Take the extreme case of a piece of machinery which is utterly broken down or so far out of date as to be entirely worthless for the purposes for which it was designed. Yet such machinery has, at least, a scrap value, and as such it should be included in the inventory as part of the tangible assets of the concern at the date in question.
Of course, in many instances, certain interests endeavor to have inventoried items which should either be omitted altogether or included at a much reduced valuation from that sought to be placed on them, and, in such cases, the very best judgment of the appraising engineer must be called into play in order that injustice may not be done to either party; but to say, as Mr. Riggs' definition virtually does, that nothing should be inventoried which can, either with or without inconvenience, be dispensed with, is absurd, and the writer does not believe that such is the meaning the author intended to convey. Probably, if the word "economically" were inserted in the definition, it would more nearly represent the proper idea.
William V. Polleys, M. Am. Soc. C. E. (by letter),—In his very thorough and painstaking paper Mr. Riggs states that it is confined to a discussion of methods for arriving at a correct figure of cost, and disclaims any intention of considering the propriety of using said figure when reached.
Inasmuch, however, as he devotes the next eight or ten pages to a dissertation on law, political economy, rate-making, finance, and advice to railroad employees, with a word of encouragement to the good, and firm reproof to the bad ones, it is fair to assume that he intends this disclaimer in a Pickwickian sense, and that the real intent of the paper is to show that the physical valuation of property is, with certain determinative, corrective factors, a proper standard for gauging taxation, bond issues, and kindred evils.
Is it not a fact, however, that taxation is based on a much more intangible structure, and that the net earnings must necessarily have more to do with it than the physical valuation of the property—whether it be that of a wicked public service corporation, or that of an honest haymaker—rather on what their property can produce, than on what it would cost to produce the property? Is it not rather a battle of business acumen between the taxer and taxee, a battle which, among other things, is regulated more or less by the fact that an extreme in either direction will bring disaster to one or both, followed by the inevitable reaction and readjustment?
Take, for instance, an extreme case: A manufactory is erected on comparatively worthless ground. A million dollars or more is invested in a plant, with the result that surrounding real estate values go up with a bound. Supposing that the manufacturer has not made any previous arrangements for immunity, and the assessors are both acute and honest, the property will be taxed for a large figure, which tax, if the factory is making money, will be paid, with more or less grumbling, up to the economical breaking point. Suppose that, owing to a sudden permanent change in business conditions, it becomes impossible to operate this plant, and it is abandoned. A corps of experts may be thrown into the mill, before the last employee has left the building, and may carefully scrutinize and caliper the machinery, count the bricks in the wall, tap the stay-bolts in the boilers, and bore into the furniture to see whether it is solid or veneer, and when they are through and their figures are all in, they have not arrived at anything that is of the slightest use as a basis for a bond issue or taxation, and very little that would be of use for sale. In such an extreme (but by no means unheard-of) case physical value bears no relation to real value.
This is not to say that a physical valuation is without worth, and even great worth in some cases; it is merely offered as an opinion that the physical value is in many (and probably most) instances a very treacherous guide to the real value—a far poorer guide, as a general rule, than the accounting department; a minor quantity, in fact.
It seems doubtful whether there is a scientific way of arriving at the true value of a going property by the physical-valuation route. There is too large a percentage of values which, being intangible, are matters of judgment. At best, the determination of value must be that of opinion, and the worth of that opinion hinges principally on the practical qualifications and disinterestedness of the person who gives it.
Unfortunately, or fortunately, as the point of view may be, the disinterested person is not apt to be qualified, nor the qualified person to be disinterested, and it seems extremely probable to the writer that, while weapons may be changed and excuses vary, the tax war will be waged as of yore, and the fool and his money will continue along diverging paths until something more ingenious than physical valuation is invented, however well the valuation may be made.
C. P. Howard, M. Am. Soc. C. E. (by letter).—While there may be no material differences of opinion as to the principles on which a physical valuation should depend, such a detailed description of organization and methods as that presented by the author should be of great service to others undertaking similar investigations.