Everything having thus far progressed in favor of the ruse the trap was sprung upon the unsuspecting party. The sellers’ options began to mature, and there was no Hudson to be obtained.
The “corner” was complete, and the stock rose to 180. It had been 112 a few mornings before, when the Commodore was basking in the sun, and found that the bears were taking advantage of his absence. The loss on a hundred shares was $6,800.
There were about 50,000 shares contracted for to be delivered at this rate of profit by the “cornerers.” It will thus be seen that they were well fixed.
The bears were in terrible anguish.
But the worst part of the deal for these poor animals had yet to come. The bears who had turned the stock were notified that they must stand and deliver. They complained bitterly of the ingratitude of the bulls, whom they had only sought to oblige, by turning the stock. The bulls were implacable, however, and demanded their property. They proposed a compromise which was most exacting. They were willing to lend stock at five per cent. per day. Some of the bears paid this, thinking the “corner” would be of short duration, but it continued for over two weeks, and, after paying five per cent. a day for several days, these poor victims bought the stock at the high rate and settled.
This double move in turning the stock was the ablest trick that had ever been accomplished in cornering. It made Vanderbilt king of strategists in that line.
But the best part of the stratagem was that wherein the bulls saved themselves from being saddled with the whole stock, and made immense profits out of the deal.
While some of the bears were purchasing to cover at 170, Vanderbilt’s private brokers were selling at 140, the clique thus craftily unloading at good paying figures. This was one of the best inside moves in the whole history of “corners.”
The bulls thus saved themselves from the risk of being loaded with probably the whole, or at any rate the greater part of the capital stock, and through the Commodore’s able management the load was comparatively light at the end of the deal, the property remaining as good a speculative as before, which is a rare exception in “corners.”
The “corner” in Harlem was not less skilfully managed than the one in Hudson, but it had fewer complications. It was all plain sailing, so to speak, compared with the former, yet it clearly illustrated that the Commodore had a genius for “corners.” When he managed the Harlem “corner” he had had no experience in railroad matters, and he had reached the ripe age of sixty-nine.