A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 3

by Henry Charles Lea

As Fray Diego de Chaves, confessor of Philip II, was a member of the junta, there could have been no conscientious scruples concerning this wholesale murder. The Church for centuries had taught that death was the penalty for heresy; this was past discussion and was accepted as a matter of course, so that anything short of it was a grace undeserved—slavery, the galleys, the mines, castration, were mercies for which the culprits should feel grateful. So all theologians taught and so Fray Bleda learnedly set forth in his hideous book, the Defensio Fidei, which was approved in Rome after careful examination, and was printed at the expense of Philip III.[1054] Yet, for the honor of humanity, it must be said that there were a few rare souls who held that religion should be spread by love and charity—at least we may so assume from a memorial presented to the Lisbon junta, setting forth that the proper means of conversion had never yet been tried; that the cure had failed through the use of violence, for the disease was not incurable and the fault lay in the methods adopted; Christ had sent forth the apostles to convert the world by preaching the gospel, and the effort should be to find teachers of exemplary life, who would preach with love and gentleness. The memorial recited calmly and temperately the mistakes that had been made in the use of coercion and the absence of instruction and persuasion, and it proposed a series of measures which show that the writer was familiar with the difficulties of the task, the essential condition of which was that those entrusted with it should persuade themselves that it was not impossible. The junta contented itself with proposing that, if the king so desired, the memorial could be sent to the prelates of Valencia, Aragon and Granada, for examination and report. It seems to have been so sent, but only two answers are on record. Archbishop Ribera replied with the alternative of immediate expulsion or, what would be better, thinning out the Moriscos by appointing a body of special inquisitors, who should execute speedy justice, until there should be so few left that they could be expelled without trouble, thus calmly proposing to burn men and women by the hundred thousand. A shade less ferocious was the suggestion of the Inquisitor of Valencia, Ximenez de Reynoso, who favored expulsion to Newfoundland, under the guard of soldiers, who should receive allotments of land and vassals, similar to those of the conquistadores in the New World.[1055] Such an expulsion averted the danger of increasing the African population and was recommended, with a characteristically savage addition, by Martin de Salvatierra, Bishop of Segorbe, when, in 1587, his advice was sought by Philip. He responded by a long and brutal attack on the Moriscos, and suggested deportation to Newfoundland, where they would speedily perish, especially if the precaution were taken of castrating all the males, old and young.[1056]

It is to the credit of Philip II and his counsellors that, after the failure of the Lisbon project of 1581, they refused to entertain the inhuman suggestions of their ecclesiastical advisers. The matter continued to be threshed out, over and over again, in repeated juntas and councils, in innumerable consultas, and in the system, which Philip had reduced to perfection, of endless talking and writing, which served as an excuse for inaction. One device after another was discussed, such as reducing all the Moriscos to slavery, or sending the able-bodied to the galleys, but the idea of expulsion gradually forged to the front. In this confused tangle of prejudice, passion and fanaticism, it is refreshing to meet with a more statesmanlike view, expressed in a letter of the royal secretary, Francisco de Idiaquez, October 3, 1594, concerning a paper, submitted to him by the king, from some zealous but unpractical person, who argued that the existing scarcity arose from overpopulation, which would be relieved by the expulsion of the Moriscos. So far from this being the case, said Idiaquez, Spain had less inhabitants than for the last two or three centuries. If the presence of this vile race were as safe as it was profitable, there was not a corner of land that should not be placed in their hands, for they alone would bring fertility and plenty by their skill and thrift, which would reduce the price of provisions and with them that of other products. Cheapness was not caused by scanty population but by dense, if the people would work; the high prices were the result of the vice, the idleness, the luxury and the excessive superfluities indulged in by all classes.[1057]

DELIBERATIONS

The panic fear entertained of the Moriscos is reflected in an elaborate memorial presented to Philip III, on his accession in 1598, by the Marquis of Velada, who had been his tutor and was his mayordomo mayor, seriously urging Sicilian Vespers to prevent them from adopting the same expedient.[1058] Yet the simpler solution of allowing the irreconcilables to depart was not without its advocates, and at one time came near to adoption. In 1598, Don Martin González de Cellorigo submitted to Secretary Idiaquez the suggestion that they should be permitted or required to leave Spain, scattering the rest throughout Castile, on their abjuring their heresies, and subjecting them to the restrictions imposed on the exiles from Granada.[1059] Even as late as 1607, the Junta de Tres, to which the whole affair of the Moriscos had been entrusted, in a consulta of January 1st, favored the plan of allowing all, who would not accept Christianity, to betake themselves to Barbary, pointing out the futility of the objection that this would increase the power of the Moors, and this it repeated, October 29th, adding the suggestion that the Moriscos of Castile should be scattered and confined to agricultural labor, in all of which Philip signified his concurrence.[1060]

This was too sensible and humane to suit the ecclesiastics, who were bent on getting rid of the obnoxious apostates by expulsion or extermination, and Spain was not to be allowed so easy a solution of the difficulties created by a century of fanaticism and wrong-doing. In the irresolute and vacillating policy of the court, a final effort was made, as we have seen, to conciliate and instruct, in the Edict of Grace of 1599, under conditions that rendered it nugatory. Its failure, in 1601, was followed by the memorials of Archbishop Ribera urging expulsion, and any subsequent efforts to convert, such as a junta of bishops held in 1608 and 1609, were merely to keep the Moriscos amused and in ignorance of the more drastic measures proposed, during the years in which Philip III and his advisers discussed and rediscussed the question, pondered over details and avoided an irrevocable decision.

When, under pressure of the alarm about Muley Cidan, Philip called upon his Council of State for an immediate decision, it admitted that there had been too much delay and that the matter must not be left for the next generation, for the Christians, through wars and religion and dissolute lives, were constantly diminishing in numbers, while the Moriscos, through peace and frugality, were multiplying until in time they would be the majority. The alternatives of massacre or slavery, or the galleys, or allowing the discontented to emigrate were barely alluded to, and expulsion was in the minds of all. The external relations of Spain rendered the opportunity propitious and it ought not to be wasted. The work should commence with Valencia, which was the most dangerous centre, and the other kingdoms could be kept quiet with assurances that the expulsion was not to go further. The opposition of the nobles could be bought off by granting them the real and personal property of their vassals, and preparations should be made to have a powerful fleet off the coast by the end of Spring, and sufficient forces on land to crush resistance. As the Inquisition was in the habit of making many arrests, it could readily seize the influential Moriscos, so as to deprive the rest of their leadership. This sketched out the plan eventually followed, and the only partially dissentient voice was that of the royal confessor, Cardinal Fray Gerónimo Xavierr, who pleaded the forcible baptism and the futile endeavors to instruct by ministers, many of whom were of lives so depraved that they wrought harm by their evil example; he asked that efforts to convert should continue and if, by the time set for expulsion, there was no prospect of improvement, the proposed rigor would be justified. A process could then be formed by the Inquisition as to their apostasy, when they could be condemned for treason against God, or, if rebellion were proved, for treason against the king.[1061]

This last suggestion refers to a characteristic scruple. Ribera had alluded to it in his second memorial, to the effect that expulsion would be an invasion of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, depriving it of inflicting the canonical punishments, but this, he suggested, could be removed by application to the pope.[1062] It was doubtless in view of this scruple, and to avoid interference by the Inquisition, which was interested in maintaining the existing situation, that the edict of expulsion represented the measure as purely secular, caused by the treasonable correspondence of the Moriscos with the enemies of Spain, and by the necessity of placating God for their heresies.[1063]

EXPULSION

Still there were irresolution and delay, and the die was not cast until, in April, 1609, the Council of State presented a consulta unanimously agreeing on expulsion and virtually determining that the work should commence in autumn, the interval being employed in organizing the militia, bringing troops from Italy, and assembling squadrons to command the coast. Early in May orders were sent to the viceroys of Sicily, Naples and Milan to have the galleys in readiness and, at the end of June, the squadrons were instructed to rendezvous at Majorca on August 15th. Even after this there were evidences of hesitation and vacillation, but the plan was adhered to.[1064]

Early in August, Don Agustin de Mexia, an officer of high rank, who had distinguished himself at the siege of Ostend, was sent to Valencia, ostensibly to inspect the fortifications, but armed with full powers to carry out the expulsion. He bore a letter from the king to Ribera, expatiating on the influence which the latter had had in leading him to a decision. Ribera had obtained more than he had bargained for. His somewhat selfish theory had been that, by expelling the Moriscos from the rest of Spain, those of Valencia and Aragon could be controlled, and he shrank from the loss and misery to be inflicted on his immediate surroundings. As late as December 19, 1608, he had urged this view in a letter to the royal secretary, arguing that they were an injury to Castile and Andalusia, while their removal would be ruin to Valencia and Aragon, now the most flourishing kingdoms of Spain. The larger cities, he said, lived on the provisions brought by the Moriscos; the churches, hospitals, monasteries, brotherhoods, pious bequests, nobles, gentry and citizens depended on their services and were supported by the censos charged on their communities; he often wished to die rather than to witness such destruction.[1065] So, when Mexia reached Valencia, August 20th, and, after conference with the Viceroy Caracena, Ribera was sent for and read the royal letter, he repeated these arguments and proposed that all three should join in appeal to the king to commence with Andalusia. When the conference ended at 4 P.M., he was still firm and was told that a courier for Madrid would start at midnight when he could write what he saw fit. On reflection he concluded that the king wanted obedience, not advice, and he sent to the palace, in time for the courier, a letter to the king, and word to Mexia and Caracena, setting forth that the royal resolution came from heaven and he would further it with all his power. Still, he could not reconcile himself to the prospect of poverty. On August 23d he wrote to Secretary de Prada repeating his urgency that commencement be made with Castile and Andalusia and, on September 3d, he said to Fray Bleda and the Dominican Prior Alcocer “Padres, we may well in the future have to eat bread and herbs and to mend our own shoes.”[1066]