In the original ordinance the members of both houses were excluded during the war; but in the second, which was carried, the measure was not made prospective. This, which most historians have overlooked, is well pointed out by Mr. Godwin. By virtue of this alteration, many officers were elected in the course of 1645 and 1646; and the effect, whatever might be designed, was very advantageous to the republican and independent factions.
[295] Whitelock, p. 145.
[296] Whether there are sufficient grounds for concluding that Henrietta's connection with Jermyn was criminal, I will not pretend to decide; though Warburton has settled the matter in a very summary style. See one of his notes on Clarendon, vol. vii. p. 636. But I doubt whether the bishop had authority for what he there says, though it is likely enough to be true. See also a note of Lord Dartmouth on Burnet, i. 63.
[297] Clarendon speaks often in his History, and still more frequently in his private letters, with great resentment of the conduct of France, and sometimes of Holland, during our civil wars. I must confess that I see nothing to warrant this. The States-General, against whom Charles had so shamefully been plotting, interfered as much for the purpose of mediation as they could with the slightest prospect of success, and so as to give offence to the parliament (Rushworth Abridged, v. 567; Baillie, ii. 78; Whitelock, 141, 148; Harris's Life of Cromwell, 246); and as to France, though Richelieu had instigated the Scots malcontents, and possibly those of England, yet after his death, in 1642, no sort of suspicion ought to lie on the French government; the whole conduct of Anne of Austria having been friendly, and both the mission of Harcourt in 1643, and the present negotiations of Montreuil and Bellievre, perfectly well intended. That Mazarin made promises of assistance which he had no design, nor perhaps any power, to fulfil, is true; but this is the common trick of such statesmen, and argues no malevolent purpose. But Hyde, out of his just dislike of the queen, hated all French connections; and his passionate loyalty made him think it a crime, or at least a piece of base pusillanimity, in foreign states, to keep on any terms with the rebellious parliament. The case was altered, after the retirement of the regent Anne from power: Mazarin's latter conduct was, as is well known, exceedingly adverse to the royal cause.
The account given by Mr. D'Israeli of Tabran's negotiations in the fifth volume of his Commentaries on the Reign of Charles I., though it does not contain anything very important, tends to show Mazarin's inclination towards the royal cause in 1644 and 1645.
[298] Colepepper writes to Ashburnham, in February 1646, to advance the Scots' treaty with all his power. "It is the only way left to save the Crown and the kingdom; all other tricks will deceive you.... It is no time to dally on distinctions and criticisms. All the world will laugh at them when a crown is in question." Clar. Papers, ii. 207.
The king had positively declared his resolution not to consent to the establishment of presbytery. This had so much disgusted both the Scots and English presbyterians (for the latter had been concerned in the negotiation), that Montreuil wrote to say he thought they would rather make it up with the independents than treat again. "De sorte qu'il ne faut plus marchander, et que V. M. se doit hâter d'envoyer aux deux parlemens son consentiment aux trois propositions d'Uxbridge; ce qu'étant fait, elle sera en sureté dans l'armée d'Ecosse" (15th Jan. 1646) P. 211.
[299] "I assure you," he writes to Capel, Hopton, etc., Feb. 2, 1646, "whatever paraphrases or prophecies may be made upon my last message (pressing the two houses to consent to a personal treaty), I shall never part with the church, the essentials of my crown, or my friends."—P. 206. Baillie could not believe the report that the king intended to take refuge in the Scots army, as "there would be no shelter there for him, unless he would take the covenant, and follow the advice of his parliament. Hard pills to be swallowed by a wilful and an unadvised prince." Vol. ii. p. 203.
[300] Not long after the king had taken shelter with the Scots, he wrote a letter to Ormond, which was intercepted, wherein he assured him of his expectation that their army would join with his, and act in conjunction with Montrose, to procure a happy peace and the restoration of his rights. Whitelock, page 208. Charles had bad luck with his letters, which fell, too frequently for his fame and interests, into the hands of his enemies. But who, save this most ill-judging of princes, would have entertained an idea that the Scots presbyterian army would co-operate with Montrose, whom they abhorred, and very justly, for his treachery and cruelty, above all men living?
[301] Parl. Hist. 499; Whitelock, 215, 218. It was voted, 17th June, that after these twenty years, the king was to exercise no power over the militia without the previous consent of parliament, who were to pass a bill at any time respecting it, if they should judge the kingdom's safety to be concerned, which should be valid without the king's assent. Commons' Journals.