Zimmerman told me that von Jagow had told him about our talk, and asked me to repeat part of it. He was particularly interested, he said, in my statements about the German-Americans, and he wished to learn from me himself the facts upon which I based my conclusions. Like most Germans, he regarded the Germanic elements in our population as almost a part of Germany.
“Are you sure that the mass of German-Americans would be loyal to the United States in case of war?” he asked. “Aren’t their feelings for the Fatherland really dominant?”
“You evidently regard those German-Americans as a distinct part of the population,” I replied, “living apart from the rest of the people and having very little to do with American life as a whole. You could not make a greater mistake. You can purchase a few here and there who will make a big noise and shout for Germany, but I am talking about the millions of Americans of German ancestry. These people regard themselves as Americans and nothing else. The second generation particularly resent being looked upon as Germans. It is practically impossible to make them talk German; they refuse to speak anything but English. They do not read German newspapers and will not go to German schools. They even resent going to Lutheran churches where the language is German. We have more than a million German-Americans in New York City, but it has been a great struggle to keep alive one German theatre; the reason is that these people prefer the theatres where English is the language. We have a few German clubs, but their membership is very small. The German-Americans prefer to belong to the clubs of general membership, and there is not a single one in New York, even the finest, where they are not received upon their merits. In the political and social life of New York there are few German-Americans who, as such, have acquired any prominent position, though there are plenty of men of distinguished position who are German in origin. If the United States and Germany go to war, you will not only be surprised at the loyalty of our German people, but the whole world will be. Another point: if the United States goes in, we shall fight to the end, and it will be a very long and a very determined struggle.”
After three years I have no reason to be ashamed of either of these prophecies. I sometimes wonder what Zimmerman now thinks of my statements.
After the explanation, Zimmerman began to talk about Turkey. He was very interested in finding out whether the Turks were likely to make a separate peace. I bluntly told him that the Turks felt themselves to be under no obligations to the Germans. This gave me another opportunity.
“I have learned a good deal about German methods in Turkey,” I said. “I think it would be a great mistake to attempt similar tactics in the United States. I speak of this because there has been a good deal of sabotage there already. This in itself is solidifying the German-Americans against you, and is, more than anything else, driving the United States into the arms of England.”
“But the German Government is not responsible,” said Zimmerman. “We know nothing about it.”
Naturally I could not accept that statement on its face value—recent developments have shown how mendacious it was—but we passed to other topics. The matter of the submarine came up again.
“We have voluntarily interned our Navy,” said Zimmerman. “We can do nothing at sea except with our submarines. It seems to me that the United States is making a serious mistake in so strongly opposing the submarine. You have a long coastline and you may need the U-boat yourself some day. Suppose one of the European Powers, and particularly Japan, should attack you. You could use the submarine to good purpose then. Besides, if you insist on this proposed declaration in the Lusitania matter, you will simply force our Government into the hands of the Tirpitz party.”
Zimmerman now returned again to the situation in Turkey. His questions showed that he was much displeased with the new German Ambassador, Graf von Metternich. Metternich, it seemed, had not made a success of winning the goodwill of the reigning powers in Turkey and had been a trial to the German Foreign Office. Metternich had shown a different attitude toward the Armenians from Wangenheim, and he had made sincere attempts with Talaat and Enver to stop them. Zimmerman now told me that Metternich had made a great mistake in doing this and had destroyed his influence at Constantinople. Zimmerman made no effort to conceal his displeasure over Metternich’s manifestation of a humanitarian spirit. I now saw that Wangenheim had really represented the attitude of official Berlin, and I thus had confirmation, from the highest German authority, of my conviction that Germany had silently acquiesced in those deportations.