The same tendency to elude all restrictions on the use of torture was manifested in the Netherlands, where the procedure was scarcely known until the 16th century, and where it was only administered systematically by the ordonnance on criminal justice of Philip II. in 1570. When once employed it rapidly extended until it became almost universal, both in the provinces which threw off the yoke of Spain and in those which remained faithful. The limits which Philip had imposed on it were soon transcended. He had forbidden its employment in all cases “où il n’y a plaine, demye preuve, ou bien où la preuve est certaine et indubitable,” thus restricting it to those where there was very strong presumption without absolute certainty. In transcription and translation, however, the wording of the ordonnance became changed to “plaine ou demye preuve, ou bien où la preuve est incertaine ou douteuse,” thus allowing it in all cases where the judge might have a doubt not of the guilt but of the innocence of the accused; and by the time these errors were discovered by a zealous legal antiquarian, the customs of the tribunals had become so fixed that the attempt to reform them was vain.[1643] Even the introduction of torture could not wholly eradicate the notion on which the ordeal system was based, that a man under accusation must virtually prove his innocence.


In Germany, torture had been reduced to a system, in 1532, by the Emperor Charles V., whose Caroline Constitutions contain a more complete code on the subject than had previously existed, except in the records of the Inquisition. Inconsistent and illogical, it quotes Ulpian to prove the deceptive nature of the evidence thence derivable; it pronounces torture to be “res dira, corporibus hominum admodum noxia et quandoque lethalis, cui et mors ipsa prope proponenda;”[1644] in some of its provisions it manifests extreme care and tenderness to guard against abuses, and yet practically it is merciless to the last degree. Confession made during torture was not to be believed, nor could a conviction be based upon it; yet what the accused might confess after being removed from torture was to be received as the deposition of a dying man, and was full evidence.[1645] In practice, however, this held good only when adverse to the accused, for he was brought before his judge after an interval of a day or two, when, if he confirmed the confession, he was condemned, while if he retracted it he was at once thrust again upon the rack. In confession under torture, moreover, he was to be closely cross-questioned, and if any inconsistency was observable in his self-condemnation the torture was at once to be redoubled in severity.[1646] The legislator thus makes the victim expiate the sins of his own vicious system; the victim’s sufferings increase with the deficiency of the evidence against him, and the legislator consoles himself with the remark that the victim has only himself to thank for it, “de se tantum non de alio quæratur.” To complete the inconsistency of the code, it provided that confession was not requisite for conviction; irrefragable external evidence was sufficient; and yet even when such evidence was had, the judge was empowered to torture in mere surplusage.[1647] Yet there was a great show of tender consideration for the accused. When the weight of conflicting evidence inclined to the side of the prisoner, torture was not to be applied.[1648] Two adverse witnesses, or one unexceptionable one, were a condition precedent, and the legislator shows that he was in advance of his age by ruling out all evidence resting on the assertions of magicians and sorcerers.[1649] To guard against abuse, the impossible effort was made to define strictly the exact quality and amount of evidence requisite to justify torture, and the most elaborate and minute directions were given with respect to all the various classes of crime, such as homicide, child-murder, robbery, theft, receiving stolen goods, poisoning, arson, treason, sorcery, and the like;[1650] while the judge administering torture to an innocent man on insufficient grounds was liable to make good all damage or suffering thereby inflicted.[1651] The amount of torment, moreover, was to be proportioned to the age, sex, and strength of the patient; women during pregnancy were never to be subjected to it; and in no case was it to be carried to such a point as to cause permanent injury or death.[1652]


[CHAPTER VIII.]
FINAL SHAPE OF THE TORTURE SYSTEM.

Charles V. was too astute a ruler not to recognize the aid derivable from the doctrines of the Roman law in his scheme of restoring the preponderance of the Kaisership, and he lost no opportunity of engrafting them on the jurisprudence of Germany. In his Criminal Constitutions, however, he took care to embody largely the legislation of his predecessors and contemporaries, and though protests were uttered by many of the Teutonic princes, the code, adopted by the Diet of Ratisbon in 1532, became part and parcel of the common law of Germany.[1653] A fair idea of the shape assumed, under these influences, by the criminal law in its relations with torture, can be obtained by examining some of the legal text-books which were current as manuals of practice from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.[1654] As most of the authors of these works appear to condemn the principle or to lament the necessity of torture, their instructions as to its employment may safely be assumed to represent the most humane and enlightened views current during the period.[1655] It is easy to see from them, however, that though the provisions of the Caroline Constitutions were still mostly in force, yet the practice had greatly extended itself, and that the limitations prescribed for the protection of innocence and helplessness had become of little real effect.

Upon the theory of the Roman law, nobles and the learned professions had claimed immunity from torture, and the Roman law inspired too sincere a respect to permit a denial of the claim,[1656] yet the ingenuity of lawyers reduced the privilege to such narrow proportions that it was practically almost valueless. For certain crimes, of course, such as majestas, adultery, and incest, the authority of the Roman law admitted of no exceptions, and to these were speedily added a number of other offences, classed as crimina excepta or nefanda, which were made to embrace almost all offences of a capital nature, in which alone torture was as a rule allowable. Thus, patricide, uxoricide, fratricide, witchcraft, sorcery, counterfeiting, theft, sacrilege, rape, arson, repeated homicide, etc., came to be included in the exceptional cases, and the only privileges extended in them to nobles were that they should not be subjected to “plebeian” tortures.[1657] As early as 1514, I find an instance which shows how little advantage these prerogatives afforded in practice. A certain Dr. Bobenzan, a citizen of good repute and syndic of Erfurt, who both by position and profession belonged to the excepted class, when brought up for sentence on a charge of conspiring to betray the city, and warned that he could retract his confession, extracted under torture, pathetically replied—“During my examination, I was at one time stretched upon the rack for six hours, and at another I was slowly burned for eight hours. If I retract, I shall be exposed to these torments again and again. I had rather die”—and he was duly hanged.[1658] In fact, all these exemptions were rather theoretical than practical, and they were speedily set aside.[1659]

In Catholic countries, of course, the clergy were specially favored, but the immunity claimed for them by the canon law was practically reduced to nearly the same as that accorded to nobles.[1660] The torture inflicted on them, however, was lighter than in the case of laymen, and proof of a much more decided character was required to justify their being exposed to torment. As an illustration of this, von Rosbach remarks that if a layman is found in the house of a pretty woman, most authors consider the fact sufficient to justify torture on the charge of adultery, but that this is not the case with priests, who if they are caught embracing a woman are presumed to be merely blessing her.[1661] They moreover had the privilege of being tortured only at the hands of clerical executioners, if such were to be had.[1662] In Protestant territories respect for the cloth was manifested by degrading them prior to administering the rack or strappado.[1663]

Some limitations were imposed as to age and strength. Children under fourteen could not be tortured, nor the aged whose vigor was unequal to the endurance, but the latter could be tied to the rack, and menaced to the last extremity; and the elasticity of the rule is manifested in a case which attracted attention at Halle in the eighteenth century, in which a man more than eighty years of age was decided to be fit to bear the infliction, and only escaped by opportunely dying.[1664] In fact, Grillandus argues that age confers no immunity from torture, but that a humane judge will inflict it only moderately, except in atrocious crimes; as for children, though regular torture could not be employed on them, the rod could be legitimately used.[1665] Insanity was likewise a safeguard, and much discussion was had as to whether the deaf, dumb, and blind were liable or not. Zanger decides in the affirmative whenever, whether as principals or witnesses, good evidence was to be expected from them;[1666] and Scialoja points out that though deaf-mutes as a rule are not to be tortured because they cannot dictate a confession, yet if they can read and write so as to understand the accusation and write out what they have to say, they are fit subjects for the torturer.[1667] Pregnant women also were exempt until forty days after childbed, even though they had become so in prison for the express purpose of postponing the infliction.[1668] Some kinds of disease likewise conferred exemption, and jurisconsults undertook with their customary minuteness to define with precision this nosology of torture, leading to discussions more prolonged than profitable. Gout, for instance, gave rise to doubt, and some authors were found to affirm that they knew of cases in which gouty patients had been cured by a brisk application of the implements of the marter-kammer or torture-chamber.[1669] Other legists gravely disputed whether in the case of epileptics the judge should bear in mind the aspects of the moon and the equinoxes and solstices, at which times the paroxysms of the disease were apt to be more violent. Those who thus escaped torture on account of disease presented a problem which the jurists solved in their ordinary fashion by condemning them to some other punishment than that provided for the crime of which they had been accused but not convicted.[1670]

In theory the accused could be tortured only once, but this, like all other restrictions in favor of humanity, amounted to but little. A repetition of torture could be justified on the ground that the first application had been light or insufficient; the production of fresh evidence authorized a second and even a third infliction; a failure to persevere in confession after torture rendered a repetition requisite; and even a variation in the confession required confirmation by the rack or strappado.[1671] Many writers affirm that a second torture is requisite to purge away the defect of the infamy incurred by confession under the first, as well as to strengthen the evidence against accomplices.[1672] In fact, some authorities go so far as to place it entirely at the discretion of the judge whether the accused shall be subjected or not to repeated torment without fresh evidence,[1673] and Del Rio mentions a case occurring in Westphalia wherein a man accused of lycanthropy was tortured twenty times.[1674] This practice of repeating torture we are told by many authorities was exceedingly common.[1675]