Diary of the Besieged Resident in Paris

by Henry Du Pré Labouchere

Monday, November 7th.

The newspapers of to-day, with the exception of the Ultra organs, are loud in their expressions of regret that the armistice has not been agreed to. The Government gives no further details, but yesterday afternoon M. Jules Favre informed several members of the press who "interviewed" him, that Prussia refused to allow the introduction of provisions into Paris during the duration of the armistice. I have long ceased believing any assertion of a member of the French Government, unless supported by independent evidence. But if this be really true, I must say that Count Bismarck has been playing a game with the Neutral Powers, for it can hardly be expected that Paris would consent to suspend all military operations against the Prussians, whilst their process of reducing the town by starvation was uninterrupted. Besides, as such a condition would have amounted practically to a capitulation, it would have been more frank on the part of Count Bismarck to have submitted the question in that form. I anticipate very shortly a sortie in force. An attempt will be made with the Second Army to pierce the Prussian lines. There appears no reason to doubt that it will fail, and then the cry for peace will become so strong that the Government will be obliged to listen seriously to it.

General Trochu's new organization is severely criticised. I hear from military men that he elaborated it himself with his personal friends. So secret was it kept, that the Minister of War knew nothing about it until it appeared in the Journal Officiel yesterday. After the scene of last Monday General Vinoy reproached Trochu for having tamely submitted to arrest and insult by a mob for several hours, and strongly hinted that a French general owed it to his cloth not to allow his decorations to be torn from his breast. It is said by General Vinoy's friends that those observations are mainly the cause why he has been deprived of his independent command, and placed under the orders of General Ducrot, with respect to whose evasion from Sedan many French officers shake their heads.

I cannot help thinking that the result of the vote of the army on Thursday last is only relatively correct. Line, Mobile, and Marines do not amount to 250,000 men, unless I am very much mistaken. The Second Army, under Ducrot, will number about 110,000 men.

The English at last are about to leave. They are very indignant at having been, as they say, humbugged so long, and loud in their complaints against their Embassy. I do not think, however, that the delay has been the fault either of Colonel Claremont or of Mr. Wodehouse. These gentlemen have done their best, but they were unable to get the Prussian and French authorities to agree upon a day for the exodus. On the one hand, to send to Versailles to receive an answer took forty-eight hours; on the other, from the fact that England had not recognized the Republic, General Trochu could not be approached officially. Colonel Claremont happens to be a personal friend of his, and it is, thanks to his exertions, coupled with those of Mr. Washburne, that the matter has at length been satisfactorily arranged. I need hardly observe that the Foreign-office has done its best to render the question more complicated. It has sent orders to Mr. Wodehouse to provide for the transport of British subjects, without sending funds, and having told Lord Lyons to take the archives with him, it perpetually refers to instructions contained in despatches which it well knows are at Tours.

Mr. Washburne remains. He has done his utmost to induce the Government to agree to an armistice, and has clearly told them that they ought not to sacrifice Paris without a prospect of a successful issue. He is in despair at their decision, and anticipates the worst. In the interests of humanity it is greatly to be regretted that Lord Lyons should have received orders to quit Paris. The personal consideration in which he was held, and the great influence which it gave him, would have been invaluable during the negotiations of the last few days.

November 8th.

I was once in love. The object of my affections had many amiable qualities. I remember I thought her an angel; but when she was crossed, she used to go up into her room and say that she would remain there without eating until I yielded the point at issue between us. As I was invariably right and she was invariably wrong, I could not do this; but, pitying the weakness of her sex, and knowing its obstinacy, I usually managed to arrange matters in a way which allowed her to emerge from her retreat without any great sacrifice of amour propre. The Parisians remind me of this sentimental episode of my existence; they have mounted a high pedestal, and called upon the world to witness that no matter what may be the danger to which they are exposed, they will not get off it, unless they obtain what they want; that they will obtain it, they find is most improbable, and they are anxiously looking around for some one to help them down, without being obliged absolutely "to swallow their own words." They had hoped that the armistice which was proposed by the neutrals would in some way get them out of their difficulty; and, as the siege still continues, they are exceedingly indignant with their kind friends. "They have," say the papers, "loosened our mainspring of sacrifice. We had fully determined to perish, rather than yield; if we do not, it will be the fault of Russia, Austria, and England." Be the cause what it may, the "mainspring of sacrifice" most assuredly is not only loosened, but it has run down, and, unless some wonderful success occurs shortly, it will never be wound up again. As long as it could be supposed that cannon and musketry would only do their bloody work outside the exterior forts, and that Paris might glory in a "heroic attitude" without suffering real hardships or incurring real danger, the note of defiance was loud and bold. As it is, the Government is obliged to do its utmost to keep their courage up to the sticking point. These foolish people really imagined that, like them, the world regarded their city as a species of sacred Jerusalem, and that public opinion would never allow the Prussians either to bombard it, or to expose the high priests of civilization who inhabit it to the realities of war. It is necessary to live here to understand the strength of this feeling. In England, little attention is paid to the utterances of French newspapers, but the Parisians, more profoundly ignorant of foreign politics than the charity school boys of an English village, were under the flattering delusion that we, in common with every other nation, lived alone to merit their favourable opinion. They find now, to their profound astonishment, that beyond a barren sympathy, founded upon a common humanity, no one regards Paris as different to any other great city, and that, if they choose to convert it into an intrenched camp for their armies, they must meet the consequences. Either they must accept the victor's terms of peace or they must fight the Prussians. The reality of the situation is by degrees coming home to them. From the general tone of the conversations I hear, I am inclined to think that, in their hearts, they admit that Alsace, if not Lorraine, is irretrievably lost. Words have a great influence over them, and they find consolation for this loss of territory in the phrase that Alsace will annex a portion of Germany, and not be annexed to Germany. It is admitted also that sooner or later, an indemnity must be paid in money to Prussia. The newspapers, who were the loudest in their praises of M. Jules Favre's language at Ferrières, now complain that nothing is to be gained by bombast, and that it is ridiculous of him to talk about "France" proposing "conditions of peace" which must be unacceptable to Prussia. The main grounds for continued resistance are the personal ambition of the members of the Government, who well know that if they sign an armistice, which is tantamount to peace, they will hereafter be made scapegoats, and be told that the Parisians were balked of their desire to perish to the last man; the mulish obstinacy of Trochu; and the dread of the capital losing its supremacy over the Provinces. Of course, there are some who wish to fight on to the bitter end. The "Ultras" hope to found on a war à outrance a democratic republic, and dream of the successes of the First Revolution. The politicians hardly know what they want. Their main idea is to keep up for their own purposes that centralization which has so long been the bane of this country. If they agree to terms before Paris has given France an example of heroism, they fear that her supremacy will be compromised; if they allow the insulation to continue, they fear that the Provinces will accustom themselves to independent action; if a Constituent Assembly be elected whilst free communication between Paris and the rest of France is interrupted, they fear that this Assembly will consist of local candidates rather than those, as has heretofore been the case in all French Legislative Chambers, who are imposed upon the departments by a central organization in the capital.

The position of the Government is a singular one. They obtained last Thursday a large majority on their plebiscite, because it was fully understood that "oui" meant peace; indeed, on many bulletins, the words "and peace" were added to the "oui." They have imprisoned the leaders of those who revolted to the cry of "no armistice!" Their friends the bourgeois trusted to them to put off the municipal elections until after the war, and they rallied to their defence to the cry of "no Commune!" In each arrondissement a mayor and two adjuncts have been elected, and these mayors and adjuncts have only to meet together in order to assume that right to interfere in public affairs which converts a municipality into a commune. In Belleville the elected mayor is a prisoner, and his two adjuncts, Flourens and Milliere, are in hiding. In the nineteenth arrondissement M. Delescluze, by far the most able of the Ultras, is mayor. Contrary to the wishes, consequently, of the voters of "oui," we are to have no armistice, and we probably shall have a commune. The Ultras are persecuted, but their programme is adopted.

There appears to be a tacit truce between all parties within the city until Trochu has made some attempt to carry out his famous plan. For the last fortnight the Government has not published any news which it may have received from the Provinces. M. Thiers has either made no report upon their condition, or it has been concealed. M. Jules Favre, in his despatch to the envoys abroad, enters into no details, and confines himself to the simple announcement, that the armistice was not concluded because Count Bismarck would not allow Paris to be revictualled during the twenty-five days which it was to last. Our anxiety for news respecting what is passing outside has to be satisfied with the following words, which fell from the lips of M. Thiers: "I have seen the Army of the Loire and the Prussian Guard; man to man I prefer the former." The Débats and some other journals contain extracts from the English newspapers up to the 22nd ult. I observe that everything which tells against France is suppressed, and what is published is headed with a notice, that as the source is English the truth is questionable. Thus does the press, while abusing the Government for keeping back intelligence, fulfil its mission.