It has been the prevailing opinion in modern times that the English ministry, rather against the judgment of their allies of Holland, insisted upon a condition not indispensable to their security, and too ignominious for their fallen enemy to accept. Some may perhaps incline to think that, even had Philip of Anjou been suffered to reign in Naples, a possession rather honourable than important, the balance of power would not have been seriously affected, and the probability of durable peace been increased. This, however, it was not necessary to discuss. The main question is as to the power which the allies possessed of securing the Spanish monarchy for the archduke, if they had consented to waive the thirty-seventh article of the preliminaries. If indeed they could have been considered as a single potentate, it was doubtless possible, by means of keeping up great armies on the frontier, and by the delivery of cautionary towns, to have prevented the King of France from lending assistance to his grandson. But, self-interested and disunited as confederacies generally are, and as the grand alliance had long since become, this appeared a very dangerous course of policy, if Louis should be playing an underhand game against his engagements. And this it was not then unreasonable to suspect, even if we should believe, in despite of some plausible authorities, that he was really sincere in abandoning so favourite an interest. The obstinate adherence of Godolphin and Somers to the preliminaries may possibly have been erroneous; but it by no means deserves the reproach that has been unfairly bestowed on it; nor can the whigs be justly charged with protracting the war to enrich Marlborough, or to secure themselves in power.[314]
Treaty of peace broken off.—The conferences at Gertruydenburg were broken off in July 1710, because an absolute security for the evacuation of Spain by Philip appeared to be wanting; and within six months a fresh negotiation was secretly on foot, the basis of which was his retention of that kingdom. For the administration presided over by Godolphin had fallen meanwhile; new counsellors, a new parliament, new principles of government. The tories had from the beginning come very reluctantly into the schemes of the grand alliance; though no opposition to the war had ever been shown in parliament, it was very soon perceived that the majority of that denomination had their hearts bent on peace.[315] But instead of renewing the negotiation in concert with the allies (which indeed might have been impracticable), the new ministers fell upon the course of a clandestine arrangement, in exclusion of all the other powers, which led to the signature of preliminaries in September 1711, and afterwards to the public congress of Utrecht, and the celebrated treaty named from that town. Its chief provisions are too well known to be repeated.
Arguments for and against the treaty of Utrecht.—The arguments in favour of a treaty of pacification, which should abandon the great point of contest, and leave Philip in possession of Spain and America, were neither few nor inconsiderable. 1. The kingdom had been impoverished by twenty years of uninterruptedly augmented taxation; the annual burthens being triple in amount of those paid before the revolution. Yet, amidst these sacrifices, we had the mortification of finding a debt rapidly increasing, whereof the mere interest far exceeded the ancient revenues of the Crown, to be bequeathed, like an hereditary curse, to unborn ages. Though the supplies had been raised with less difficulty than in the late reign, and the condition of trade was less unsatisfactory, the landed proprietors saw with indignation the silent transfer of their wealth to new men, and hated the glory that was bought by their own degradation. Was it not to be feared that they might hate also the revolution, and the protestant succession that depended on it, when they tasted these fruits it had borne? Even the army had been recruited by violent means unknown to our constitution, yet such as the continual loss of men, with a population at the best stationary, had perhaps rendered necessary.[316]
2. The prospect of reducing Spain to the archduke's obedience was grown unfavourable. It was at best an odious work, and not very defensible on any maxims of national justice, to impose a sovereign on a great people in despite of their own repugnance, and what they deemed their loyal obligation. Heaven itself might shield their righteous cause, and baffle the selfish rapacity of human politics. But what was the state of the war at the close of 1710? The surrender of 7000 English under Stanhope at Brihuega had ruined the affairs of Charles, which in fact had at no time been truly prosperous, and confined him to the single province sincerely attached to him, Catalonia. As it was certain that Philip had spirit enough to continue the war, even if abandoned by his grandfather, and would have the support of almost the entire nation, what remained but to carry on a very doubtful contest for the subjugation of that extensive kingdom? In Flanders, no doubt, the genius of Marlborough kept still the ascendant; yet France had her Fabius in Villars; and the capture of three or four small fortresses in a whole campaign did not presage a rapid destruction of the enemy's power.
3. It was acknowledged that the near connection of the monarchs on the thrones of France and Spain could not be desired from Europe. Yet the experience of ages had shown how little such ties of blood determined the policy of courts; a Bourbon on the throne of Spain could not but assert the honour, and even imbibe the prejudices, of his subjects; and as the two nations were in all things opposite, and must clash in their public interests, there was little reason to fear a subserviency in the cabinet of Madrid, which, even in that absolute monarchy, could not be displayed against the general sentiment.
4. The death of the Emperor Joseph, and election of the Archduke Charles in his room, which took place in the spring of 1711, changed in no small degree the circumstances of Europe. It was now a struggle to unite the Spanish and Austrian monarchies under one head. Even if England might have little interest to prevent this, could it be indifferent to the smaller states of Europe that a family not less ambitious and encroaching than that of Bourbon should be so enormously aggrandised? France had long been to us the only source of apprehension; but to some states, to Savoy, to Switzerland, to Venice, to the principalities of the empire, she might justly appear a very necessary bulwark against the aggressions of Austria. The alliance could not be expected to continue faithful and unanimous, after so important an alteration in the balance of power.
5. The advocates of peace and adherents of the new ministry stimulated the national passions of England by vehement reproaches of the allies. They had thrown, it was contended, in despite of all treaties, an unreasonable proportion of expense upon a country not directly concerned in their quarrel, and rendered a negligent or criminal administration their dupes or accomplices. We were exhausting our blood and treasure to gain kingdoms for the house of Austria which insulted, and the best towns of Flanders for the states-general who cheated us. The barrier treaty of Lord Townshend was so extravagant, that one might wonder at the presumption of Holland in suggesting its articles, much more at the folly of our government in acceding to them. It laid the foundation of endless dissatisfaction on the side of Austria, thus reduced to act as the vassal of a little republic in her own territories, and to keep up fortresses at her own expense, which others were to occupy. It might be anticipated that, at some time, a sovereign of that house would be found more sensible to ignominy than to danger, who would remove this badge of humiliation by dismantling the fortifications which were thus to be defended. Whatever exaggeration might be in these clamours, they were sure to pass for undeniable truths with a people jealous of foreigners, and prone to believe itself imposed upon, from a consciousness of general ignorance and credulity.
These arguments were met by answers not less confident, though less successful at the moment, than they had been deemed convincing by the majority of politicians in later ages. It was denied that the resources of the kingdom were so much enfeebled; the supplies were still raised without difficulty; commerce had not declined; public credit stood high under the Godolphin ministry; and it was especially remarkable that the change of administration, notwithstanding the prospect of peace, was attended by a great fall in the price of stocks. France, on the other hand, was notoriously reduced to the utmost distress; and, though it were absurd to allege the misfortunes of our enemy by way of consolation for our own, yet the more exhausted of the two combatants was naturally that which ought to yield; and it was not for the honour of our free government that we should be outdone in magnanimous endurance for the sake of the great interests of ourselves and our posterity by the despotism we so boastfully scorned.[317] The King of France had now for half a century been pursuing a system of encroachment on the neighbouring states, which the weakness of the two branches of the Austrian house, and the perfidiousness of the Stuarts, not less than the valour of his troops and skill of his generals, had long rendered successful. The tide had turned for the first time in the present war; victories more splendid than were recorded in modern warfare had illustrated the English name. Were we spontaneously to relinquish these great advantages, and two years after Louis had himself consented to withdraw his forces from Spain, our own arms having been in the meantime still successful on the most important scene of the contest, to throw up the game in despair, and leave him far more the gainer at the termination of this calamitous war, than he had been after those triumphant campaigns which his vaunting medals commemorate? Spain of herself could not resist the confederates, even if united in support of Philip; which was denied as to the provinces composing the kingdom of Arragon, and certainly as to Catalonia; it was in Flanders that Castile was to be conquered; it was France that we were to overcome; and now that her iron barrier had been broken through, when Marlborough was preparing to pour his troops upon the defenceless plains of Picardy, could we doubt that Louis must in good earnest abandon the cause of his grandson, as he had already pledged himself in the conferences of Gertruydenburg?
2. It was easy to slight the influence which the ties of blood exert over kings. Doubtless they are often torn asunder by ambition or wounded pride. But it does not follow that they have no efficacy; and the practice of courts in cementing alliances by intermarriage seems to show that they are not reckoned indifferent. It might, however, be admitted that a king of Spain, such as she had been a hundred years before, would probably be led by the tendency of his ambition into a course of policy hostile to France. But that monarchy had long been declining; great rather in name and extent of dominion than intrinsic resources, she might perhaps rally for a short period under an enterprising minister; but with such inveterate abuses of government, and so little progressive energy among the people, she must gradually sink lower in the scale of Europe, till it might become the chief pride of her sovereigns that they were the younger branches of the house of Bourbon. To cherish this connection would be the policy of the court of Versailles; there would result from it a dependent relation, an habitual subserviency of the weaker power, a family compact of perpetual union, always opposed to Great Britain. In distant ages, and after fresh combinations of the European commonwealth should have seemed almost to efface the recollection of Louis XIV. and the war of the succession, the Bourbons on the French throne might still claim a sort of primogenitary right to protect the dignity of the junior branch by interference with the affairs of Spain; and a late posterity of those who witnessed the peace of Utrecht might be entangled by its improvident concessions.
3. That the accession of Charles to the empire rendered his possession of the Spanish monarchy in some degree less desirable, need not be disputed; though it would not be easy to prove that it could endanger England, or even the smaller states, since it was agreed on all hands that he was to be master of Milan and Naples. But against this, perhaps imaginary, mischief the opponents of the treaty set the risk of seeing the crowns of France and Spain united on the head of Philip. In the years 1711 and 1712 the dauphin, the Duke of Burgundy, and the Duke of Berry, were swept away. An infant stood alone between the King of Spain and the French succession. The latter was induced, with some unwillingness, to sign a renunciation of this contingent inheritance. But it was notoriously the doctrine of the French court that such renunciations were invalid; and the sufferings of Europe were chiefly due to this tenet of indefeasible royalty. It was very possible that Spain would never consent to this union, and that a fresh league of the great powers might be formed to prevent it; but, if we had the means of permanently separating the two kingdoms in our hands, it was strange policy to leave open this door for a renewal of the quarrel.