The vessels engaged in the action off Coronel, with their armament, etc., were:[5]
It will be noticed that our two armoured cruisers were respectively six and five years older than the Germans'. Our armament was much inferior in size, number, and quality on account of the later designs of the enemy's artillery. The range of the German 4.1-inch guns was nearly equal to that of our 6-inch guns. But perhaps the greatest point in favour of the enemy was the fact that Cradock's ships, with the exception of the Glasgow, were only commissioned at the outbreak of war, and had had such continuous steaming that no really good opportunity for gunnery practices or for testing the organisation thoroughly had been possible, whilst von Spee's had been in commission for over two years and had highly trained crews, accustomed to their ships.
The following account has been compiled from personal information received from officers who took part, from letters that have appeared in the Press, from a translation that has been published of Admiral von Spee's official report, and from the official report made by Captain Luce of the Glasgow.
Admiral Cradock, as we have seen, joined the remainder of his little squadron with the exception of the Canopus off the coast of Chile on October 29th. The latter was following at her best speed. The squadron proceeded northwards, whilst the Glasgow was detached to Coronel to send telegrams, a rendezvous being fixed for her to rejoin at 1 P.M. on November 1st.
No authentic news of the movements of the Germans was available at this time; in fact, the last time that von Spee's squadron had been definitely heard of was when it appeared off Papeete and bombarded the town toward the end of September. That the enemy might be encountered at any moment was of course fully realised, but it was hoped that either the Dresden and Leipzig or the main squadron might be brought to action separately, before they were able to join forces. Time was everything if this was to be brought about, so Admiral Cradock pushed on without delay. The anxiety to obtain news of a reliable character may be imagined, but only the vaguest of rumours, one contradicting the other, were forthcoming. Reports showed that the German merchant shipping in the neighbourhood were exhibiting unwonted signs of energy in loading coal and stores, but this gave no certain indication of the proximity of the entire squadron.
Rejoining the British squadron at sea on November 1st, the Glasgow communicated with the Good Hope. Our ships had recently been hearing Telefunken[6] signals on their wireless, which was proof that one or more enemy warships were close at hand. About 2 P.M., therefore, the Admiral signalled the squadron to spread on a line bearing N.E. by E. from the Good Hope, which steered N.W. by N. at 10 knots. Ships were ordered to open to a distance of fifteen miles apart at a speed of 15 knots, the Monmouth being nearest to the flagship, the Otranto next, and then the Glasgow, which was thus nearest the coast.
DIAGRAM I. (Enemy sighted) 4.20 p.m.
There was not sufficient time to execute this manœuvre, and when smoke was suddenly sighted at 4.20 P.M. to the eastward of the Otranto and Glasgow, these two ships were still close together and about four miles from the Monmouth. The Glasgow went ahead to investigate and made out three German warships, which at once turned towards her. The Admiral was over twenty miles, distant and out of sight, and had to be informed as soon as possible, so the Glasgow returned at full speed, warning him by wireless, which the Germans endeavoured to jam, that the enemy was in sight.