[[2]] "The Colony of New Zealand," Gisborne, pp. 171-2.
[[3]] New Zealand Official Year Book, 1894. Report by Under-secretary of Public Works.
[[4]] Report of Department of Lands and Survey, 1896; page iv.
[[5]] Report of Department of Labour, 1896; page vii.
V
CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTORIAN LEGISLATION
Comparisons between the Australasian Upper Houses—Conflicts between the two Houses in Victoria—The proposed obviation of deadlocks—The utility of the Legislative Council—The antagonism between Town and Country—The Factory Acts, their justification and provisions—State Socialism: Railways, Irrigation Works, the encouragement of Mining, Subsidies and Bonuses, State advances to Settlers—The Unemployed and the Leongatha Labour Colony.
The Victorian Legislative Council is, from the democratic point of view, the most objectionable of all the Australasian Upper Houses. In Queensland, New South Wales, and New Zealand, the members of the Council are nominated for life and receive no remuneration for their services; but, as their number is not restricted, their opposition to measures passed by the Assembly is limited by the dread that the Executive may exercise the power of making additional appointments. In the other Provinces the Councils are elective; in South Australia, Western Australia, and Tasmania, as in the Provinces already mentioned, the Members are subject to no property qualification, and in New Zealand, South Australia, and Tasmania they are paid at the rate, respectively, of £150, £200, and £50 a year. In Victoria, on the other hand, there is a property qualification for membership which consists in the possession of a freehold estate of the clear annual value of £100, which confines eligibility to a small fraction of the population; and the area of selection is restricted further by the absence of remuneration and by the size of the electoral districts, which necessitates heavy expenditure on the part of a candidate at a contested election. Under these circumstances, the comparatively low electoral franchise, which admits upon the rolls two-thirds of the voters for members of the Assembly, is absolutely useless to the democratic electors: they are unable to find candidates who will adopt their views, and have been obliged, as at the last elections, to allow all the retiring members to be re-elected without opposition. It should be stated that the members are elected for a period of six years in ten provinces, and retire in rotation at intervals of two years.