It appears, then, from this, the latest case, that:
1.—The view of the lower Court that a franchise or intangible value is not separable, and that if there be a value it must be determined from the earnings, is concurred in by the Supreme Court.
2.—That the arbitrary increase of franchise value, by the lower Court, proportional to the normal increase of the physical property, is not concurred in.
3.—Inferentially, it appears that the acquiescence of the State in the franchise value of 1884 is the main reason for permitting that value to stand, and it would seem to follow, from the reasoning of the Court, that it is very questionable whether any franchise or intangible value based on excessive rates should be allowed to stand.
Another view of franchise values, as stated by George H. Benzenberg, Past-President, Am. Soc. C. E., in discussing water-works franchises, is as follows:
"Some contend that a franchise is simply and purely a privilege given by the municipality to a water company to utilize the streets for the purpose of laying a system of pipes through which it may distribute and deliver water. It is not a license to do business, but a privilege to use public streets, alleys, and grounds. * * * If that interpretation is the proper one, the value of the franchise, if the property is to be purchased by a municipality, is comparatively nothing. If the property is to be purchased by another company, it represents all of the great value that such franchise possesses to the original holder, together with all the privilege it confers; but in the event it is purchased by the city, it is dispossessed of that certain element of value, and I think for that reason it is stipulated in many of the ordinances that no value shall be placed on the franchise by appraisers."
In the paragraph just quoted, it is evident that the term "franchise" is used in a restricted sense, and refers to the ordinance or contract from a municipal corporation granting the right to operate on specific terms, rather than the broad use of the word as indicating all rights derived from general laws or special contracts or grants. The point, however, is applicable to the case of any corporation occupying public ground.
It is believed that enough argument has been adduced to show that any attempt to give separate value to the different elements that enter into the intangible value of a property is a very risky proceeding on the part of appraisers, and to support further the contention that, as a business proposition, the value of any property depends on its earnings; that the franchise simply protects the owners of the property in their enjoyment of those earnings; that the value of the franchise merges in the "fair value" of the property, and that the franchise can have no special value of itself unless the earnings of the property are in excess of a usual and fair rate on the actual investment. In case there are surplus earnings, they measure and determine not only the value of the franchise, but also the value of all other non-physical elements. If this be true, any readjustment of rates, any restriction of operations, or other form of legislative control which would unfavorably and violently affect earnings, is bound to hold down franchise or non-physical values; as it would not seem possible to read into the various decisions any intention on the part of the Court to base the right to demand fair return on anything but the "fair value of the property being used."
The writer, therefore, reaches the following conclusions regarding non-physical values:
1.—That all the different non-physical elements of value are inseparable.