It is thus clear that the Government would be ultimately driven to redeem the certificates in silver bullion. What does that imply? First, that the Treasury would have to stand the loss upon the deposits of bullion that might arise from a fall in its value. Take a case for illustration. A deposit is made of 1,000,000 ounces of gold at the current price of $1.10 per ounce, the Treasury being required to issue against it $1,100,000 of certificates. Later, when the price of silver has fallen to say $1.05, the $1,100,000 of certificates is presented for redemption, and 1,047,619 ounces of silver have to be delivered, as the bullion equivalent at the current market value. The Government thus loses 47,619 ounces of silver by the transaction. Now, seeing what a handsome profit can be made by thus depositing bullion at a higher price and withdrawing it at a lower, are men so virtuous that we can depend on their not working this Treasury silver mine to the utmost possible advantage? With the hands of the Government thus tied, it would be at the mercy of unprincipled speculators and could not escape being mulcted to the extent of millions of dollars. The moment such a bill was signed by the President, speculative combinations would be formed with London bullion dealers; the European stocks would be secured, and, after advancing the price, would be sent to the United States Treasury. The next step would be to force down the price; and then the certificates would be presented to be redeemed by a much larger quantity of silver than had been deposited against them. And thus the game would go on continuously, the Government being the loser in every transaction. A finer scheme for the benefit of speculators could not have been conceived; but for legitimate interests, in many ways dependent on the value of silver, nothing could be more serious.

There is nothing in Mr. Warner’s measure to prevent the United States Treasury from being saddled with as much of the European stocks of silver as speculators find it to their interest to send here, in addition to the product of our own mines; and for such deposits the Treasury would be compelled to pay whatever artificial price it suited the operators to determine. And what does such a transfer involve? First, that we should have to ship so much more gold to Europe, making the operation a virtual exchange of Europe’s silver for America’s gold; next, that the United States Government would thus be made to bear the sole weight and responsibility of carrying the WORLD’S surplus of silver; next, that, as a consequence, England, Germany, and other nations would become still more reluctant than they now are to negotiate for an international settlement of the silver question; next, that the Government would be so handicapped with its enormous load of silver as to place it at an utter disadvantage in such negotiations; next, that the Government would be exposed to immense losses in assuming such vast responsibilities; and, next, that the large issues of certificates to be made against this mass of bullion would be a forcible and artificial inflation of the currency, which could not fail to produce disaster to all the material interests of the country.

Of course, such an arrangement would be all that the silver interests could desire. For them, indeed, it would be a far better protection than the Bland Act. But this advantage would be only temporary; for when the scheme broke down of its own weight, as sooner or later it must, the miners would be exposed to ruin from the consequent derangements.

The only wholesome treatment of this question is to repeal the Silver Coinage Act. That done, we should add $25,000,000 to our yearly exports, instead of locking up so much of our national product as dead capital in the Treasury; while that increase of exports would give us a greater command of European gold and thereby strengthen our international position in this question. Europe, and especially England, would then be compelled to earnestly consider measures for placing the double standard upon a broad and lasting international basis; and as such a disposition began to manifest itself, the silver market would so far sympathize as to amply compensate producers for any losses they might suffer from a temporary fall in bullion.

Henry Clews.

Bad as the situation is, in respect to this vast mass of the world’s circulating medium, yet it is far from being a hopeless one. The more serious it becomes, the nearer will be the remedy. The derangements to commerce and to immense vested interests must ultimately become so serious, that the nations which now obstruct the application of a remedy will be compelled to submit to the necessities of an imperative danger, and the end will probably be that a coinage union will be established between the great nations, on a basis broad enough to give stability to this form of money beyond all possibility of future disturbance.


CHAPTER XLV.
THE LABOR QUESTION.

Harmony Between the Representatives of Capital and Labor Necessary for Business Prosperity.—If Manufacturers should Combine to Regulate Wages, the Arrangement Could only be Temporary.—The Workingmen are Taken Care of by the Natural Laws of Trade.—Competition Among the Capitalists Sustains the Rate of Wages.—Opinion of John Stuart Mill on this Subject.—Compelling a Uniform Rate of Pay is a Gross Injustice to the Most Skilful Workmen.—The Tendency of the Trades Unions to Debar the Workingman from Social Elevation.—The Power of the Unions Brought to a Test.—The Universal Failure of the Strikes.—Revolutionary Demands of the Knights of Labor.—Gould and the Strikes on the Missouri Pacific, &c., &c.

There is no influence to which business circles are more sensitive than the disruption of harmony between capital and labor. Whatever affects the productiveness of labor affects, more directly than any other cause, the national prosperity and the welfare of all classes of society. The value of the vast aggregate of corporate property represented on the Stock Exchange is vitally dependent on the maintenance of such relations between the employed and employing classes as contribute to the highest welfare of both and to the largest possible national production; and, therefore, whatever tends to imperil such relations becomes a source of serious disturbance to the stock market, to financial interests at large, and to the best interests of labor itself.