In a few instances an attempt was made to carry this farther, by declaring the party incapable of sitting in parliament. It is hardly necessary to remark that upon this rested the celebrated question of the Middlesex election in 1769. If a few precedents, and those not before the year 1680, were to determine all controversies of constitutional law, it is plain enough from the journals that the house have assumed the power of incapacitation. But as such an authority is highly dangerous and unnecessary for any good purpose, and as, according to all legal rules, so extraordinary a power could not be supported except by a sort of prescription which cannot be shown, the final resolution of the House of Commons, which condemned the votes passed in times of great excitement, appears far more consonant to just principles.

2. The power of each house of parliament over those who do not belong to it is of a more extensive consideration, and has lain open, in some respects, to more doubt than that over its own members. It has been exercised, in the first place, very frequently, and from an early period, in order to protect the members personally, and in their properties, from anything which has been construed to interfere with the discharge of their functions. Every obstruction in these duties, by assaulting, challenging, insulting any single representative of the Commons, has from the middle of the sixteenth century downwards, that is, from the beginning of their regular journals, been justly deemed a breach of privilege, and an offence against the whole body. It has been punished generally by commitment, either to the custody of the house's officer, the serjeant-at-arms, or to the king's prison. This summary proceeding is usually defended by a technical analogy to what are called attachments for contempt, by which every court of record is entitled to punish by imprisonment, if not also by fine, any obstruction to its acts or contumacious resistance of them. But it tended also to raise the dignity of parliament in the eyes of the people, at times when the government, and even the courts of justice, were not greatly inclined to regard it; and has been also a necessary safeguard against the insolence of power. The majority are bound to respect, and indeed have respected, the rights of every member, however obnoxious to them, on all questions of privilege. Even in the case most likely to occur in the present age, that of libels, which by no unreasonable stretch come under the head of obstructions, it would be unjust that a patriotic legislator, exposed to calumny for his zeal in the public cause, should be necessarily driven to a troublesome and uncertain process at law, when the offence so manifestly affects the real interests of parliament and the nation. The application of this principle must of course require a discreet temper, which was not perhaps always observed in former times, especially in the reign of William III. Instances at least of punishment for breach of privilege by personal reflections are never so common as in the journals of that turbulent period.

The most usual mode, however, of incurring the animadversion of the house was by molestations in regard to property. It was the most ancient privilege of the Commons to be free from all legal process, during the term of the session and for forty days before and after, except on charges of treason, felony, or breach of the peace. I have elsewhere mentioned the great case of Ferrers, under Henry VIII., wherein the house first, as far as we know, exerted the power of committing to prison those who had been concerned in arresting one of its members; and have shown that, after some little intermission, this became their recognised and customary right. Numberless instances occur of its exercise.[379] It was not only a breach of privilege to serve any sort of process upon them, but to put them under the necessity of seeking redress at law for any civil injury. Thus abundant cases are found in the journals, where persons have been committed to prison for entering on the estates of members, carrying away timber, lopping trees, digging coal, fishing in their waters. Their servants, and even their tenants, if the trespass were such as to affect the landlord's property, had the same protection.[380] The grievance of so unparalleled an immunity must have been notorious, since it not only suspended at least the redress of creditors, but enabled rapacious men to establish in some measure unjust claims in respect of property; the alleged trespasses being generally founded on some disputed right. An act however was passed, rendering the members of both houses liable to civil suits during the prorogation of parliament.[381] But they long continued to avenge the private injuries, real or pretended, of their members. On a complaint of breach of privilege by trespassing on a fishery (Jan. 25, 1768), they heard evidence on both sides, and determined that no breach of privilege had been committed; thus indirectly taking on them the decision of a freehold right. A few days after they came to a resolution, "that in case of any complaint of a breach of privilege, hereafter to be made by any member of this house, if the house shall adjudge there is no ground for such complaint, the house will order satisfaction to the person complained of for his costs and expenses incurred by reason of such complaint."[382] But little opportunity was given to try the effect of this resolution, an act having passed in two years afterwards, which has altogether taken away the exemption from legal process, except as to the immunity from personal arrest, which still continues to be the privilege of both houses of parliament.[383]

3. A more important class of offences against privilege is of such as affect either house of parliament collectively. In the reign of Elizabeth we have an instance of one committed for disrespectful words against the Commons. A few others, either for words spoken or published libels, occur in the reign of Charles I. even before the long parliament; but those of 1641 can have little weight as precedents, and we may say nearly the same of the unjustifiable proceedings in 1680. Even since the revolution we find too many proofs of encroaching pride or intemperate passion, to which a numerous assembly is always prone, and which the prevalent doctrine of the house's absolute power in matters of privilege has not contributed much to restrain. The most remarkable may be briefly noticed.

The Commons of 1701, wherein a tory spirit was strongly predominant, by what were deemed its factious delays in voting supplies, and in seconding the measures of the king for the security of Europe, had exasperated all those who saw the nation's safety in vigorous preparations for war, and led at last to the most angry resolution of the Lords, which one house of parliament in a matter not affecting its privileges has ever recorded against the other.[384] The grand jury of Kent, and other freeholders of the county, presented accordingly a petition on the 8th of May 1701, imploring them to turn their loyal addresses into bills of supply (the only phrase in the whole petition that could be construed into disrespect), and to enable his majesty to assist his allies before it should be too late. The tory faction was wrought to fury by this honest remonstrance. They voted that the petition was scandalous, insolent, and seditious, tending to destroy the constitution of parliament, and to subvert the established government of this realm; and ordered that Mr. Colepepper, who had been most forward in presenting the petition, and all others concerned in it, should be taken into custody of the serjeant.[385] Though no attempt was made on this occasion to call the authority of the house into question by habeas corpus or other legal remedy, it was discussed in pamphlets and in general conversation, with little advantage to a power so arbitrary, and so evidently abused in the immediate instance.[386]

A very few years after this high exercise of authority, it was called forth in another case, still more remarkable and even less warrantable. The House of Commons had an undoubted right of determining all disputed returns to the writ of election, and consequently of judging upon the right of every vote. But, as the house could not pretend that it had given this right, or that it was not, like any other franchise, vested in the possessor by a legal title, no pretext of reason or analogy could be set up for denying that it might also come, in an indirect manner at least, before a court of justice, and be judged by the common principles of law. One Ashby, however, a burgess of Aylesbury, having sued the returning officer for refusing his vote; and three judges of the king's bench, against the opinion of Chief-Justice Holt, having determined for different reasons that it did not lie, a writ of error was brought in the House of Lords, when the judgment was reversed. The House of Commons took this up indignantly, and passed various resolutions, asserting their exclusive right to take cognisance of all matters relating to the election of their members. The Lords repelled these by contrary resolutions; That by the known laws of this kingdom, every person having a right to give his vote, and being wilfully denied by the officer who ought to receive it, may maintain an action against such officer to recover damage for the injury; That the contrary assertion is destructive of the property of the subject, and tends to encourage corruption and partiality in returning officers; That the declaring persons guilty of breach of privilege for prosecuting such actions, or for soliciting and pleading in them, is a manifest assuming a power to control the law, and hinder the course of justice, and subject the property of Englishmen to the arbitrary votes of the House of Commons. They ordered a copy of these resolutions to be sent to all the sheriffs, and to be communicated by them to all the boroughs in their respective counties.

A prorogation soon afterwards followed, but served only to give breathing time to the exasperated parties; for it must be observed, that though a sense of dignity and privilege no doubt swelled the majorities in each house, the question was very much involved in the general whig and tory course of politics. But Ashby, during the recess, having proceeded to execution on his judgment, and some other actions having been brought against the returning officer of Aylesbury, the Commons again took it up, and committed the parties to Newgate. They moved the court of king's bench for a habeas corpus; upon the return to which, the judges, except Holt, thought themselves not warranted to set them at liberty against the commitment of the house.[387] It was threatened to bring this by writ of error before the Lords; and, in the disposition of that assembly, it seems probable that they would have inflicted a severe wound on the privileges of the lower house, which must in all probability have turned out a sort of suicide upon their own. But the Commons interposed by resolving to commit to prison the counsel and agents concerned in prosecuting the habeas corpus, and by addressing the queen not to grant a writ of error. The queen properly answered, that as this matter, relating to the course of judicial proceedings, was of the highest consequence, she thought it necessary to weigh very carefully what she should do. The Lords came to some important resolutions: That neither house of parliament hath any power by any vote or declaration to create to themselves any new privilege that is not warranted by the known laws and customs of parliament; That the House of Commons, in committing to Newgate certain persons for prosecuting an action at law, upon pretence that their so doing was contrary to a declaration, a contempt of the jurisdiction, and a breach of the privileges of that house, have assumed to themselves alone a legislative power, by pretending to attribute the force of law to their declaration, have claimed a jurisdiction not warranted by the constitution, and have assumed a new privilege, to which they can show no title by the law and custom of parliament; and have thereby, as far as in them lies, subjected the rights of Englishmen, and the freedom of their persons, to the arbitrary votes of the House of Commons; That every Englishman, who is imprisoned by any authority whatsoever, has an undoubted right to a writ of habeas corpus, in order to obtain his liberty by the due course of law; That for the House of Commons to punish any person for assisting a prisoner to procure such a writ is an attempt of dangerous consequence, and a breach of the statutes provided for the liberty of the subject; That a writ of error is not of grace but of right, and ought not to be denied to the subject when duly applied for, though at the request of either house of parliament.

These vigorous resolutions produced a conference between the houses, which was managed with more temper than might have been expected from the tone taken on both sides. But, neither of them receding in the slightest degree, the Lords addressed the queen, requesting her to issue the writs of error demanded upon the refusal of the king's bench to discharge the parties committed by the House of Commons. The queen answered the same day, that she should have granted the writs of error desired by them, but finding an absolute necessity of putting an immediate end to the session, she was sensible there could have been no further proceeding upon them. The meaning of this could only be, that by a prorogation all commitments by order of the lower house of parliament are determined, so that the parties could stand in no need of a habeas corpus. But a great constitutional question was thus wholly eluded.[388]

We may reckon the proceedings against Mr. Alexander Murray, in 1751, among the instances wherein the House of Commons has been hurried by passion to an undue violence. This gentleman had been active in a contested Westminster election, on an anti-ministerial and perhaps jacobite interest. In the course of an inquiry before the house, founded on a petition against the return, the high-bailiff named Mr. Murray as having insulted him in the execution of his duty. The house resolved to hear Murray by counsel in his defence, and the high-bailiff also by counsel in support of the charge, and ordered the former to give bail for his appearance from time to time. These, especially the last, were innovations on the practice of parliament, and were justly opposed by the more cool-headed men. After hearing witnesses on both sides, it was resolved that Murray should be committed to Newgate, and should receive this sentence upon his knees. This command he steadily refused to obey, and thus drew on himself a storm of wrath at such insolence and audacity. But the times were no more, when the Commons could inflict whippings and pillories on the refractory; and they were forced to content themselves with ordering that no person should be admitted to him in prison, which, on account of his ill-health, they soon afterwards relaxed. The public voice is never favourable to such arbitrary exertions of mere power: at the expiration of the session, Mr. Murray, thus grown from an intriguing jacobite into a confessor of popular liberty, was attended home by a sort of triumphal procession amidst the applause of the people. In the next session he was again committed on the same charge; a proceeding extremely violent and arbitrary.[389]