As this completely coincided with my views, I immediately consulted Hoover, and we jointly sent a wireless to President Wilson, which elicited a prompt approval of the idea, and the order that it be left to Pershing to decide who should make the trip.
The Harbord Mission and its very able report on Armenia resulted. Complete impartiality, and a total lack of prejudice, were shown by the manner in which he ended his report. He stated thirteen reasons for the United States adopting a mandate and thirteen reasons against it, and they were placed in parallel columns, so that everyone who read them could come to his own conclusions, and with General Harbord’s permission I am including them here.
| Reasons For | Reasons Against |
| 1. As one of the chief contributors to the formation of the League of Nations, the United States is morally bound to accept the obligations and responsibilities of a mandatory power. | 1. The United States has prior and nearer foreign obligations, and ample responsibilities with domestic problems growing out of the war. |
| 2. The insurance of world peace at the world's cross-ways, the focus of war infection since the beginning of history. | 2. This region has been a battle ground of militarism and imperialism for centuries. There is every likelihood that ambitious nations will still maneuver for its control. It would weaken our position relative to the Monroe Doctrine and probably eventually involve us with a reconstituted Russia. The taking of a mandate in this region would bring the United States into politics of the Old World, contrary to our traditional policy of keeping free of affairs in the Eastern Hemisphere. |
| 3. The Near East presents the greatest humanitarian opportunity of the age--a duty for which the United States is better fitted than any other--as witness Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and our altruistic policy of developing peoples rather than material resources alone. | 3. Humanitarianism should begin at home. There is a sufficient number of difficult situations which call for our action within the well-recognized spheres of American influence. |
| 4. America is practically the unanimous choice and fervent hope of all the peoples involved. | 4. The United States has in no way contributed to and is not responsible for the conditions, political, social, or economic, that prevail in this region. It will be entirely consistent to decline the invitation. |
| 5. America is already spending millions to save starving peoples in Turkey and Transcaucasia and could do this with much more efficiency if in control. Whoever becomes mandatory for these regions we shall be still expected to finance their relief, and will probably eventually furnish the capital for material development. | 5. American philanthropy and charity are world wide. Such policy would commit us to a policy of meddling or draw upon our philanthropy to the point of exhaustion. |
| 6. America is the only hope of the Armenians. They consider but one
other nation, Great Britain, which they fear would sacrifice their
interests to Moslem public opinion as long as she controls hundreds of
millions of that faith. Others fear Britain's imperialistic policy and
her habit of staying where she hoists her flag. For a mandatory America is not only the first choice of all the peoples of the Near East, but of each of the great powers, after itself. American power is adequate; its record clean; its motives above suspicion. | 6. Other powers, particularly Great Britain and Russia, have shown
continued interest in the welfare of Armenia. Great Britain is fitted by
experience and government, has great resources in money and trained
personnel, and though she might not be as sympathetic to Armenian
aspirations, her rule would guarantee security and justice. The United States is not capable of sustaining a continuity of foreign policy. One Congress can not bind another. Even treaties can be nullified by cutting off appropriations. Non-partisanship is difficult to attain in our Government. |
| 7. The mandatory would be self-supporting after an initial period of not
to exceed five years. The building of railroads would offer
opportunities to our capital. There would be great trade advantages not
only in the mandatory region, but in the proximity to Russia, Roumania,
etc. America would clean this hot-bed of disease and filth as she has in Cuba and Panama. | 7. Our country would be put to great expense, involving probably an
increase of the Army and Navy. Large numbers of Americans would serve in
a country of loathsome and dangerous diseases. It is questionable if
railroads could for many years pay interest on investments in their very
difficult construction. Capital for railways would not go there except
on Government guaranty. The effort and money spent would get us more trade in nearer lands than we could hope for in Russia and Roumania. Proximity and competition would increase the possibility of our becoming involved in conflict with the policies and ambitions of states which now our friends would be made our rivals. |
| 8. Intervention would be a liberal education for our people in world politics; give outlet to a vast amount of spirit and energy and would furnish a shining example. | 8. Our spirit and energy can find scope in domestic enterprises, or in lands south and west of ours. Intervention in the Near East would rob us of the strategic advantage enjoyed through the Atlantic which rolls between us and probable foes. Our reputation for fair dealing might be impaired. Efficient supervision of a mandate at such distance would be difficult or impossible. We do not need or wish further education in world politics. |
| 9. It would definitely stop further massacres of Armenians and other Christians, give justice to the Turks, Kurds, Greeks and other peoples. | 9. Peace and justice would be equally assured under any other of the great powers. |
| 10. It would increase the strength and prestige of the United States abroad and inspire interest at home in the regeneration of the Near East. | 10. It would weaken and dissipate our strength which should be reserved for future responsibilities on the American continents and in the Far East. Our line of communication to Constantinople would be at the mercy of other naval powers, and especially of Great Britain, with Gibraltar and Malta, etc., on the route. |
| 11. America has strong sentimental interests in the region; our missions and colleges. | 11. These institutions have been respected even by the Turks throughout the war and the massacres; and sympathy and respect would be shown by any other mandatory. |
| 12. If the United States does not take responsibility in this region, it is likely that international jealousies will result in a continuance of the unspeakable misrule of the Turk. | 12. The Peace Conference has definitely informed the Turkish Government that it may expect to go under a mandate. It is not conceivable that the League of Nations would permit further uncontrolled rule by that thoroughly discredited government. |
| 13. "And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel, thy brother? And he said: 'I know not; am I my brother's keeper?'" Better millions for a mandate than billions for future wars. | 13. The first duty of America is to its own people and its nearer neighbours. Our country would be involved in this adventure for at least a generation and in counting the cost Congress must be prepared to advance some such sums, less such amount as the Turkish and Transcaucasian revenues could afford, for the first five years. |
The Harbord Commission constituted itself attorney for both sides to the controversy, and expected the people of America to act as the jury to determine this question.
My own opinion as to the duties of the United States toward Turkey is elaborately outlined in an article on “Mandates or War?” which I contributed to the New York Times on November 9, 1919, and which appears in the appendix of this volume, and I hope that those of my readers who are really interested in this problem will take the trouble to read it.
CHAPTER XVIII
MY MISSION TO POLAND
PARIS, in 1919, had emerged from her darkness. She had ceased her weary vigils for air raids. She was no longer troubled by the nightmare of Emperor William at the head of his army triumphantly entering her gates, marching down the Champs-Elysées, and, like his grandfather in 1871, mortally offending her pride by defiling the Arc de Triomphe. Instead, she rejoiced daily in contemplating the thousands of captured German guns which had been placed along this very route to celebrate her victory. Crowds of people in their hysteric joy wept as they stood before the decorated statues of Strassburg and Metz, which once again were French cities. Versailles was not to be again used to crown a German Emperor, who, this time, would have been Emperor of the World. On the contrary, Paris was to have her revenge, for here were to gather all the representatives of the various victorious nations, as well as the neutrals, in an endeavour to formulate a permanent peace.