I asked the Minister of War to talk the matter over with Falkenhayn in his proposed interview, and report to me when he returned. In some way this conversation came to the ears of the new German Ambassador, Graf von Metternich, who immediately called to discuss the subject. He apparently wished to impress upon me two things: that Germany would never surrender Alsace-Lorraine and that she would insist on the return of all her colonies. I replied that it was apparently useless to discuss peace unless England first won some great military victory.
“That may be so,” replied the Graf, “but you can hardly expect that Germany shall let England win such a victory merely to put her in a frame of mind to consider peace. But I think that you are wrong. It is a mistake to say that Great Britain has not already won great victories. I think that she has several very substantial ones to her credit. Just consider what she has done. She has established her unquestioned supremacy of the seas and driven off all German commerce. She has not only not lost a foot of her own territory, but she has gained enormous new domains. She has annexed Cyprus and Egypt and has conquered all the German colonies. She is in possession of a considerable part of Mesopotamia. How absurd to say that England has gained nothing by the war!”
On December 1st Enver came to the American Embassy and reported the results of his interview with Falkenhayn. The German Chief-of-Staff had said that Germany would very much like to discuss peace, but that Germany could not state her terms in advance, as such an action would be generally interpreted as a sign of weakness. But one thing could be depended on: the Allies could obtain far more favourable terms at that moment than at any future time. Enver told me that the Germans would be willing to surrender all the territory they had taken from the French and practically all of Belgium. But the one thing on which they had definitely settled was the permanent dismemberment of Serbia. Not an acre of Macedonia would be returned to Serbia, and even parts of old Serbia would be retained; that is, Serbia would become a much smaller country than she had been before the Balkan Wars and, in fact, she would practically disappear as an independent State. The meaning of all this was apparent, even then. Germany had won the object for which she had really gone to war: a complete route from Berlin to Constantinople and the East. Part, and a good part, of the Pan-German “Mittel Europa” had thus become an accomplished military fact. Apparently Germany was willing to give up the overrun provinces of Northern France and Belgium, provided that the Entente would consent to her retention of these conquests. The proposal which Falkenhayn made then did not materially differ from that which he put forward in the latter part of 1918(?). This Enver-Falkenhayn interview, as reported to me, shows that it is no suddenly conceived German plan, but that it has been Germany’s scheme from the first.
In all this I saw no particular promise of an early peace. Yet I thought that I should lay these facts before the President. I therefore applied to Washington for a leave of absence, which was granted.
I had my farewell interview with Enver and Talaat on January 13th. Both men were in their most delightful mood. Evidently both were turning over in their minds, as was I, all the momentous events that had taken place in Turkey and in the world since my first meeting with them two years before. Then Talaat and Enver were merely desperate adventurers who had reached high position by assassination and intrigue. Their position was insecure, for at any moment another revolution might plunge them into the obscurity from which they had sprung. But now they were the unquestioned despots of the Ottoman Empire, the allies of the then strongest military power in the world, and the conquerors—at least, they so regarded themselves—of the British Navy. At this moment of their great triumph—the Allied expedition to the Dardanelles had evacuated their positions only two weeks before—both Talaat and Enver regarded their country again as a world power.
“I hear you are going home to spend a lot of money and re-elect your President,” said Talaat—this being a jocular reference to the fact that I was the Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Democratic National Committee. “That’s very foolish; why don’t you stay here and give it to Turkey? We need it more than your people do.
“But we hope you are coming back soon,” he added. “We feel almost as though you were one of us. You and we have really grown up together; you came here about the same time that we took office and we don’t know how we could ever get so well acquainted with another man. We have grown fond of you, too. We have had our differences, and pretty lively ones at times, but we have always found you fair, and we respect American policy in Turkey as you have represented it. We don’t like to see you go, even for a few months.”
I expressed my pleasure at these words.
“It’s very nice to hear you talk that way,” I answered. “Since you flatter me so much, I know that you will be willing to promise me certain things. Since I have you both here together, this is my chance to put you on record. Will you treat the people in my charge considerately, just the same as though I were here?”
“As to the American missionaries and colleges and schools,” said Talaat, and Enver assented, “we give you an absolute promise. They will not be molested in the slightest degree, but can go on doing their work just the same as before. Your mind can rest easily on that score.”