The Crime of the Century; Or, The Assassination of Dr. Patrick Henry Cronin

by Henry M. Hunt

"The law exacts a conviction, wherever there is sufficient legal evidence to show the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and circumstantial evidence is legal evidence.

"The following rules should guide you in your use and application of the circumstances introduced in evidence: It is the duty of the jury to enter upon the consideration of each circumstance proven, having in their minds the presumption that the defendants, and each of them, are innocent, and in considering such fact or circumstance, they should apply to it the presumption of innocence, and if such fact or circumstance, when considered in connection with all the evidence in the case, can be explained consistently with the innocence of the accused, it is their duty so to explain it. No circumstance introduced in evidence on this trial can be used by you as a basis for any inference of guilt against the defendants, or either of them, unless such circumstance is first proven to your entire satisfaction, and every circumstance in the case which is not proven to your entire satisfaction should be wholly dismissed from consideration, and must not be permitted to influence you to any extent against the defendants, or either of them. Any circumstance which is essential to a conclusion of guilt against the defendants, or either of them, should be established beyond all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty before it can be used by the jury against the defendants.

"In order to justify the inference of legal guilt from circumstantial evidence, the existence of the inculpatory facts must be absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of their guilt. If you can reconcile the facts in this case upon any reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of the defendant, John Kunze, it is your duty so to do, and to find said defendant, John Kunze, not guilty. If you can reconcile the facts in this case upon any reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of the defendant, Patrick O'Sullivan, it is your duty so to do, and to find said defendant, Patrick O'Sullivan, not guilty. If you can reconcile the facts in this case upon any reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of the defendant, Martin Burke, it is your duty so to do, and to find said defendant, Martin Burke, not guilty. If you can reconcile the facts in this case upon any reasonable theory consistent with the innocence of the defendant, Daniel Coughlin, it is your duty so to do, and to find said defendant, Daniel Coughlin, not guilty.

"It is not sufficient for the jury to find that a resolution was adopted for the appointment of a secret committee in Camp 20 on February 8, 1889, but it must further appear to your satisfaction, beyond all reasonable doubt that such committee was in fact appointed by the defendant Beggs, and that such appointment was in pursuance or in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crime set out in the indictment, and you must further be satisfied, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the defendant Beggs had knowledge of the purpose for which said committee was asked, or, if appointed, assented to its purpose subsequently, or you will not be justified in finding a participation in such conspiracy on the part of the defendant Beggs by reason of the facts just recited. That the defendant Beggs was a member of the United Brotherhood and was the presiding officer of Camp 20 are not circumstances standing alone tending to establish his guilt of the crime charged in the indictment in this case. And as there is no evidence in this case that any overt act was committed by the defendant Beggs in the commission of the alleged murder charged in the indictment in this case, therefore, unless it is established that a conspiracy was entered into to commit the murder charged in said indictment, to which conspiracy the said Beggs was a party, he should be acquitted.

"When the testimony of witnesses appears to be fair, is not unreasonable or unnatural, and is consistent with itself, and where the witnesses have not, in any manner, been impeached, then you have no right under the law, to disregard the testimony of such witnesses from mere whim, caprice, or without just cause. It is the duty of the jury to consider the whole of the evidence, and to render a verdict in accordance with the weight of all the evidence in the case, and not act upon a consideration of the evidence for the prosecution or the defense alone. All the evidence must be considered.

"While it is your duty to carefully scrutinize and dispassionately weigh the evidence of all the witnesses in the case, still it is your sworn duty to give proper credit to the evidence of each and all of the witnesses, and, if possible, to reconcile all of the evidence in the case with the presumption that each witness has intended to speak the truth, unless by their manner of testifying on the witness-stand, or by inconsistent statements sworn to, or by the testimony inconsistent with other credible evidence in the cause you are impelled to believe that the testimony of some one or more of the witnesses is untruthful or unreliable, or unless you are led to believe, from an exhibition of interest, bias or prejudice, that such witness or witnesses have been inclined to exaggerate, color or suppress the truth, or unless they have been impeached in some of the ways known to the law.

"One of the modes of impeaching a witness is by showing that he or she has made statements out of court at variance with his or her statements on the witness-stand; and if the jury believe from the evidence that a witness has made statements at another time and place at variance with his or her evidence in this case, regarding any material matter testified to by him or her, then it is the province of the jury to determine to what extent this fact tends to impeach either his or her memory or his or her credibility, or detract from the weight which ought to be given to his or her testimony. If the jury believe from the evidence that any witness has willfully sworn falsely as to any matter or thing material to the issues in this case, then the jury are at liberty to disregard his or her entire testimony, except in so far as it has been corroborated by other credible evidence, or by the facts and circumstances proven on the trial. Testimony of verbal admissions, statements and conversations, ought to be taken by you with caution, because that sort of testimony is subject to much imperfection and mistake. And when the verbal admission of a person charged with crime is offered in evidence, the whole of the admission must be taken together, as well that part which makes for the accused as that which makes against him; and if part of the statement which is in favor of the defendant is not disproved, and is not apparently improbable or untrue, when consistent with all the other evidence in the case, then such part of the statement is entitled to as much consideration from the jury as any other part of the statement.

"Before you can be warranted in using against any one of the defendants any evidence respecting the conduct or conversation of any other defendant, you must believe to a moral certainty, from reliable and credible evidence, not only that the particular defendant whose conduct and conversation the prosecution seek to use against the defendant was a member of an unlawful conspiracy, as charged in the indictment, but that the defendant himself was also an associate and member of such conspiracy. If, after an examination of all the evidence, which examination should be made by you in a spirit free from passion and prejudice, there should exist in your mind any reasonable doubt as to whether or not any defendant was a member of an unlawful conspiracy as charged in the indictment, then and in such case it would be illegal and wrong for you to use against such defendant any evidence respecting the conduct or conversation of any other defendant, even if you should believe that such other defendant was a member of such alleged conspiracy.

"In no view which can be taken of this case will you be warranted in using against one defendant any evidence of the act, conduct or conversation of any other defendant occurring subsequent to the day of the alleged homicide of Dr. Cronin.

"Although you may believe that the defendant Beggs, at a meeting of Camp 20 on May 10th, remarked in substance that that committee was to report to him, and even if you should further believe that such remark possessed some criminal import, yet, in no view that can be taken of this case, will you be justified in using such remark as evidence against any other defendant.