The workers should protect themselves not only against foreign goods, but against undesirable immigrants, whether they be Orientals or indigent Europeans.
The consideration of these questions, and of the wider issues with which they are concerned, will cover most of the points of recent interest in Australasian politics.
(1) It is doubtful whether Responsible Government, in the sense of government by a Ministry which carries out a definite policy approved by the country, and, in return, receives allegiance from its supporters in Parliament, has ever been acclimatised in Australasia except in New South Wales under the influence of the late Sir Henry Parkes. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, when it was sought to transplant a delicate system, hallowed by conventions and dependent for its success upon the election of a special class of representatives, among a community necessarily ruled by men who had little experience of public life? Australian Parliaments, save on the rare occasions when some important issue, such as that of the tariff, has come to the front, have not been divided on ordinary party lines, and have amused themselves with the excitement of a constant succession of new Ministries selected on personal and not on political considerations. New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria, to take three Provinces at random, have had, respectively, 28, 42, and 26 Ministries in 40 years. The policy of the Opposition has often been almost identical with that of the Government. Again, coalitions between former opponents have been of frequent occurrence; the Ministries formed by Messrs. Deakin and Gillies in Victoria, and by Sir Samuel Griffith and Sir Thomas McIlwraith in Queensland, are recent instances of this tendency. In some rural constituencies, also, candidates appeal to the electorate on personal grounds and are not required to declare their adhesion to a party. I was struck, when present at the elections in South Australia and New Zealand, by the subsequent animated discussions in the newspapers as to the probable effect of the changes in the personnel of the Members upon the prospects of the Government. This is the more noticeable from the fact that the freedom of action allowed to representatives has been curtailed since the return to Parliament of Labour Members, who are pledged to a definite programme and have put forward questions on which there is a distinct line of cleavage. Proposals for the extension of the franchise, for the abolition of the plural vote, or for the imposition of a tax on incomes and land values, are such as divide the electorate into two camps and perpetuate the division in the House. This state of things, combined, perhaps, with the financial crisis which raised problems demanding continuity of administration for their solution, has contributed to the greater stability of Ministries. Another factor, which has given constituencies a greater hold on their representatives, and has tended thereby to make them adhere more closely to one or other of the parties, is the payment of Members, which has now been adopted in all the Lower Houses except that of Western Australia, and in the Upper Houses of South Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand. Australia has been confronted with the difficulty experienced by every young country, that the men who should naturally enter Parliament are prevented by commercial or professional duties from devoting the necessary time, and that, in the absence of men of leisure, constituencies are much hampered in their choice of candidates. The payment of Members, it is needless to say, offers no inducement to the successful merchant or lawyer, but has increased the competition among men to whom the salary is an inducement. My inquiries as to its effect upon the tone of politicians have elicited mutually contradictory replies. On the one hand I am assured that the attractions of the salary have led men to resort to disreputable practices in order to be selected as candidates and to seek to retain the fickle affections of their constituents by similar means; on the other, that necessitous Members have been raised by the salary above temptations which their poverty made it difficult for them to resist; and such temptations must increase in number with each extension of the functions of the State unless it be dissociated from political influence. It is clear that a knowledge of the inner life of a Parliament could alone supply materials for the adequate discussion of this question, and that a similar consideration applies to the discussion of the effects of State socialism upon political morality. The possible abuses are many: railways may be constructed with a view to popularity; the rents of Crown tenants may be remitted, and borrowers may be allowed to fall in arrears with the interest on their advances; subsidies and bonuses voted by Parliament may be misapplied; and the unemployed may be conciliated by unnecessary public works. Personal corruption, I am confident, does not exist, but that safeguards have been felt to be necessary is proved by the appointment of independent Railway Commissioners by New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland, and New Zealand, and of Public Works Committees by Victoria and New South Wales. In the latter country, as has been seen, the Commissioners have been most successful, but New Zealand has reverted to the system of political control, and Victoria, Queensland, and South Australia have reduced the number of Commissioners from three to one. This change, which must have lessened the efficacy of non-political control, was advocated on grounds of economy at a time when all forms of expenditure were being cut down to the lowest point. In Victoria the Leongatha Labour Settlement has diminished the difficulties connected with the unemployed, and its administration has been studied by the other Provinces with a view to similar action. The general political tone is healthy, and is stimulated, in all the Provinces, by a high-class press, which uses its great influence in a conscientious manner. But, as long as Treasurers can balance their accounts by recourse to loans, and are tempted, as is inevitable, to apply borrowed money to placatory enterprises, the dangers which are necessarily connected with State socialism are multiplied tenfold. They would be lessened if the objects for which loans might be contracted were defined, as has been suggested, by Act of Parliament, or if Federation were to eventuate at an early date and the right to borrow were limited to the Federal Authority.
In New Zealand alone have I found direct evidence of the misuse of political patronage. Upon the third reading of the Appropriation Bill in 1896, Captain Russell, the Leader of the Opposition, made use of the following words: "I maintain that for years past the administration of the Government has been anything but good. They have hunted for popularity and they have hunted their enemies. They have hunted their enemies to a very great extent. You find positions which were capably filled by old and valued servants now filled by friends of the Government. We have a system of espionage in existence which is disgusting.... The Civil Servants should not depend on the favour and their popularity with Ministers for promotion, but rather on good honest service, and that is not the case now. Why, a Civil Servant dare not come and speak to an Opposition Member for fear of that fact being reported to the Ministers. (An Hon. Member: No!) It is all very well to say 'No,' but I am acquainted with dozens of Civil Servants in Wellington, and they will not come and speak to me in the street for fear of being reported."[[8]] In his reply the Premier made no attempt to meet these charges, which I have quoted because I have gathered corroborative evidence in different parts of the country, though it is not such as admits of being adduced as definite proof, and because the Minister of Lands made an exceedingly candid admission shortly after the elections. In the course of a speech delivered at Geraldine he is reported by a Ministerial newspaper to have said: "They had endeavoured during their term of office to do what they could in the interests of the Colony as a whole, but they had been very badly treated by two classes of the public at the elections. In the session of 1895, they would remember, the Government passed a measure to give relief to pastoral Crown tenants who lost a large number of sheep in the snow. The Government did this in the interest of the people as a whole, as they thought, but how had they been treated by the people they helped in time of distress? (A voice: Very badly.) Yes, there might have been one or two exceptions, but generally speaking they fought tooth and nail against the Government. Then, again, the Government saved the Bank of New Zealand and the Colony from ruin, but still the old leaven of the Bank fought and voted against the Government at the elections. He considered this very unfair on their part, considering what the Government had done for them."[[9]] Sir Robert Stout, a former Premier of New Zealand, has also brought a grave indictment against the Government, from which I quote the portion referring to appointments:—
"By the Statute Law of New Zealand, no one who has been a member of either House can be appointed to any position in the Civil Service until he has for twelve months ceased to be a member of Parliament. A vacancy occurred in the position of Sergeant-at-arms, and it was announced that an ex-member, who had at the elections retired in favour of a Ministerial candidate, had received the office. When Parliament met, the appointment gave rise to much discussion. Ultimately a large majority supported the Ministry in conferring the appointment temporarily, the official appointment to be made at the end of twelve months. If this had been the only flagrant violation of the law it might have been overlooked; but it is only a type of what has been done. The Civil Service Reform Act, 1886, provides that no one, save an expert, can be appointed to the Civil Service unless he enters as a cadet. Some departments, such as the railway, postal, and telegraph departments, are exempted from the provisions of the Act. The cadets must obtain their positions by competition; the examination is annual. The Ministry, however, appointed some cadets out of their order, and some who had never even submitted to an examination at all. There is a provision for "temporary" clerks. When vacancies arise in the service these are given to temporary clerks. The policy of "spoils for the victors" has been openly defended. To carry out this pernicious system the law has been violated. It has been said that only those of the 'right colour' of political opinions should receive appointments in the Civil Service."[[10]]
However great may be one's sympathy with the efforts of the Government to encourage settlement and to promote industrial conciliation and arbitration, one cannot but rejoice at the increased strength of the Opposition, which will be sufficient to enforce greater purity of administration and the enactment of legislation which will prevent a recurrence of the evil.
The realisation of the dangers of an unmuzzled democracy has caused a widespread anxiety which has been displayed in vehement but, for the most part, unsuccessful opposition to proposed changes in the constitution of the Assembly. New Zealand and South Australia have adopted adult suffrage, coupled with the abolition of plural voting; Victoria and New South Wales manhood suffrage, associated in the former case with the plural vote but not in the latter. In Victoria, the Conservatives, if I may so characterise the less-advanced party, have put forward a proposal which is unique in Australasia. They suggest that, while each man should continue to have a vote, the present plural votes should be replaced by a second vote which should be possessed equally by all freeholders whatever be the size and number of their properties. They believe that they would thereby place the power in the hands of the more stable elements of the population, and that they are not unlikely to be supported by the freeholders, who constitute nearly two-thirds of the electors on the rolls for the Assembly.
At present the Labour parties are engaged in onslaughts upon the Legislative Councils with a view to their ultimate abolition, but are prepared to accept, as an instalment, any proposals which would cripple their power. They concurred heartily with the Bill introduced in 1896 by the Government of New South Wales and rejected by the Council after it had been passed by large majorities through the Assembly, which provided for the reference to a popular vote of matters in dispute between the two Houses. Similar measures are also advocated by the Governments of Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania; while in New Zealand, it is proposed that deadlocks shall be obviated by a joint session of both Houses, which shall sit as one Chamber. It may be that an Act of 1891 which, as will be seen, tends to popularise the Legislative Council in New Zealand will account for the less drastic character of the solution put forward in that Province. It is probable that it will become customary in Australasia to submit distinct issues to the electorate, on a separate ballot-paper, at the time of a general election. The Government of South Australia ascertained in this manner the popular wishes in regard to religious instruction in State schools, and the payment to denominational schools of a capitation grant for secular results; and the recent "Alcoholic Liquors Sale Control Act" of New Zealand provides that Local Option polls shall be taken concurrently with the election of representatives. Under references similar to that in South Australia, it may be objected, Ministers may be supported on their general policy, but be required to introduce a measure to which they are opposed. Such a position, however, would not apparently be regarded as inconsistent, as most of the candidates in South Australia stated their willingness to give effect to the popular vote, in whatever direction it might be expressed. Disputes between the two Houses will, I believe, be decided similarly, on the score of the expense of a special poll, unless the issue be such as to demand an immediate settlement.
The first line of attack of the Labour Members is thus seen to be an agitation which aims at enabling the electorate of the Assembly to override the Council; the second is directed at its Conservative tendencies. The policy pursued depends upon the constitution of the Council: if it is elective, it should be so modified as to become a Chamber of paid representatives, subject to no property qualification and elected upon a wide franchise, such as the South Australian Council, in which a combination of Ministerialists and Labour Members has been able to obtain a bare majority. If it is nominated, the life tenure should be superseded by nomination for a short term of years, which will enable successive Ministries to introduce a new leaven of persons who are in touch with popular feeling, and will be prevented, by the limit placed upon the duration of their appointments, from being subjected to reactionary influences. The Council, that is to say, is to become a mere machine for registering the wishes of the Assembly. The only success which has hitherto attended this agitation is the enactment in 1891 of a measure in New Zealand which limited to seven years the duration of subsequent appointments; but the Government now desire to abolish the life tenure, and they are followed herein by New South Wales, by providing for the gradual retirement of all the members who hold their seats for life. They also propose, whether seriously or in order to cast ridicule upon the Council, that women shall be eligible for appointment to that body. In regard to the general position of the nominated Councils, which are not limited as to the number of their members, it may be stated that the Imperial Government decided, upon a case submitted to them from New Zealand, that the Governor should accept the recommendations of his constitutional advisers in the matter of additional appointments. Strangely enough, the Premier of Queensland, the only other Australasian Province that has a nominated Legislative Council, though a strong constitutionalist, aimed a blow at its prestige in a proposal, which he carried through the Assembly but not through the Council, that the former House alone should be vested with the power of selecting the delegates to the pending Federal Convention.
Before leaving this portion of the subject, I must mention that other proposals affecting the form of Government of the Provinces have been discussed in Parliament and are likely to attract serious attention. Theoretically, indeed, it has been asserted, apart from the question of the power of the Upper Houses, and the point is of interest as showing the ideas germinating in the minds of Australasian politicians, that five changes are required in order that the Parliamentary machinery may be brought into proper relations with the people: the election of Ministers by the Assembly; continuity of representation in the Assembly, to be secured by the division of the country into constituencies returning two representatives who retire alternately at fixed periods; the Swiss form of Initiative and Referendum; and the right of a certain proportion of the members to convoke a special session of Parliament, and of an absolute majority of the electors in a constituency to require the resignation of their member. The first and second of these reforms, as I have shown, are included in the programme of the Ministry of South Australia, which, however, in spite of its success at the polls, has not pressed them forward during the first session of the New Parliament. Continuity of representation could easily be arranged, as all the constituencies return two members. An Elective Executive Bill has been introduced in the House of Representatives in New Zealand and received a large measure of support, though it was opposed by the Premier and the leader of the Opposition. The idea has taken a strong hold upon the imagination of the Labour Members in all the Provinces.