[381] 12 Will. 3, ch. 3.

[382] Journals, 11th Feb. It had been originally proposed, that the member making the complaint should pay the party's costs and expenses, which was amended, I presume, in consequence of some doubt as to the power of the house to enforce it.

[383] 10 G. 3, c. 50.

[384] Resolved, That whatever ill consequences may arise from the so long deferring the supplies for the year's service, are to be attributed to the fatal counsel of putting off the meeting of a parliament so long, and to unnecessary delays of the House of Commons. Lords' Journals, 23rd June 1701. The Commons had previously come to a vote, that all the ill consequences which may at this time attend the delay of the supplies granted by the Commons for the preserving the public peace, and maintaining the balance of Europe, are to be imputed to those who, to procure an indemnity for their own enormous crimes, have used their utmost endeavours to make a breach between the two houses. Commons' Journals, June 20th.

[385] Journals, 8th May; Parl. Hist. v. 1250; Ralph, 947. This historian, who generally affects to take the popular side, inveighs against this petition, because the tories had a majority in the Commons. His partiality, arising out of a dislike to the king, is very manifest throughout the second volume. He is forced to admit afterwards, that the house disgusted the people by their votes on this occasion. P. 976.

[386] History of the Kentish Petition; Somers Tracts, xi. 242; Legion's Paper; Id. 264; Vindication of the Rights of the Commons (either by Harley or Sir Humphrey Mackworth); Id. 276. This contains in many respects constitutional principles; but the author holds very strong language about the right of petitioning. After quoting the statute of Charles II. against tumults on pretence of presenting petitions, he says: "By this statute it may be observed, that not only the number of persons is restrained, but the occasion also for which they may petition; which is for the alteration of matters established in church or state, for want whereof some inconvenience may arise to that county from which the petition shall be brought. For it is plain by the express words and meaning of that statute that the grievance or matter of the petition must arise in the same county as the petition itself. They may indeed petition the king for a parliament to redress their grievances; and they may petition that parliament to make one law that is advantageous, and repeal another that is prejudicial to the trade or interest of that county; but they have no power by this statute, nor by the constitution of the English government, to direct the parliament in the general proceedings concerning the whole kingdom; for the law declares that a general consultation of all the wise representatives of parliament is more for the safety of England than the hasty advice of a number of petitioners of a private county, of a grand jury, or of a few justices of the peace, who seldom have a true state of the case represented to them."—P. 313.

These are certainly what must appear in the present day very strange limitations of the subject's right to petition either house of parliament. But it is really true that such a right was not generally recognised, nor frequently exercised, in so large an extent as is now held unquestionable. We may search whole volumes of the journals, while the most animating topics were in discussion, without finding a single instance of such an interposition of the constituent with the representative body. In this particular case of the Kentish petition, the words in the resolution, that it tended to destroy the constitution of parliament and subvert the established government, could be founded on no pretence but its unusual interference with the counsels of the legislature. With this exception, I am not aware (stating this, however, with some diffidence) of any merely political petition before the Septennial bill in 1717, against which several were presented from corporate towns; one of which was rejected on account of language that the house thought indecent; and as to these it may be observed, that towns returning members to parliament had a particular concern in the measure before the house. They relate, however, no doubt, to general policy, and seem to establish a popular principle which stood on little authority. I do not of course include the petitions to the long parliament in 1640, nor one addressed to the Convention, in 1689, from the inhabitants of London and Westminster, pressing their declaration of William and Mary; both in times too critical to furnish regular precedents. But as the popular principles of government grew more established, the right of petitioning on general grounds seems to have been better recognised; and instances may be found, during the administration of Sir Robert Walpole, though still by no means frequent. Parl. Hist. xii. 119. The city of London presented a petition against the bill for naturalisation of the Jews, in 1753, as being derogatory to the Christian religion as well as detrimental to trade. Id. xiv. 1417. It caused, however, some animadversion; for Mr. Northey, in the debate next session on the proposal to repeal this bill, alluding to this very petition, and to the comments Mr. Pelham made on it, as "so like the famous Kentish petition that if they had been treated in the same manner it would have been what they deserved," observes in reply, that the "right of petitioning either the king or the parliament in a decent and submissive manner, and without any riotous appearance against anything they think may affect their religion and liberties, will never, I hope, be taken from the subject." Id. xv. 149; see also 376. And it is very remarkable that notwithstanding the violent clamour excited by that unfortunate statute, no petitions for its repeal are to be found in the journals. They are equally silent with regard to the marriage act, another topic of popular obloquy. Some petitions appear to have been presented against the bill for naturalisation of foreign protestants; but probably on the ground of its injurious effect on the parties themselves. The great multiplication of petitions on matters wholly unconnected with particular interests cannot, I believe, be traced higher than those for the abolition of the slave trade in 1787; though a few were presented for reform about the end of the American war, which would undoubtedly have been rejected with indignation in any earlier stage of our constitution. It may be remarked also that petitions against bills imposing duties are not received, probably on the principle that they are intended for the general interests, though affecting the parties who thus complain of them. Hatsell, iii. 200.

The convocation of public meetings for the debate of political questions, as preparatory to such addresses or petitions, is still less according to the practice and precedents of our ancestors; nor does it appear that the sheriffs or other magistrates are more invested with a right of convening or presiding in assemblies of this nature than any other persons; though, within the bounds of the public peace, it would not perhaps be contended that they have ever been unlawful. But that their origin can be distinctly traced higher than the year 1769, I am not prepared to assert. It will of course be understood, that this note is merely historical, and without reference to the expediency of that change in our constitutional theory which it illustrates.

[387] State Trials, xiv. 849.

[388] Parl. Hist. vi. 225 et post; State Trials, xiv. 695 et post.