Had he been permitted to pursue this policy, von Spee was inevitably bound to touch on the delicate subject of neutrality in arranging supplies for so numerous a squadron. Now, according to the laws laid down by Article 5 of the Hague Conference, 1907, "belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of operations against their adversaries." By Article 12 it is laid down that in default of any other special provisions in the legislation of a neutral Power, belligerent warships are forbidden to remain in the ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters of the said Power for more than twenty-four hours, except in special cases covered by the Convention. It is left to the neutral to make regulations as to the hospitality it will afford, and those laid down by Brazil were that a belligerent vessel was only allowed to visit one of their ports once in three months for the purpose of obtaining supplies.
Being aware of these conditions, and that neutrality could not be imposed upon to an unlimited extent, it follows that von Spee would have been dependent in a great measure on supply ships which were able to evade the scrutiny of the neutral authorities—a precarious state of existence. Coal would be his prime necessity, and he might have hoped to secure a supply of this from captured colliers, but he could not depend upon it for such a large number of ships. Meanwhile, however, very considerable damage might have been done to our shipping, and it is generally believed the Germans were optimistic enough to hope that England would be brought to her knees from starvation by being cut off from both North and South American ports during this period, although there was really no ground whatsoever for such a surmise. Perhaps we shall in the future be careful not to frame so many laws for the conduct of war, since the Power that neglects these laws rides roughshod over her more conscientious opponent.
Such a scheme may have been the natural outcome of von Spee's success at Coronel. On the other hand, it is impossible to state with certainty that he did not intend to go ultimately to the Cape of Good Hope or some other part of Africa, but the pros and cons have already been discussed, and it scarcely appears probable. Von Spee, of course, had no notion of the prompt measure taken by our Admiralty in dispatching two powerful battle-cruisers of high speed to these waters without loss of time and in complete secrecy, though he must have concluded that no time would be lost in sending out reinforcements. Apparently his judgment was here at fault; hence the proposed attack on our colony in the Falkland Islands, the capture of which would have yielded him coal for his squadron's immediate requirements.
Von Spee is said to have been over-persuaded by his staff to undertake this latter venture. His movements here certainly led to the conclusion that he had no fixed plan. When the Invincible reached Pernambuco on her way home, there was a strong rumour that three colliers had been waiting off the coast for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; this points to the capture of the Falklands not being included in the original plan. Admiral Sturdee searched the area for these ships but found nothing.
Both the British and German squadrons refrained from using wireless, and so had no knowledge of their proximity during the first week in December. Had the German ships passed our squadron whilst coaling at the Falklands, they would in all likelihood have separated, and would then have had a free hand—for some time, at any rate—along the east coast, whilst our ships would have gone round the Horn and searched for them in vain in the Pacific. The first intimation of their having eluded our squadron would have been that much of our shipping would be reported overdue in England from South American ports (for von Spee would most assuredly have avoided approaching within sight of land). This would very probably have been put down in the first few instances to the depredations of the Karlsruhe, whose fate was at this time quite unknown. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sufficiently powerful to cope with anything which von Spee thought was likely to be in these seas. As a matter of fact, however, the battle-cruiser Princess Royal was in North American waters at this time, having left England in secrecy soon after the Invincible and Inflexible were dispatched south.
In further support of this theory of what was the German Admiral's plan of campaign, it may be mentioned that a fully laden German collier was forced to intern at a South American port south of the Plate in order to avoid capture by the Carnarvon and Cornwall, who were searching the coast there just after the battle of the Falklands took place. Another collier, the Mera, put back into Montevideo very hurriedly and interned herself, and lastly, the tender Patagonia ended her career in like manner. The presence of all these ships in this locality is evidence of the organisation arranged for the supply of the German squadron along this coast, and precludes the idea of its going to Africa.
There is evidence to show that von Spee picked up naval reservists for his squadron at Valparaiso, but there is none to confirm the rumour that he proposed to occupy the Falkland Islands, retaining a garrison there after they had been captured. He could never have hoped to occupy or to hold them for any length of time. Baron von Maltzhan, the manager of a large sheep farm in Chile, was selected to take command of an expedition consisting of an armed force of some 500 men, whose function was to assist in the capture of the Falkland Islands, but not necessarily to remain on as a permanent garrison.
The damage that can be done to merchant shipping and trade by a single hostile ship has been demonstrated on more than one occasion during this war. If, therefore, it is presumed that the revised German programme was to capture the Falkland Islands, thus aiming a blow at British prestige, and then to scatter in the manner suggested so as to hamper or cripple our trade with the New World as long as possible, it will then be seen how opportune a victory this was for the British nation.
Had von Spee escaped being brought to action, it seems probable that he would have endeavoured to work his way home in preference to the alternative of internment.
In brief, then, this is a rough outline of events that "might"—one could almost use the word "would"—have taken place, had not such prompt steps been taken by the Admiralty to meet him wherever he went by superior forces. Von Spee knew he was being cornered, and is reported to have said so at Valparaiso.