The strategical plan of attack above outlined was not carried out. Ord’s strategy never reached the domain of tactics, for he went into camp seven miles west of Iuka and the head of Rosecrans’ column was attacked by the entire army of Price. It was with the head of this column that the Eleventh Ohio Battery marched into the fight. Anticipating a combined engagement the head of the column pushed its innocent way into the maw of the entire rebel army. We had to fight first and think afterward. Price had hours to choose his positions and, incidentally, he chose our position also. We didn’t have time to change it.
“Rapidity of movement and surprise are the life and soul of the strategical offensive.” That maxim reads well but, in practice, it is important to provide against being surprised by the other fellow before you spring your surprise on him.
For several miles in the afternoon of the 19th of September the advance of Rosecrans’ column was warmly contested. The enemy’s sharp-shooters occupied every point of vantage, making the last five miles a steady contest. The cavalry had long ago been driven in. A few companies formed an advance skirmish line only a short distance from the main column. Near the front of the column marched the Eleventh Ohio Battery. The men knew that an engagement was imminent but their immediate front was unknown and unexplored. As usual, we had no maps. While marching through a defile at the crest of a thickly wooded hill we noticed that the rifle fire in front was suddenly increased. But there was no pause to reconnoiter. The battery marched from the defile into within short range of Price’s whole army. Instantly an entire rebel division concentrated its fire on the battery with the intention of annihilating it before it could unlimber.
As we emerged from the cut this sudden concentration of rifle fire gave me the impression of being in a violent hail storm. Riding at the head of the column I turned my head to look for the men, expecting to see half the men and horses down. To my great joy I found all uninjured. The storm of bullets was passing just over our heads. We hastened to get into position and unlimber before they could get the range. Just in front of us the road turned to the right. We turned to the right into the brush and took position facing this road. As our men were clearing the hazel brush for positions for their guns a Wisconsin battery appeared about three or four hundred yards to our left and unlimbered; but it suddenly limbered up and galloped to the rear without having fired a shot. It had been ordered back, leaving the Eleventh the only Union battery in the battle.
The Fifth Iowa took position just at our right. The Twenty-sixth Missouri prolonged the line to the right of the Fifth Iowa. On our left the Forty-eighth Indiana formed a line that swung somewhat forward at its left flank. Our side of the fight began with these three regiments in position. The front thus hastily formed did not permit of further extension, owing to the nature of the ground.
A little later the Fourth Minnesota and Sixteenth Iowa were, respectively, echeloned in rear of the left and right flanks. The total force actually engaged was 2800 Union and 11,000 Confederates.
When the Eleventh went into position Lieutenant Sears was in command. As junior First Lieutenant, I had the right section, while Second Lieutenant Alger fought the center section. Of the acting Second Lieutenants Perrine had the left section and Bauer the line of caissons. During the fight I succeeded to the command when Sears went to the rear with a wound. Alger was captured. Bauer was killed.
The battery had taken position in line from column under an infantry fire from an entire division at ranges of from 200 to 400 yards. Shells from the rebel artillery were also crashing through our line. We opened fire at first with shell. This shell fire proved so effective that a rebel assault on the battery was ordered. A division of Price’s army rushed to the charge. The battery changed from shell to double charges of canister. The effect of the canister was terribly increased because of the rebel method of charging in masses. Had the line to the left of the battery held its front the assault on the battery would have been impossible of success. But Col. Eddy of the 48th Indiana was killed and the survivors of his regiment were swept back by overwhelming numbers. The left flank of the battery was thus left bare and unsupported. On the right the Fifth Iowa was cut to pieces. Only eleven officers and a handful of men remained. With the line melted away the battery found itself facing in three directions and battling with masses on three fronts. It had a rear but no flanks. The guns were being worked with greater speed and smaller crews. Cannoneers were falling. Other cannoneers coolly took their places and performed double duty. Drivers left their dead horses and took the places of dead or wounded comrades, only to be struck down in turn. Of eighty horses only three remained standing and a withdrawal of the guns was impossible. The surviving men were too few to do more than work the guns. Finally the charging hordes, checked and mutilated again and again in front, to right and to left, pressed close. Eight thousand men against two score. On the fifth charge the survivors were finally choked from the guns they would not abandon.
General Rosecrans in his notice, in orders, of the facts and results of the battle of Iuka, states that the Eleventh Ohio Battery participated:
“Under circumstances of danger and exposure such as rarely, perhaps never, have fallen to the lot of one single battery during this war.”