A History of the Inquisition of Spain; vol. 4

by Henry Charles Lea

EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION CLAIMED

The brief of Gregory XV was not published in Spain but, by some means, the Ordinary of Seville obtained a copy and exhibited it to the inquisitors. The Suprema promptly, on January 14, 1623 addressed a consulta to Philip IV, stating that it had not learned that the brief had reached any other bishop and dwelling eloquently on the frequency and heinousness of the crime, the energy and rigor of the Inquisition in its repression, and the disastrous consequences of concurrent episcopal jurisdiction, where the leniency of punishment encouraged evildoers, and the publicity of procedure conveyed knowledge to husbands and kinsmen. The king was therefore asked to apply for the exemption of Spain from the operation of the brief; this was speedily arranged and, on April 10, Ambassador Alburquerque reported the forwarding of a decree of the Congregation of the Inquisition, stating that it was not the papal intention that the brief should apply to the Spanish dominions. Cardinal Millino, at the same time, wrote that the pope had declared that the Inquisition should continue to prosecute such cases in its customary form and manner.[194]

This simply left the matter where it was before, but the Inquisition boldly asserted that it had been given exclusive jurisdiction and, when Urban VIII granted, to the Bishop of Astorga, cognizance of these cases among the regular clergy, it had the effrontery to raise a competencia with him.[195] On May 19, 1629, it sent to the tribunals copies of Gregory’s brief, with instructions to follow its prescriptions, as punishment should be uniform in a crime of such frequent occurrence. Although, it added, the brief appeared to confer only cumulative jurisdiction, the pope had declared to the king that in his dominions it was exclusive so that, if any Ordinary should undertake to hear such a case, he was to be inhibited and a prompt report be made to the Suprema. To make matters sure, this was followed by an order of August 9th, that this exclusive cognizance should be asserted in the Edict of Faith.[196]

It was not long before this produced another quarrel with Archbishop Aliaga of Valencia. In 1631, Vicente Palmer, rector of Játiva, was prosecuted in the archiepiscopal court for sundry offences, including a charge of solicitation preferred by Ana Martínez. The notary employed was a familiar who informed the tribunal. It promptly notified the Ordinary to omit that specification, to which Aliaga replied that his court had always possessed jurisdiction over the matter, and the brief of Gregory XV had confirmed the cumulative jurisdiction of both tribunals; if Urban VIII had rendered that of the Inquisition exclusive, he had not seen the brief, but if shown to him he would of course obey it. Then came a pause during which Palmer returned to Játiva and, from the pulpit, denounced all who had testified against him, declaring that all who accused ecclesiastics were excommunicated and he would not hear them in confession, especially Ana Martínez; the town was in an uproar and one man died without confession. After some months the tribunal, in its customary arrogant fashion, with threats of excommunication, summoned the archbishop to surrender the papers and admit that he was inhibited. To this he replied at much length, pointing out that it was unreasonable to ask him to strip himself of an established jurisdiction on the simple assertion of the inquisitors that they held a brief of Urban VIII, which they would not exhibit. He offered to submit the question to the pope or to form a competencia in the regular way, but both suggestions were rejected, although the tribunal adopted a more moderate tone. The records are imperfect and we do not know the outcome, but probably the Suprema quietly let the affair drop out of sight through delay, in preference to provoking an investigation which would have manifested the fraudulence of its claims.[197]

INCLUDED IN EDICT OF FAITH

The audacity of the claim increased with time and, in the formula of the Edict of Faith, in use in 1696, there was an absolute assertion that Gregory XV had declared that, in the Spanish dominions, the offence was subjected to the exclusive cognizance of the Inquisition and not to that of the bishops, their vicars, provisors or ordinaries.[198] Notwithstanding this, when bishops asserted their rights, the Suprema shrank from a direct contest. Thus, in 1755, when the Bishop of Quito undertook to try cases of the kind, the Suprema merely presented a long and argumentative consulta to the king. So, in 1807, the Bishop of Badajoz tried Joseph Méndez Rodríguez, priest of Llerena, for solicitation, apparently without remonstrance on its part and when, in 1816, Rodríguez was prosecuted by the tribunal of Llerena for propositions and mala doctrina, the Suprema ordered it to obtain from the bishop the papers of the former trial and add them to the new proceedings.[199]

While the Inquisition was thus aggressive in grasping exclusive jurisdiction, it hesitated for some time as to the vigorous use of its powers. It could evidently do little more than the inert episcopal courts unless it included solicitation in the Edicts of Faith, which specified offences and the obligation of denouncing them, but this involved the ever-present dread of scandal, and the necessity of calling attention to a matter so delicate. This explains the initial fluctuations of policy. When jurisdiction was first conferred, the Suprema ordered the omission of solicitation and then, by edict of July 17, 1562, that it should be included.[200] This speedily brought forth a vigorous remonstrance, which earnestly urged the necessity of secrecy to prevent scandal and the rendering of confession odious. It should never be admitted that such wickedness was possible; it had, in fact, always existed, but such a remedy had never been imagined, which would lead men to keep their wives and daughters from the confessional, nobles to refrain from putting their daughters into convents, religion to be despised and Christianity itself to be abhorred. Good confessors would be driven to abandon the confessional, and the clergy, seeing that their weaknesses were to be punished by the Inquisition, would withdraw their support from it, leading to serious results. At least the punishment should be secret, so that the people, seeing no results, might be led to believe that there were no wicked men administering the sacrament.[201] This final suggestion was superfluous, for clerical offenders, short of those incurring degradation and relaxation, were always punished in secret.

The opposition to this public admission of clerical frailty grew so strong that the Suprema, in a carta acordada of May 22, 1571, stated that, after many discussions, it had been decided that the disadvantages attendant on it required its omission, and inquisitors were told to find some other means, including notice to the Ordinaries to instruct confessors to admonish penitents to denounce offenders to the Holy Office. The exception thus made in favor of soliciting confessors evidently led to a marked diminution in the number of denunciations, causing the Suprema to hesitate for, in a carta of September 20, 1574, repeating the orders to omit, the Suprema spoke of it as possibly a temporary regulation.[202] The conviction seems to have grown that in no other way could the abuse be checked and, in a carta acordada of March 2, 1576, inquisitors were ordered to replace the clause in the Edict of Faith.[203]

REPUGNANCE TO DENOUNCE