Causes of revolutions. 58. As the forms of government are three, it follows that the possible revolutions from one to another are six. For anarchy is the extinction of a government, not a revolution in it. He proceeds to develop the causes of revolutions with great extent of historical learning and with judgment, if not with so much acuteness or so much vigour of style as Machiavel. Great misfortunes in war, he observes, have a tendency to change popular rule to aristocracy, and success has an opposite effect; the same seems applicable to all public adversity and prosperity. Democracy, however, more commonly ends in monarchy, as monarchy does in democracy, especially when it has become tyrannical; and such changes are usually accompanied by civil war or tumult. Nor can aristocracy, he thinks, be changed into democracy without violence, though the converse revolution sometimes happens quietly, as when the labouring classes and traders give up public affairs to look after their own; in this manner Venice, Lucca, Ragusa, and other cities have become aristocracies. The great danger for an aristocracy is, that some ambitious person, either of their own body or of the people, may arm the latter against them: and this is most likely to occur, when honours and magistracy are conferred on unworthy men, which affords the best topic to demagogues, especially where the plebeians are wholly excluded: which, though always grievous to them, is yet tolerable so long as power is intrusted to deserving persons; but when bad men are promoted, it becomes easy to excite the minds of the people against the nobility, above all, if there are already factions among the latter, a condition dangerous to all states, but mostly to an aristocracy. Revolutions are more frequent in small states, because a small number of citizens is easily split into parties; hence we shall find in one age more revolutions among the cities of Greece or Italy than have taken place during many in the kingdoms of France or Spain. He thinks the ostracism of dangerous citizens itself dangerous, and recommends rather to put them to death, or to render them friends. Monarchy, he observes, has this peculiar to it, that if the king be a prisoner, the constitution is not lost; whereas, if the seat of government in a republic be taken, it is at an end, the subordinate cities never making resistance. It is evident that this can only be applicable to the case, hitherto the more common one, of a republic, in which the capital city entirely predominates. “There is no kingdom which shall not, in continuance of time, be changed, and at length also be overthrown. But it is best for them who least feel their changes by little and little made, whether from evil to good, or from good to evil.”
Astrological fancies of Bodin. 59. If this is the best, the next is the worst chapter in Bodin. It professes to inquire, whether the revolutions of states can be foreseen. Here he considers, whether the stars have such an influence on human affairs, that political changes can be foretold by their means, and declares entirely against it, with such expressions as would seem to indicate his disbelief in astrology. If it were true, he says, that the conditions of commonwealths depended on the heavenly bodies, there could be yet no certain prediction of them; since the astrologers lay down their observations with such inconsistency, that one will place the same star in direct course at the moment that another makes it retrograde. It is obvious that any one who could employ this argument, must have perceived that it destroys the whole science of astrology. But, after giving instances of the blunders and contradictions of these pretended philosophers, he so far gives way as to admit that, if all the events from the beginning of the world could be duly compared with the planetary motions, some inferences might be deduced from them; and thus giving up his better reason to the prejudices of his age, he acknowledges astrology as a theoretical truth. The hypothesis of Copernicus he mentions as too absurd to deserve refutation; since, being contrary to the tenets of all theologians and philosophers and to common sense, it subverts the foundations of every science. We now plunge deeper into nonsense; Bodin proceeding to a long arithmetical disquisition, founded on a passage in Plato, ascribing the fall of states to want of proportion.[1108]
[1108] c. 2.
Danger of sudden changes. 60. The next chapter, on the danger of sudden revolutions in the entire government, asserts that even the most determined astrologers agree in denying that a wise man is subjugated by the starry influences, though they may govern those who are led by passion like wild beasts. Therefore a wise ruler may foresee revolutions and provide remedies. It is doubtful whether an established law ought to be changed, though not good in itself, lest it should bring others into contempt, especially such as affect the form of polity. These, if possible, should be held immutable; yet it is to be remembered, that laws are only made for the sake of the community, and public safety is the supreme law of laws. There is therefore no law so sacred that it may not be changed through necessity. But, as a general rule, whatever change is to be made should be effected gradually.[1109]
[1109] c. 3.
Judicial power of the sovereign. 61. It is a disputed question whether magistrates should be temporary or perpetual. Bodin thinks it essential that the council of state should be permanent, but high civil commands ought to be temporary.[1110] It is in general important that magistrates shall accord in their opinions; yet there are circumstances in which their emulation or jealousy may be beneficial to a state.[1111] Whether the sovereign ought to exercise judicial functions may seem, he says, no difficult question to those who are agreed that kings were established for the sake of doing justice. This, however, is not his theory of the origin of government; and after giving all the reasons that can be urged in favour of a monarch-judge, including as usual all historical precedents, he decides that it is inexpedient for the ruler to pronounce the law himself. His reasons are sufficiently bold, and grounded on an intimate knowledge of the vices of courts, which he does not hesitate to pour out.[1112]
[1110] c. 4.
[1111] c. 5.
[1112] c. 6.
Toleration of religions. 62. In treating of the part to be taken by the prince, or by a good citizen, in civil factions, after a long detail from history of conspiracies and seditions, he comes to disputes about religion, and contends against the permission of reasonings on matters of faith. What can be more impious, he says, than to suffer the eternal laws of God, which ought to be implanted in men’s minds with the utmost certainty, to be called in question by probable reasonings? For there is nothing so demonstrable, which men will not undermine by argument. But the principles of religion do not depend on demonstrations and arguments, but on faith alone; and whoever attempts to prove them by a train of reasoning, tends to subvert the foundations of the whole fabric. Bodin in this sophistry was undoubtedly insincere. He goes on, however, having purposely sacrificed this cock to Æsculapius, to contend that, if several religions exist in a state, the prince should avoid violence and persecution; the natural tendency of man being to give his assent voluntarily, but never by force.[1113]