tribunals was exhibited, was forbidding the penitent to approach within a specified distance of the sea-coast. This was not infrequent in sentences on Moriscos, whose relations with Barbary always excited apprehension, but it is not apparent why the Valladolid tribunal, in 1659, when sentencing Diego de la Peña for Jewish tendencies, should have included an inhibition to approach within eight leagues of any sea-port without a special licence.[334]
Again, we sometimes find a penitent exiled to some particular place for a term of years, and this is frequently combined with provisions for keeping him under surveillance. Thus the Valladolid tribunal, in 1659, sentenced Isabel Rubía and María Martin, for sorcery, to reside for four years in a place to be designated, where there was an official to whom they must present themselves monthly and who would report as to their amendment.[335] This was sometimes a form of commutation for imprisonment, as in the case of Isabel Núñez, sentenced at Cuenca to prison and Sanbenito, which was modified to four years’ exile at San Clemente. December 24, 1657, she presented a notarial certificate of her being there and begged that, as she was 74 years old and very poor and miserable, she might be released, in honor of the birth of the prince (Felipe-Prosper) or at least have the place changed to Alcalá, Guadalajara or Pastrana, where there were people who would help her. This pitiful petition was simply endorsed to be filed with the papers of the case, which indicates that it was refused.[336] A more rigorous example of this, which shows that no limit was placed on the discretion of the Inquisition, was the banishment for life to the Philippines, in 1802, of two frailes concerned in the imposture of Isabel María Herraiz, known as the Beata of Cuenca.[337] Conversely, a penitent might be prohibited to leave a designated place, as when, in 1599, Rodrigo Ramírez, a Morisco of Yepes, was forbidden for three years to leave Yepes without licence.[338]
As the ordinary form of exile was easily violated, the sentence, as we have seen above, was frequently accompanied with a threat of increased penalties for non-fulfilment. In Toledo this seems ordinarily to be a doubling of the original term, but frequently it was more severe as, in 1604, at Valencia, the sentence of Bartolomé Posca added to this a hundred lashes and, in 1607, Francisco Xiner, condemned to five years’ exile, was threatened with three years of galleys.[339] It was probably to check, in some degree, the facility for evasion that the Suprema, in 1665, required the tribunals to furnish it with a description of the culprit whenever they pronounced a sentence of exile. As this always comprised Madrid and, as the capital was likely to attract the homeless waifs, details which might assist in their identification were useful.[340]