[4] "If the Turks had possessed this bulwark of Christendom (Vienna), I do not conceive what could have hindered them from being masters immediately of Austria, and all its depending provinces; nor, in another year, of all Italy, or of the southern provinces of Germany, as they should have chosen to carry on their invasion, or of both in two or three years' time; and how fatal this might have been to the rest of Christendom, or how it might have enlarged the Turkish dominions, is easy to conjecture."—Sir W. Temple, Works, iii. 393, edit. 1814.
CHAPTER II.
The Emperor was exposed on either side to these two implacable enemies. At Versailles, as at the Porte, had the destruction of the house of Austria been sworn.
But France was the power which, in the latter half of the seventeenth century, menaced most seriously the independence of her neighbours. Turkey was, perhaps, from her internal weakness and faulty constitution, in no condition to effect a lasting conquest, however great her mere destructive energies might be. An ingenious nation and an ambitious king, able ministers and skilful generals, revenues, ships, colonies, commercial enterprise, a central situation among divided foes, combined to render France the dominant power of the age.
The great Turkish Vizier, the restorer of order and prosperity, Ahmed Kiuprili, had had a greater counterpart in the French minister, Cardinal Richelieu. The Sultan, Mahomet IV., was wanting in all those qualities which made Louis XIV. for long the successful administrator of a despotic power. The armies of France, under the leadership of a Condé, a Turenne, a Luxembourg, were the finest of the world, the envy of neighbouring princes, the pattern for all soldiers. The Duke of Marlborough and John Sobieski both learnt their first lessons in military affairs under French command. Prince Eugene vainly sought employment in the French troops; their opposition to himself taught William III. the art of war.
Nor was the French ascendency won by arms alone. The order and splendour of her government, the genius of her authors, the attractions of her society, the diplomatic skill of her ambassadors, made a French party in every court in Europe.
Portugal may be said to have owed her independent existence to France; Holland till 1672 ranked as a French ally; Sweden, too far removed to be a rival, was an almost constant friend, till Louis' aggressions alienated her also in 1681. France had a party in Poland; the petty princes and republics of Italy vacillated between her and the Empire; in England she had had Cromwell as an ally, and she held both Charles II. and his opponents in her pay. She maintained an understanding with Turkey. Discontented Romanists in England and Ireland, unruly Protestants in Hungary, were alike taught to look to her for advice and for assistance. Her frontiers were steadily advancing at the expense of Spain and of the German princes. Neither force nor treaties seemed to avail aught against her superior strength and cunning. The Lotharingian bishoprics and their dependencies; Elsass, Breisach and Bar, Roussillon, Franche Comté, parts of Flanders, of Artois, of Hainault and Luxemburg, the free imperial city of Strassburg, the territory of Orange, were steadily absorbed by her, and thoroughly incorporated with the French kingdom.
Her opponents saw no possibility of resistance, save in a great confederacy against her. Her power was not finally checked, nor her ambition confined within bounds, till such a confederacy was made. But it is hardly too much to say that such a confederacy would have been scarcely possible had the Turks been completely victorious at Vienna in 1683.