"The Treasurer, with ample funds at his disposal, was able to meet calls for financial help that were frequent and pressing, and recognizing the desirability of experienced and competent assistance in making the necessarily intimate inquiries, to determine if applicants for relief were worthy, he applied to Mr. Robert W. DeForest, President of The Charity Organization Society, for expert advice in the matter, and was referred by Mr. DeForest to Mr. Frank Persons, Manager of the New York Bureau, and Miss Byington, in charge of the Brooklyn Branch, who rendered invaluable services in connection with many of the applications, all of which were carefully investigated. Much suffering and distress, and some cases of actual destitution were found to exist, and while a detailed statistical statement would seem uncalled for and not desired at this time, the following brief résumé of the Committee's 'relief work' will undoubtedly prove to be of interest.
"Financial assistance was extended to about one hundred individuals and families; rent was paid for thirty-nine; food purchased for forty-six; clothing was furnished in seven instances; five persons were placed in hospitals; there were a considerable number of cases where the Committee in whole or in part took care of funeral expenses; old debts for medical attendance and drugs; agency fees and surety bonds; life insurance premiums, board and lodging, etc., etc. Many applicants for assistance proved to be merely temporarily embarrassed, they were willing and anxious to be helped but did not want charity, so to meet that emergency a form of voucher was used, which acknowledged the receipt of a 'loan' without interest, to be repaid at the convenience of the 'borrower.' That applied to cash of course, payments for groceries, rent, etc., were simply receipted for.
"The results achieved, in the opinion of many, would seem to warrant an amendment to the original idea that a return to normal conditions would involve the dissolution of the Committee, and the proposition that it be made a permanent organization is being seriously considered."
This record is deeply gratifying to the brokerage fraternity because it discloses the fact that, even in the midst of a calamity so great that no individual could feel himself beyond the reach of insolvency, the impulse to succor the unfortunate remained as strong as ever among them.
CHAPTER III
THE REOPENING OF THE EXCHANGE
The fact that the Stock Exchange closed on July 31st and did not reopen fully until December 15th, might lead to the supposition that the question of reopening was not taken up before December. Far from this being the case, the truth is that reopening began to be discussed immediately after the institution was closed. Within twenty-four hours of the closing the minority, who had not been at first convinced of the wisdom of that action, joined with the majority in urgently advising that the Exchange be not reopened soon. All through the month of August a growing anxiety over the possibility of some hasty action by the Exchange authorities showed itself among brokers, bankers, and even some government officials. For this anxiety there was never any basis, because the officers of the Exchange having exceptional means of knowing what the dangers were, had no intention of assuming the immense responsibilities of re-establishing the market without the backing and approval of the entire banking fraternity. Gradually the excited solicitude about a premature reopening subsided as the ultra-conservative attitude of the Exchange was understood, and this was followed ere long by the first symptoms of agitation for the establishment of some form of restricted market.
As we have already shown the restraints of July 31st were relaxed one by one with the lapse of time. First a market at or above the closing prices was organized under the Committee on Clearing House; then Committees to facilitate trading in listed and unlisted bonds were formed; and finally a market was provided for unlisted stocks. All these devices, however, while they brought about readjustment and diminution of strain, did not constitute a reopening of the Stock Exchange, and the restoration of that great primary market, in some restricted way, became more and more a subject of public interest and concern.