"Some allusion has been made by Mr. Donahoe to myself. I do not propose to refer to it, except in one respect. What possible personal motive could I have, except the motive that every citizen should be actuated by, and that should control the conduct of every lawyer engaged in the prosecution of a great case like this? Should I fail in my duty when invited into this case by the State's Attorney to assist him in its prosecution? Was the fact that I first saw the light of day in the same land that Martin Burke did, going to embarrass my conduct or to hinder me in the performance of my duty in any respect? A scandal to my profession, and a shame and reproach to my people, would I indeed be, if for one moment I forgot my simple function of an American lawyer, in an American court, before an American jury, pleading for the vindication of American law. If these men, unfortunately situated as they are to-day, have been personal enemies, I do not know them. I certainly have no personal feeling; I contemplate them only with pain and with regret and with shame. I never saw one of them before the commission of this crime, except John F. Beggs, and I assure you that although I had seen John F. Beggs, and had spoken with him and had a very slight acquaintance with him, I did not know that the man indicted under that name was the prisoner at the bar, until the first day that I came into court here. Whatever relation I had with him was not of an unkind character; so that I come to the trial of this case free from the impulse of personal motive—having no anxiety except an anxiety for the punishment of crime, the vindication of the law, the maintenance of its majesty, the sanctity of human life, and the punishment of the foulest crime that has blotted the calendar of this State, or of any other State of this American Union.
"Now, you have listened to me with patience; I thank you for your attention through the desultory speech that it was necessary for me to make after the exhaustive and able manner in which the people's case had been presented to you by the two distinguished gentlemen who preceded me, Judge Longenecker and Mr. Ingham. In leaving you, gentlemen of the jury, and this case and my associates in it, I trust I leave it without any trace of personal feeling toward anybody—counsel or anybody else in this case. If, in the sharp fight of a lawsuit—of a trial like this—under the spur of combat at times, I have said or done anything that has wounded the feelings or hurt the sensibilities of any man, no matter who, I am sorry for it. I want you to take this case. It is a great case and a serious case. There never was a greater nor more serious duty devolved upon any twelve men on God's earth. It is as sacred and as important as the duty of the soldiers who went out to fight for the flag and maintain the unity of the States and the sovereignty of the Constitution. I commit it to you with all its awful solemnity; with all its awful responsibilities, feeling confident that in the breast of every one of these twelve men beats the heart of an honorable, honest, a patriotic and a law-abiding man; that your verdict will be the verdict of your conscience—a verdict that your consciences and judgments will approve and that the Court will ratify, that God will sanctify, that will vindicate the law and commit the guilty to a just punishment."
Foster's Plea for Beggs.
At the conclusion of Mr. Hynes' argument, Mr. Foster, who appeared specially in behalf of John F. Beggs, claimed the attention of the Court. Among other things he said:
"Dr. Cronin was murdered. A more dastardly and heinous murder, a more atrocious and cold-blooded murder, in my judgment was never perpetrated. Are the gentlemen for the State satisfied with that? In this connection allow me to urge you to pause and consider. You remember what it is to which I refer. Whatever you may see of error on the part of counsel, in the name of heaven don't charge it on the head of his client. Don't charge the forgetfulness; don't charge the investigation; don't charge the bad judgment of the lawyer upon the head of the client he is attempting to represent. The man who does not say that the murderer or murderers of Dr. Cronin ought to be punished is a man whose friendship I don't prize, and whose citizenship, in my judgment, we can get along better without than with. Those are my sentiments; that is my belief; but in the name of God, gentlemen, must an innocent man suffer because of a crime which we concede as being perpetrated in our midst? Are the minds of men to be inflamed, are men to lose their reason by visiting vengeance on a man who is charged of the diabolical crime of the murder which is being investigated here?
"These are the questions to which I direct your attention to some extent. Because a man has espoused a cause, because a man is identified with a clan which may not meet your approval or may not meet mine, that is no reason, no excuse under heaven, why his life should be destroyed. And I thank my friend, Judge Longenecker, for the statement which he made at the very threshold of this case as to what the issue involved really was. In his opening he used this language in reference to the Clan-na-Gael Society: 'Remember that we are not called upon to try the Clan-na-Gael organization; we are not here to prosecute that organization or to defend it. If that organization has no right to exist, then it is the duty of the government under which it exists to take hold of it. It is not the duty of those trying the criminal case to settle that question. As I said, no matter what our feelings may be in regard to this, no matter what our ideas may be about an organization formed to make war with a country at peace with ours, we are not called to try that question, and you are not sworn to try that issue.' Gentlemen, every word of that is true."
Mr. Foster then went on to comment upon the questions relating to prejudice on the part of the jurors put during their examination. He said that those questions were proper and wise, because it was needful to ascertain if they entertained any religious or radical prejudice. Then he said: "John F. Beggs must be convicted of the murder of Patrick H. Cronin, or he must be discharged. There is no question here as to whether he is a Protestant or as to whether he is a Catholic. There is no question here as to whether he is a Clan-na-Gael or whether he is not. He is a murderer and must be punished for murder or he must be discharged by your verdict. The issue is simple—easy to understand. No intricate pleadings are needed in this case; no intricate issues are involved. The plain and simple question is, did John F. Beggs kill Dr. Cronin? Not necessarily with his own hand, but was he a part and parcel of a conspiracy to destroy the life of Patrick H. Cronin? Freed of all rubbish, that question is left to your consideration and no other. There are some things, gentlemen, of which I complain in this case, and I believe I have a right to complain of them. The law in its wisdom has provided means for the punishment of crime. One of the most important offices in the State of Illinois, one of the most remunerative offices is the office of State's Attorney of Cook county. Why is that office sought for? Because it is honorable, because it is remunerative, and the lawyers are few who would not gladly assume the responsibilities of the office of public prosecutor. The law not only provides for a public prosecutor, but it provides for five assistants. Mr. Foster then referred to the importance of having a competent and trustworthy man for this office, and then remarked that it was singular that the State's Attorney with his five assistants could not attend to the business of the county." At this juncture he made it evident that he was opposed to the appointment of Mr. Hynes to assist the prosecution, for he said:
"No sooner was there an arrest made on account of the murder of Dr. Cronin than war was declared in the opposing camps of the Clan-na-Gael in Chicago. It was war to the knife, and the knife to the hilt, which has been kept up incessantly from that time to this. What was the first thing to do? Employ a good lawyer. Not satisfied with the provisions of the statute to which I have referred—not satisfied with the ability of my learned friend, Judge Longenecker, and all his assistants, they looked for another man. They cast about for a man of extraordinary ability to come to the rescue and hang the lot of opposing Clan-na-Gaels, and as they cast about for the man, he, who of all others is a power before a jury, the man who first attracts their attention is the man who last addressed you—a man whose home is in the courts—a man who only lives to address juries, and by addressing juries and courts—a man who can win cases before juries regardless of the facts by the power of his ingenuity and his eloquence. That is the man they want; that is the man they will have, who, in addition to the power I have referred to, is a partisan in the conflict, an Irishman and a Clan-na-Gael of the opposing faction. What other man among the two thousand lawyers at the Chicago bar except William J. Hynes, is the man to whom their attention is called?"
Having commented on the able arguments of Mr. Ingham and Mr. Hynes, Mr. Foster said: