All in a Life-time

by Henry Morgenthau; French Strother

When I had started on this trip with Sir Douglas Haig as my chief objective, my wife had begged me to ascertain from Sir Douglas why he had not captured Lens. The reader will recall that, at that time, there were constant reports about the Battle of Lens, and it was very puzzling to us that, although the British seemed in complete control of the batteries around Lens, they hesitated about taking the town. Therefore, one of the first questions I put to Sir Douglas when I met him three days after my meeting with Currie, was the one entrusted to me by my wife, and in reply he explained to me that it was more efficacious to use Lens as a means of diminishing the Germans’ unused reserve than to take possession of it.

The full record of my meeting with Sir Douglas Haig, quoted from my diary, is as follows:

Tuesday, August 28, 1917: It rained hard. We left the Château at 11 A.M. ... We had an accident with auto forty minutes from headquarters, were hastily transferred to another car, an open Sunbeam, with torn top which I had to hold down, raining, rushing madly, stopped by R. R. crossing, and once by a long line of troops, but we reached there at 1 P.M.

Sir Philip Sassoon, M. P., private secretary of Sir Douglas Haig, received us and ushered me into private room of D. H. We talked for ten minutes before, and forty minutes after, lunch, alone; most interesting and instructive. He showed me and explained maps of Ypres, Lens, etc., and lists of German divisions and the steady diminution, since April 15, of their unused reserves which declined from 44 to 5. He said that Germans having concluded that the French were used up and the British unprepared, commenced transporting troops to the Russian front, and among other things he wanted to save Russians, so he ordered attack on Lens and made attack on Ypres. He also wanted to convince Lloyd George and others of his capacity to push back the Germans and settle the war on western front. He thinks it wrong tactics to attempt to secure small victories at Gaza or Bagdad. The war can only be won by attacking the German army. The only place to reach them is at the western front. Germans will never admit or consider themselves defeated even if all their allies are whipped and forsake them. Hence everybody should concentrate attention here. Italians should also help....

Thinks Germans are beginning to realize their position and possible defeat and great loss of economic position, and will in October or so offer peace terms, which it will be difficult to have French decline. He begs and urges that no early, incomplete peace be made, now being the day or time of reckoning. He thinks the Germans are much worse off than is known. He is positive that England will hold out until we can come to assist. He says it is unnecessary expense for us to prepare great airplane units, and that shelling German cities will not end war, or shorten it. It is right here, with artillery and infantry and of course a proper amount of airplanes, that work must be done.

He believes that the U. S. is destined to play a very important part, but thinks we must admit it is also self-defense that prompts our actions, and not only the altruistic spirit. He said the French were not ready at Havre to receive U. S. troops, and it would be much more effective if U. S. troops joined them and received their hints in good English which they understood. He is pleased that U. S. troops believe in same system of warfare as English, offensive and hitting out and not defensive. He explained their method of attacking, their intention only to move far enough each time to secure a height and drive the Germans from points of advantage and be prepared for counter attacks and each time absorb some German divisions. Lays great stress on gradual diminution of German unused reserve division.

Engineers built 600 miles of standard and narrow-gauge railroads. They have 600 locomotives and 6,000 cars. Shortage of freight cars was great handicap. They took old rails from England, South America, and U. S. to build these lines. He hopes we will send more railroad men and engineers. Quick transporting of men and material greatest help. He thinks war has at last given Great Britain an empire and hopes it will also give them the U. S. as a permanent ally. War must be won by Great Britain and U. S. jointly. Said their own experience will make them patient with us. Spoke most flatteringly of Pershing and our American troops. Thinks their temperament is so spirited and warlike.... He makes the impression of a determined experienced soldier, who has a well-defined plan which he is sure will lead to victory and wants everyone to adopt it and fight it out here in Flanders. He neither drank nor smoked at lunch.

From our luncheon with Sir Douglas Haig we returned at once to Paris. My diary for the next day contains the following:

Wednesday, August 29, 1917: Called at headquarters. Saw Col. Harbord, and then General Pershing.... Harbord told me French put Americans south of them and not next to English, because they, themselves, wanted to be defending Paris and did not want foreigners to determine destiny of France. It sounds plausible. He again suggested a visit from Baker, who could then talk more convincingly to Americans and would understand needs. Pershing told me that every sinew of his muscles, every artery leading to his heart, and all his energy and hours are devoted to working for success. He again expressed hope of United States fighting to the end. He spoke of needs of dockage for the ships, thinks it will require 30 to 40. Feels we need our own locomotives and cars to send men, etc., to front; claims our camps will be so located that we can send men to any part of lines. Shipping is needed to bring men over, and then their food and ammunition. He says nothing can be secured here—all must come over. Hopes seized German ships will answer; if not we should insist upon Allied ships, including Japan and Italy. It will take fully a year before we can be of much actual assistance.

A few days later, I sailed for America to make my report to President Wilson. It was my intention, upon my arrival in New York, to make this report in the form of a letter, and with this idea in mind, while still aboard ship, I wrote several drafts of it by hand, and in New York dictated a letter in final form to the President under date of September 15, 1917. I finally decided, however, that a verbal report was better, and consequently, I proceeded to Washington, and on September 19th, called on the President. I gave him at considerable length the information I had gathered. As our conversation, however, was simply a verbal enlargement of my letter of the 15th, I will quote that letter here. It is, I think, of some historical importance: