In the course of a few weeks after I was waited upon by a diamond dealer and his lawyer, with neither of whom I had the honor of any previous acquaintance, and they accordingly introduced each other. The diamond dealer introduced the lawyer and vice versa. I immediately concluded I was going to get a good stock order from both of them, but I was soon disappointed as well as surprised to find that these gentlemen had called on an entirely different kind of business, which was totally devoid of commissions on any stock transactions.
They said I had a pair of earrings belonging to them, and I declined to give them up except on return of my thousand dollars.
These two gentlemen bade me good day, and in the course of time I was served with the usual legal papers in a suit which reached the calendar after some time. The young man who sold me the diamonds was put on the stand. He testified that he had received them from a certain diamond broker, but not the dealer in question, with whom he had had no connection whatever.
The diamond broker, it appeared, had long been agent for this dealer, selling diamonds and had, as set forth in the evidence, sold over ten thousand dollars’ worth in a few years.
During the trial a paper was produced to prove that this broker had received these diamonds to show them to a customer, and as it turned out I happened to be the customer. The money which I had paid him for them he had failed to turn over to his employer, of whom I had no knowledge, nor had I any chance of knowing him in the transaction.
All the facts were presented, as above related, to the jury, who, after due deliberation, decided that I must give up the diamonds and suffer to be cheated out of my thousand dollars.
This case is now on appeal. I have since offered to relinquish the diamonds and lose my money, rather than suffer the expense and trouble of continuing the litigation, but plaintiff wants to bleed me further to the tune of $300 to cover his law expenses. To this illegal tribute I have not yet submitted, and have resolved to see what virtue there is in further defense before a higher tribunal.
“Millions of dollars for defence, but not a dollar for tribute,” is a maxim which it is expensive to follow, but after all, the result of such a course, if one can afford it, may be morally healthy.
I consider that these cases, in which I acted a rather unenviable part, are only samples of many which constitute one of the best arguments for a general system of arbitration, such as I have briefly and imperfectly outlined.