Among the ancient Aztecs the oath assumed the proportions of an ordeal; the accused in taking it touched with his finger first the ground and then his tongue, and a perjury thus committed was expected to be followed with speedy misfortune. So among the Ostiaks and Samoiedes a disculpatory oath with imprecations taken on the head of a bear is held to have the same virtue.[838]


Reverting to the older races, we find no trace of formal ordeals in the fragmentary remains out of which Egyptologists thus far have succeeded in reconstructing the antique civilization of the Nile valley, but this is not attributable to an intellectual development which had cast them aside as worthless. The intimate dependence of man on the gods, and the daily interposition of the latter in human affairs, were taught by the prophets of the temples and reverently accepted by the people. It was merely a question as to the manner in which the judgment of God was to be obtained, and this apparently took the form of reference to the oracles which abounded in every Egyptian nome. In this we are not left to mere conjecture, for a story related by Herodotus shows that such an interpellation of the divine power was habitual in prosecutions when evidence of guilt was deficient. Aames II., before he gained the crown, was noted for his reckless and dissolute life, and was frequently accused of theft and carried to the nearest oracle, when he was convicted or acquitted according to the response. On ascending the throne, he paid great respect to the shrines where he had been condemned, and neglected altogether those where he had been absolved, saying that the former gave true and the latter lying responses.[839]


The Semitic races, while not giving to the ordeal the development which it has received among the Aryans, still afford sufficient manifestation of its existence among them. Chaldean and Assyrian institutions have not as yet been sufficiently explored for us to state with positiveness whether or not the judgment of God was a recognized resource of the puzzled dispenser of justice; but the probabilities are strongly in favor of some processes of the kind being discovered when we are more fully acquainted with their judicial system. The constant invocation of the gods, which forms so marked a feature of the cuneiform inscriptions, indicates a belief in the divine guidance of human affairs which could hardly fail to find expression in direct appeals for light in the administration of justice. The nearest approach however to the principle of the ordeal which has thus far been deciphered is found in the imprecations commonly expressed in contracts, donations, and deeds, by which the gods are invoked to shed all the curses that can assail humanity on the heads of those who shall evade the execution of their plighted faith, or seek to present false claims. Akin to this, moreover, was the penalty frequently expressed in contracts whereby their violation was to be punished by heavy fines, the greater part of which was payable into the treasury of some temple.[840]

Among the Hebrews, as a rule, the interposition of Yahveh was expected directly, without the formulas which human ingenuity has invented to invite and ascertain the decisions of the divine will. Still, the combat of David and Goliath has been cited as a model and justification of the judicial duel; and there are some practices described in Scripture which are strictly ordeals, and which were duly put forth by the local clergy throughout Europe when struggling to defend the system against the prohibitions of the papacy. When the man who blasphemed the Lord (Levit. xxiv. 11-16) was kept in ward “that the mind of the Lord might be showed them,” and the Lord ordered Moses to have him stoned by the whole congregation, we are not told the exact means adopted to ascertain the will of Yahveh, but the appeal was identical in principle with that which prompted the mediæval judgment of God. The use of the lot, moreover, which was so constantly employed in the most important and sacred matters, was not a mere appeal to chance, but was a sacred ceremony performed “before the Lord at the door of the tabernacle of the congregation” to learn what was the decision of Yahveh.[841] The lot was also used, if not as a regular judicial expedient, at all events in unusual cases as a mode of discovering criminals, and its results were held to be the undoubted revelation of Omniscience. It is more than probable that the Urim and Thummin were lots, and that they were not infrequently used, as in the cases of Achan and Jonathan.[842] And the popular belief in the efficacy of the lot is manifested in the account of Jonah’s adventure (Jonah i. 7) when the sailors are described as casting lots to discover the sinner whose presence brought the tempest upon them. The most formal and absolute example of the ordeal, however, was the Bitter Water by which conjugal infidelity was convicted and punished (Numb. v. 11-31). This curious and elaborate ceremony, which bears so marked an analogy to the poison ordeals, was abandoned by order of R. Johanan ben Saccai about the time of the Christian era, and is too well known to require more than a passing allusion to the wealth of Haggadistic legend and the interminable controversies and speculations to which it has given rise. I may add, however, that Aben Ezra and other Jewish commentators hold that when Moses burnt the golden calf and made the Israelites drink the water in which its ashes were cast (Exod. xxxii. 20), he administered an ordeal, like that of the Bitter Water, which in some way revealed those who had been guilty of idolatry, so that the Levites could slay them; and Selden explains this by reference to a tradition, according to which the gold of the calf reddened the beards of those who had worshipped it, and thus rendered them conspicuous.[843]


The teachings of Mahomet were too directly derived from the later Judaism for him to admit into his jurisprudence any formal system depending on miracles to establish justice between man and man whenever Allah might be invoked to manifest his power. Like the Jews, however, he taught that the constant supervision of the divine power is spontaneously exerted, and he carried this so far as to inculcate the belief that a judge pure from self-seeking would be inspired constantly from above. “He who asks to be made judge will not be assisted; and he who is made judge by compulsion, God sends down to him an angel, who causes his actions and sentences to be just.” To one who hesitated to accept the office, the Prophet said, “God will direct your heart, and show you judicial ways, and fix your tongue in truth and justice.” On the other hand, when a judge is unjust, “he separates from himself the assistance and favor of God, and the devil is always with him.” It was hard on litigants when the tribunal might be presided over by either Allah or Eblis, but they had no recourse, except in the oath, which was the corner-stone of Mahomet’s judicial system. In the absence of evidence, the oath of the defendant was final, and this incitement to perjury could only be repressed by investing the oath with the qualities of the ordeal. Accordingly he lost no opportunity of insisting upon the punishment, here and hereafter, of those who perjured themselves before the judgment-seat. Sometimes this failed to deter an eager pleader, and then he consoled the defeated party with the assurance that his successful adversary would suffer in the end, as when the chief of the Cindah tribe urged that a Jew, against whom he brought suit for land unjustly held, would swear falsely, and the Prophet rejoined, “Swearing is lawful, but he who takes a false oath will have no luck in futurity.” Tradition relates, however, that frequently he succeeded thus in frightening those who were ready to forswear themselves, as when a man of Hadramut claimed land occupied by a Cindah, and, being without evidence, the defendant was ready to take the oath, when Mahomet interposed, “No one takes the property of another by oath but will meet God with his tongue cut off,” and the Cindah feared God and said, “The land is his.” In another case, when two men were quarrelling over an inheritance, and neither had a witness, he warned them, “In whose favor soever I may order a thing which is not his right, then I lay apart for him nothing less than a piece of hell-fire,” whereupon each litigant exclaimed, “O messenger of God, I give up my right to him.” Sometimes, however, even Mahomet had recourse to a more direct invocation of the supreme power, as in a case wherein two men disputed as to the ownership of an animal, and neither had witnesses, when he directed them to cast lots upon oath.[844]

These cases do not bear out the tradition that, when the Prophet was perplexed beyond his ability, he had the resource of appealing to the angel Gabriel for enlightenment. There is one legend respecting him, however, which manifests the popular belief that in doubtful cases God may be relied on to interpose for the vindication of innocence. A youth brought before Mahomet on an accusation of murder, protested that the act was committed in self-defence. The Prophet ordered the corpse to be entombed, and postponed the trial until the next day. The brethren of the slain, still insisting on vengeance, were then told that they might inflict upon the murderer precisely the same wounds as those which they should find on the body. On opening the sepulchre for the purpose of ascertaining the exact measure of the punishment conceded, they returned affrighted to the judgment-seat, and reported that they had found nothing but the smoke and stench of Gehenna; whereupon Mahomet pronounced that Eblis had carried off the corpse of the guilty, and that the accused was innocent.[845] The prevalence of superstitions kindred to this, in spite of the principles laid down in the law, is shown by the custom which exists among some tribes of Arabs, of employing the ordeal of red-hot iron in the shape of a gigantic spoon, to which, when duly heated, the accused applies his tongue, his guilt or innocence being manifested by his suffering, or escaping injury.[846] A species of vulgar divination, common among the Turks, moreover, belongs to the same category of thought, as it is used in the detection of thieves by observing the marks on wax slowly melted, while certain magic formulas are recited over it.[847]